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ABSTRACT 
 “Radioactive Dixie: A History of Nuclear Power and Nuclear Waste in the 
American South, 1950-1990,” examines the political, social, cultural, economic, 
environmental, and technological dimensions of the nuclear industry in the American 
South. Today, the US South contains more nuclear reactors than any other region and 
much of the nation’s radioactive waste. In “Radioactive Dixie,” I argue that this regional 
distinction resulted from a decades-long effort by southern politicians, industry figures, 
and government officials to transform the American South into a nuclear-oriented region. 
Waving the atomic talisman, the nuclear industry served as one pivotal part in a larger 
project of regional modernization, which intended to transform the South’s economy and 
its identity. And yet, despite the promises of progress through nuclear things, the 
American South’s transformation into a new nuclear South met a surprising degree of 
resistance, prompting debates about energy, the environment, corporate and government 
accountability, and risk. While some historians have called for an end to southern history, 
“Radioactive Dixie” demonstrates the lasting relevance of regional frameworks, and why 
studying a region’s energy system informs national and global issues concerning energy 
and the environment. By studying the forces that shaped nuclear technology development 
in the South and uniting top-down perspectives with local experiences, this study 
illustrates the uneven, contested process of modernization in the region. “Radioactive 
Dixie” shifts the focus away from metropolitan areas to rural communities—to the people 
and the places near nuclear reactors that power sprawling, energy-hungry cities.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
All over Alabama, the Lamps are out.  
--James Agee, Let Us Now Praise Famous Men  
 
  
 The guards watched Darryl Malek-Wiley through binoculars on August 6, 1977. 
Standing in the searing Alabama heat, Wiley was the lone protestor in Dothan that day. 
The Catfish Alliance’s solitary representative in southern Alabama embraced their motto 
of “No Nuke’s Y’all” and put on his one man show. Standing across from Alabama 
Power & Light’s Farley nuclear plant, Wiley released one-hundred balloons into the air.  
The plant’s “beefed up security force” prepared for a storming of the gates that never 
occurred.1 Instead, as Wiley described decades later, the event amounted to “just me and 
this trailer full of balloons.”2 On the anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, 
Japan, anti-nuclear activists throughout the American South released colored balloons.3 
Activists affixed balloons with warnings about radiation and gathered outside of the 
region’s nuclear power plants. Through the balloon release, activists observed past
                                                
1 “Balloons Released in Nuclear Protest,” The Tuscaloosa News, August 7, 1977.  
 
2 Darryl Malek-Wiley, Interview by author, June 22, 2013 (recording in author’s 
possession).   
 
3 Ibid.  
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 horrors and protested an atomic powered future. This future seemed all too real in 1977. 
Across the region, nuclear power plants were under construction, with some already 
sending power to the grid. If advocates viewed nuclear reactors as a valuable source for 
employment and cheap, plentiful power, others saw an emerging tomb over the American 
South. Looking back, Wiley described the region’s anti-nuclear dissenters as “young, 
idealistic, and didn’t have a clue.”1 But in 1977, the atomic threat combined with a 
gnawing dread about a changing region. The South now had shopping malls, air 
conditioners, and shag carpet like everybody else, but these trappings rang hollow for 
some. The long-standing appeals to progress, modernity, and a “New South,” the century-
long call for regional redemption, suddenly appeared misguided and even a little sinister. 
The balloon spectacle in August 1977 meant more than a remembrance or a protest 
against an energy source then; the act was a battle cry in the fight over the modern 
South’s future.  
  “Radioactive Dixie: A History of Nuclear Power and Nuclear Waste in the 
American South, 1950-1990,” examines the political, social, cultural, economic, 
environmental, and technological dimensions of the nuclear industry in the American 
South. Today, the South contains more nuclear reactors than any other region and much 
of the nation’s radioactive waste. I argue that this regional distinction resulted from a 
decades-long effort by southern politicians, industry figures, universities, and government 
officials to transform the American South into a nuclear-oriented region. Waving the 
atomic talisman, the nuclear industry served as one pivotal part in a larger project of 
                                                
1 Darryl Malek-Wiley, Interview with author, June 22, 2013.  
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regional modernization. From this purview, bomb plants and nuclear reactors promised to 
expand the South’s economy and help refashion its identity.  
 Technology, however, cannot make history itself. As historian David Nye has 
explained, machines are not “like meteors,” that “arrive unbidden” and bring about 
“impacts.”2 Nuclear reactors and energy systems are shaped by a variety of forces—
human and non-human. Society, politics, culture, and the environment all play important 
roles in the creation, management and regulation, and interpretation of nuclear 
technology.3 The American South’s nuclear history matters not because reactors marched 
through the region wreaking havoc, but rather because, as David Nye put it, energy 
systems are “the outcomes of complex negotiations between ordinary people in the 
past.”4  
 Despite the promise of progress, the calls for a new, nuclear South met a 
surprising degree of resistance from citizens. Modern environmentalism and the energy 
crisis created ripples across the globe, and in the South, these trends combined with a 
growing sense of unease about the region’s embrace of “nuclear things” and its 
                                                
 2 David E. Nye, Consuming Power: A Social History of American Energies (Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 1998); James C. Williams, “Understanding the Place of Humans in 
Nature,” in Stephen H. Cutcliffe and Martin Reuss, eds., The Illusory Boundary: 
Environment and Technology in History (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 
2010), 20-21;Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas Parke Hughes, and T. J Pinch. The Social 
Construction of Technological Systems New Directions in the Sociology and History of 
Technology. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987. 
3 Nye. 5.  
 
4 Nye, Consuming Power, 11.  
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adjustment to larger transformations.5 From the 1960s to 1980s, as utilities built more 
nuclear plants and industry buried more radioactive waste in the South, debates about 
energy and the environment became headline news, letters poured into the offices of 
elected officials, and South Carolina’s nuclear waste dump even elicited a mention on 
Saturday Night Live. A new class of moderate southern governors, including Jimmy 
Carter and Bill Clinton, broke rank from their predecessors and challenged the pro-
nuclear agenda from decades past. While the accident at Pennsylvania’s Three Mile 
Island in 1979 is generally portrayed as the defining moment in the history of commercial 
nuclear power in the United States, in the American South, it shared the spotlight with the 
Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant, Grand Gulf Unit 1, and the Clinch River Breeder Reactor.  
 And yet, in recent years, historians have emphasized the “naturalization” of 
energy production, where power systems merge with landscapes in our mind.6 Electricity 
comes from some unknown distant place, travels through the grid, and delivers a reliable 
product. Historians Richard Hirsh and Benjamin Sovacool have argued that electrical 
infrastructures “have essentially become invisible.”7 Only when infrastructures fail do 
                                                
5 Hecht, “The Power of Nuclear Things,” Technology and Culture 51, No. 1 (January 
2010): 1-30.  
 
6 Richard F. Hirsh and Benjamin Sovacool, “Wind Turbines and Invisible Technology:  
Unarticulated Reasons for Local Opposition to Technology,” Technology and Culture 54, 
No. 4 (October 2013), 705-734.  David Nye, Consuming Power, 7-8; James C. Williams, 
“Understanding the Place of Humans in Nature.”  
7 Richard F. Hirsh and Benjamin Sovacool, “Wind Turbines and Invisible Technology:  
Unarticulated Reasons for Local Opposition to Technology,” Technology and Culture 54, 
No. 4 (October 2013), 719.  
  5 
these systems take on heightened visibility.8 But as Paul Edwards notes, “mature 
technological systems,” like energy grids rarely have major hiccups, and in general, this 
encourages a kind of mental distance between power sources and power usage.9 While 
this conceptualization might reflect contemporary attitudes, the past suggests a markedly 
different scenario. Hirsh and Sovacool have characterized more recent opposition to wind 
turbines as “unarticulated,” but history can offer rich and vivid articulations of popular 
attitudes about energy systems. “Radioactive Dixie” demonstrates that even 
southerners—not typically known for their engagement in such topics—engaged deeply 
in energy issues during the 1970s and 1980s. In fact, the energy crisis and nuclear power 
controversies produced a torrent of constituent correspondence and grassroots activism, 
dispelling any notion that energy systems in modern America have served as mere 
backdrops.  
 Studying the history of nuclear power and radioactive waste illustrates the ways in 
which energy infrastructure, and the disposal systems required by it, were hyper-visible 
for a period of time. In the American South, the massive nuclear building spree and a 
booming radioactive waste business, highlighted dilemmas about energy and the 
environment, but also provoked bigger conversations about democracy, risk, 
accountability, poverty, and power. Whether startled by rising electric bills or by the 
cooling tower next door, for a time, people in the South grappled with questions about 
energy, technology, and the environment. Undoubtedly, the risks surrounding nuclear 
                                                
8 Paul N. Edwards,  “Infrastructure and Modernity: Force, Time, and Social Organization 
in the History of Sociotechnical Systems,” in Thomas J. Misa, Philip Brey, and Andrew 
Feenberg, eds., Modernity and Technology (MIT Press, 2004).  
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power encouraged widespread fear and skepticism about its safety, far more pronounced 
during the industry’s infancy than now.10 But as this study shows, interpretations of the 
region’s nuclear industry were also grounded in southern history and in local history. The 
South’s nuclear controversies do share commonalities with other places—whether in 
California, France, or Russia, but they are arguably more meaningful when situated in 
local and regional contexts. 
 While some historians have called for an end to southern history, “Radioactive 
Dixie” demonstrates the lasting relevance of regional frameworks.11 At the very least, the 
justification for a regional framework comes from historical actors themselves. 
Politicians, industry figures, and southern universities coordinated their efforts to obtain 
funding from the Atomic Energy Commission and laid the groundwork for the nuclear 
building spree that occurred in the 1970s. Those people and their institutions, as I 
demonstrate, viewed this project as a regional one, which promised to give the American 
South equality with other places, if not supremacy in certain areas. A favorable 
environment, with plentiful water and sparsely populated land, gave southern utility 
companies few initial barriers to constructing nuclear plants. In the 1950s, southern states 
banded together to attract industry but also to rewrite radiation regulatory laws in order to 
                                                
10 The decrease in heightened fears may be attributable to the “technological momentum” 
achieved after decades of operation and broad similarities between reactors (although 
variation exists). See Thomas P. Hughes, “Technological Momentum,” in Merritt Roe 
Smith and Leo Marx, eds. Does Technology Drive History?: The Dilemma of 
Technological Determinism (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1994), 101-114; Hughes, 
Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930 (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1983), 140-174.  
11 Matthew D. Lassiter, and Joseph Crespino, “The End of Southern History,” in Matthew 
Lassiter and Joseph Crespino, eds., The Myth of Southern Exceptionalism (Oxford 
University Press, 2010).  
  7 
preserve “atomic rights.”12 By the late 1970s, however, the southern president and 
nuclear expert, Jimmy Carter, devoted much of his presidency to stopping two nuclear 
projects in the South. Carter, along with governors Richard Riley (South Carolina), 
William Winter (Mississippi), and Bill Clinton (Arkansas), capitalized on the anti-nuclear 
moment, and called for more thoughtful and equitable approaches to nuclear power, 
radioactive waste disposal, and energy generally. Other formidable forces, such as 
Senator Ernest Hollings (South Carolina) and Senator Howard Baker (Tennessee), 
remained intractable in their devotion to nuclear projects, and as a result, the bitter 
contests over atomic issues gave opponents small victories, and the South ultimately 
found itself nuclear powered.   
 By studying the forces that shaped nuclear technology development in the South 
and uniting top-down perspectives with local experiences, this dissertation highlights the 
uneven, contested process of modernization. Histories of the American South after World 
War II focus predominantly on metropolitan areas, obscuring and distorting larger 
narratives of transformation and change. “Radioactive Dixie” shifts the focus away from 
urban and suburban areas to rural communities—to the people and the places near 
nuclear reactors that produced the power for sprawling, energy-hungry cities.  To some 
extent, studying nuclear power offers a way to show the interactions between these 
places. Power lines connected the rural to the region’s growing metropolitan areas, but 
the controversies over nuclear power also demonstrate how large-scale, high-risk 
                                                
12 “Atomic Rights are Stressed: States Advised to Take Action,” Lexington-Herald, June 
12, 1968.  
  8 
technology systems disperse power in very specific ways.13 Risk assessment, rate setting, 
and siting decisions necessitate certain value judgments about whose lives and whose 
environments are “worth” more.  
Living in a radiation plume exposure pathway reinforces a kind of hierarchy 
between the places that supply power and the people that use it. As Langdon Winner 
provocatively argued in 1980, “the things we call ‘technologies’ are ways of building 
order in our world.”14 In tandem, Winner surmised that certain technologies, such as 
nuclear power, might entail an “ongoing social process in which scientific knowledge, 
technological invention, and corporate profit reinforce each other in deeply entrenched 
patterns that bear the unmistakable stamp of political and economic power.”15 If artifacts 
do “have” politics, as Winner suggests, this is not to say that technologies themselves 
build order.16 Rather, the systems humans develop for assessing where to build reactors, 
how to regulate them, and who pays for them, reflect particular arrangements of power. 
In the American South, nuclear power plants and radioactive waste disposal bore “the 
unmistakable stamp of political and economic power,” as Winner put it.  
                                                
13 This does not suggest technologies act autonomously and disperse power, but rather the 
systems devised to distribute power, to manage technology, to regulate its risks, and 
calculate its benefits and downsides, offer types of order, or at least, reflect society and 
culture.  
 
14 Langdon Winner, “Do Artifacts Have Politics?” Daedalus 109, No. 1 (Winter, 1980): 
127.  
15 Winner, 126-127.  
16 Winner’s views have been characterized as technological determinism, however, his 
ideas about power and ordering remain relevant, as long as a simple causal explanations 
are avoided. See Merritt Roe Smith, “Technological Determinism in American Culture,” 
Does Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism, 2-35.  
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 “Radioactive Dixie” contributes to several fields of scholarship. First, this study 
adds to twentieth century southern history, specifically the post-World War II era.  
Recent trends in this field have emphasized suburban political conservatism, Wal-Mart 
populism, the Civil Rights Movement and its aftermath, and the re-consideration of 
southern history in new frameworks: national, global, and Cold War. Fundamentally, this 
dissertation challenges prevailing trends in southern history by reorienting our focus to 
the region’s rural communities. As of late, historians have become enamored with a type 
of American South, one characterized by affluence, conservatism, and evangelical 
Christianity.17 By disproportionately focusing on the “Americanization of Dixie,” and 
casting aside southern exceptionalism, the place of rural communities, the presence of 
poverty, and the new types of inequity created by technological and environmental 
                                                
 17 Matthew D. Lassiter and Kevin M. Kruse, “The Bulldozer: Suburbs and Southern 
History Since World War II,” Journal of Southern History 75, No. 3 (August 2009): 691-
706. Since its publication, the focus on suburban spaces, conservatism, and an 
Americanized or even globalized region has increased. For a few examples, see Joseph 
Crespino, In Search of Another Country: Mississippi and the Conservative 
Counterrevolution (Princeton University Press, 2007); Kevin Kruse, White Flight: 
Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism (Princeton University Press, 2005); 
Matthew D. Lassiter, The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South 
(Princeton University Press, 2013); Michelle Nickerson and Darren Dochuk. Sunbelt 
Rising: The Politics of Space, Place, and Region (University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2013). Bethany Moreton’s recent work considers Walmart’s brand of Christian free 
enterprise, along with the rural and working class populations it has historically appealed 
to and employs in its stores. See Moreton, To Serve God and Wal-Mart: The Making of 
Christian Free Enterprise (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2009).  
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choices, has become obscured. Studying nuclear power and radioactive waste helps 
illustrate how the modern American South became defined by certain geographies of 
power and risk.    
 Although this study emphasizes cultural attitudes about the environment more 
than providing a detailed history of environmental change, “Radioactive Dixie” adds to 
the growing field of southern environmental history and the proliferating field of the 
history of technology. Environmental histories of the American South have largely 
focused on periods prior to 1945, with a few notable exceptions. Recent works include 
studies of Georgia peach farming, PCB pollution in Alabama, the fire ant war, pesticides 
in southern agriculture, and Gulf Coast environments.18 In the realm of energy and 
                                                
18 Barbara L. Allen, Uneasy Alchemy: Citizens and Experts in Louisiana’s Chemical 
Corridor Disputes (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 2003); Joshua Blu Buhs, The Fire 
Ant Wars: Nature, Science, and Public Policy in Twentieth-Century America (University 
of Chicago Press, 2004). Robert D. Bullard, Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class, and 
Environmental Quality. 3rd ed. (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 2000); Craig E. Colten, 
ed. Transforming New Orleans and Its Environs: Centuries of Change (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000); Craig E. Colten, Perilous Place, Powerful Storms: 
Hurricane Protection In Coastal Louisiana. (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 
2009) Pete Daniel, Toxic Drift: Pesticides and Health in the Post--World War II South 
(Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 2007); Robert W. Hastings, The Lakes of Pontchartrain: Their 
History and Environments (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2009); Christopher 
J. Manganiello, Southern Water, Southern Power: How the Politics of Cheap Energy and 
Water Scarcity Shaped a Region (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 
2015); Martin V. Melosi and Joseph A. Pratt, eds. Energy Metropolis: An Environmental 
History of Houston and the Gulf Coast (Pittsburgh, Pa: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
2007); Christopher Morris, "A More Southern Environmental History," The Journal of 
Southern History 75, no. 3 (August 2009): 581–598; Christopher Morris, The Big Muddy: 
An Environmental History of the Mississippi and Its Peoples, from Hernando de Soto to 
Hurricane Katrina (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Tom Okie, “Under the 
Trees: The Georgia Peach and the Quest for Labor in the Twentieth Century,” 
Agricultural History 85, No. 1 (Winter 2011), 72-101; Ellen Griffith Spears Baptized in 
PCBs Race, Pollution, and Justice in an All-American Town (Chapel Hill: The University 
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atomic projects, scholars have produced substantial work on the Savannah River Site, 
atomic testing in Mississippi, and the relationship between energy and the environment in 
south Texas and southern Louisiana.19 “Radioactive Dixie” builds upon these 
contributions, and more fundamentally, positions itself within a longer thread of southern 
political and cultural history.20 Inevitably, the histories presented here also offer insight 
into the broader field of American political history.  
                                                                                                                                            
of North Carolina Press, 2014) Theodore Steinberg, Acts of God: The Unnatural History 
of Natural Disaster in America. 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); 
Jeffrey K. Stine, Mixing the Waters: Environment, Politics, and the Building of the 
Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway. 1st ed. (Akron, Ohio: University of Akron Press, 
1993); Paul Sutter and Christopher J. Manganiello, eds. Environmental History and the 
American South: A Reader (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2009).  
19 David Allen Burke, Atomic Testing in Mississippi Project Dribble and the Quest for 
Nuclear Weapons Treaty Verification in the Cold War Era (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 2012); Kari A. Frederickson, Cold War Dixie: Militarization and 
Modernization in the American South (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 2013); 
Martin V. Melosi and Joseph A. Pratt, eds. Energy Metropolis: An Environmental History 
of Houston and the Gulf Coast (Pittsburgh, Pa: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007); 
Jason P. Theriot, American Energy, Imperiled Coast: Oil and Gas Development in 
Louisiana’s Wetlands. The Natural World of the Gulf South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 2014);  
 20 For a very brief selection, see Numan V. Bartley, The New South, 1945-1980 (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995); Jack Bass, The Transformation of 
Southern Politics: Social Change and Political Consequences since 1945 (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 1995); James C. Cobb, Away down South: A History of 
Southern Identity (Oxford  ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Cobb, 
Industrialization and Southern Society, 1877-1984 (Lexington, KY: University Press of 
Kentucky, 1984); Cobb, The Selling of the South: The Southern Crusade for Industrial 
Development 1936-1990. 2nd ed. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993); Karen L. 
Cox, Dreaming of Dixie: How the South Was Created in American Popular Culture 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011); R. Douglas Hurt, ed. The Rural 
South since World War II (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1998); Jack 
Temple Kirby, Rural Worlds Lost: The American South, 1920-1960 (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1987); Bruce J. Schulman, From Cotton Belt to 
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While “Radioactive Dixie” might frustrate those looking for a more technically-
oriented study, it nonetheless addresses a tendency by historians of technology to 
overlook the American South and rural places. For historians of technology and energy, 
this can hopefully offer ways to understand how southern politics, culture, and society 
shaped the development of the region’s nuclear industry, and how the local case studies 
intersect with a broader national and global story about nuclear power and radioactive 
waste. 21 The larger themes about risk, energy, and environment can inform the field 
more generally.  
                                                                                                                                            
Sunbelt: Federal Policy, Economic Development, and the Transformation of the South, 
1938-1980 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994).  
21 Richard F. Hirsh, Power Loss: The Origins of Deregulation and Restructuring in the 
American Electric Utility System (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1999); Technology and 
Transformation in the American Electric Utility Industry (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989); Thomas Parke Hughes. American Genesis: A Century of 
Invention and Technological Enthusiasm, 1870-1970 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2004), Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930. 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983); Christopher F. Jones, Routes of 
Power: Energy and Modern America (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 2014); Robert D. Lifset, Power on the Hudson: Storm King Mountain and the 
Emergence of Modern American Environmentalism (Baltimore, Maryland: Project Muse, 
2014); George T. Mazuzan and J. Samuel Walker, Controlling the Atom: The Beginnings 
of Nuclear Regulation, 1946-1962 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); 
Andrew Needham, Power Lines: Phoenix and the Making of the Modern Southwest 
(Princeton, New Jersey  ; Oxford, England: Princeton University Press, 2014); David E. 
Nye, American Technological Sublime (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1994), Consuming 
Power: A Social History of American Energies (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998); 
Electrifying America: Social Meanings of a New Technology, 1880-1940 (Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 1992); Robert Pool, Beyond Engineering: How Society Shapes 
Technology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); James C. Williams, Energy and 
the Making of Modern California (University of Akron Press, 1997); J. Samuel Walker, 
Containing the Atom: Nuclear Regulation in a Changing Environment, 1963-1971 
(University of California Press, 1992). For a sampling of nuclear-related history, see 
works by Kate Brown, Plutopia: Nuclear Families, Atomic Cities, and the Great Soviet 
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 In chapter one, “Visions of a Nuclear South,” I analyze the political and cultural 
meanings of atomic energy in the region during the 1950s and 1960s, why nuclear power 
served as a powerful symbol for the South’s future, and how southern politicians 
refashioned “New South” rhetoric to sell their new, nuclear South. The chapter explores 
the coordinated effort among politicians, industry figures, federal officials, and southern 
universities to obtain subsidies from the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and to 
develop the commercial nuclear industry in the region. Leading the wave of interest, 
southern universities created nuclear engineering programs and sought funding from the 
AEC for experimental nuclear reactors. To attract industry, southern states and a special 
interest group, the Southern Interstate Nuclear Board, helped formulate legal agreements 
between the AEC and states for certain regulatory powers. These mechanisms preserved 
the “atomic rights” of southern states, while also providing an example of a cordial 
relationship between the federal government and the South. “Visions of a Nuclear South” 
traces the history of the region’s first nuclear plants and examines the forces that finally 
galvanized southern utilities to invest in nuclear power.  
 Chapters two and three explore the history of two nuclear power plants along the 
Mississippi River. “The Kudzu and The Reactor: Nuclear Power on the Mississippi 
                                                                                                                                            
and American Plutonium Disasters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Jacob 
Darwin Hamblin, Poison in the Well: Radioactive Waste in the Oceans at the Dawn of 
the Nuclear Age (New Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers University Press, 2008); Gabrielle Hecht, 
The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II 
(Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1998); Paul R. Josephson, Red Atom: Russia’s Nuclear 
Power Program from Stalin to Today (New York: W.H. Freeman, 2000); Sara B. 
Pritchard, Confluence: The Nature of Technology and the Remaking Of the Rhône 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011).  
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River” analyzes the Grand Gulf nuclear plant in Mississippi, and “The Louisiana Way 
and the Reactor: Nuclear Power on the Mississippi River” examines the Waterford plant 
upriver from New Orleans. Both plants share a common owner, the utility conglomerate 
Entergy, and a common waterway, the Mississippi River, adjacent to both sites. Using 
Langdon Winner’s provocation about whether “technical artifacts have political 
qualities,” and why large-scale, high-risk projects offer ways of “building order in this 
world,” these chapters argue that the histories of Grand Gulf and Waterford are 
emblematic of the New South’s muddled legacy, where the declarations of modernity, 
progress, and economic opportunity rarely ignited the kinds of economic transformation 
promised in the communities most directly affected by nuclear power. Like first iteration 
of the “New South” in the late-Nineteenth Century, the corruption and political 
opportunism rife within Louisiana and Mississippi in the late-Twentieth Century shaped 
the development of both projects—down to the very concrete laid for the foundation.  
 In “The Kudzu and The Reactor,” I contextualize the story of Grand Gulf Unit 1 
in the history of the community where it sits, detailing the interplay between the local 
history and the meanings attached to the nuclear plant. The chapter then examines Grand 
Gulf’s controversial history, where the plant triggered a major debate, led by Bill Clinton, 
about corporate power, utility rates, and poverty that extended into multiple states. 
Emphasizing the particular arrangements of power certain energy systems encourage, the 
chapter also traces the battle over Grand Gulf’s tax revenues and why Mississippi’s past 
remained ever present even as it adopted modern technology.  
 In chapter three, “The Louisiana Way and The Reactor,” I examine the history of 
Waterford 3, a nuclear power plant located twenty-miles away from New Orleans. 
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Located in St. Charles Parish, the Waterford unit sits upon a former sugar cane plantation 
now surrounded by pyro-chemical industry and oil refineries. Waterford’s construction 
further highlighted the sense that southern Louisiana’s willingness to attract any and all 
industry carried potentially deadly consequences. Waterford embodies the formation of 
Louisiana’s new “technological disaster subculture,” where older threats from nature 
combined with newer threats from engineering.22 The public’s fears were well-founded. 
Long accustomed to the “Louisiana way,” LP&L’s management of Waterford’s 
construction proved deeply flawed, forcing a more stringent Nuclear Regulatory 
Committee (NRC) after Three Mile Island in 1979 to launch a major investigation into 
the plant’s safety.  
 In chapter four, “The Nuclear Burden of Southern History,” examines the history 
of a low-level radioactive waste facility in Barnwell, South Carolina. In the late 1970s, 
the Barnwell site received nearly eighty-five percent of the nation’s nuclear waste, 
exposing the inequitable and the unresolved manner in which the United States dealt with 
the by-products of the nuclear industry.  Even as contemporary observers pronounced the 
“Americanization of Dixie,” and bemoaned disappearance of regional and local 
distinctions, anti-nuclear activists located a new form of regional identity through 
environmental inequity. The activists railed against the South’s “disproportionate burden” 
produced by a broken system of waste disposal. While many in South Carolina deplored 
their state’s role as the “nation’s trash can,” the people of Barnwell rallied in support of 
the local nuclear waste facility. This chapter analyzes why Barnwellians defended what 
                                                
22 “Evacuation Behavior: Case Study of the Taft, Louisiana Chemical Tank Explosion 
Incident,” Report for FEMA, May 1983, Disaster Research Center, Ohio State 
University, 17, F: WSES – Emer. Response, Box 2, Department of Justice, Matter of 
Louisiana Power & Light, Co. 1971-1984, Accession Number: P1991-137.   
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most communities scorned, storing over twenty-seven million cubic feet of radioactive 
waste. Finally, this chapter proposes that the South’s new burden looms in its future, not 
in its past.    
 Chapter five, “Jimmy Carter and the Trouble with Expertise,” sets Jimmy Carter’s 
nuclear and energy policy in the context of the battles over the Clinch-River Breeder 
Reactor (CRBR) and the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (BNFP), two highly lucrative 
nuclear projects in the South. In terms of political consequences, the fate of BNFP and 
CRBR proved far more meaningful for shaping Carter’s presidency than the accident at 
Three Mile Island. The chapter first analyzes a pivotal moment in Carter’s energy policy 
in 1979 and then details his fight over CRBR and BNFP. I argue that Carter’s propensity 
to master complex policy issues, and fashion himself as an energy expert and 
environmental steward, trapped him in a delicate political climate. While Carter touted 
his own expertise, his public criticisms of “red tape” and bureaucracy laid the 
groundwork for the anti-regulatory and anti-expert mood during Ronald Reagan’s 
presidency. Through his stubborn battles over Clinch River and Barnwell Nuclear Fuel 
Plant, Carter, the native Southerner and “high-tech” President, challenged nearly three 
decades of regional nuclear optimism by wielding his nuclear expertise.  
 Chapter six, “The Mind of the Nuclear South,” analyzes the anti-nuclear rebellion 
that emerged in the South in the 1970s and extended into the 1980s. This chapter places 
their critique of the nuclear industry within a long line of thinking about the region’s path 
to modernity. As heirs to a tradition of “regional self-scrutiny,” these dissenters organized 
a network of anti-nuclear groups across the region and helped shape a “mind” of the 
nuclear South, one fractured by their critiques but still “progress-haunted,” as writer W.J. 
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Cash claimed decades earlier. The chapter analyzes the apocalyptic imagery and language 
activists employed, considering its significance in southern history. Southern anti-nuclear 
activists drew upon regional history, environmental discourse, and fears about out-of-
control science and technology. In response to their critics, activists sought diverse 
coalitions and whistle-blowers, which reflected a larger cultural turn towards 
romanticizing the working-class, and intended to refute claims that activists only 
represented a fringe group. Using the jeremiad form, the region’s anti-nuclear rebels 
issued dire warnings about a nuclear-powered future and advocated salvation in the form 
of decentralized, alternative power.  
 Chapter seven, “Nuclear Ghosts: Relics of the Tennessee Valley Authority’s 
Nuclear Program,” examines the TVA’s nuclear program, specifically an abandoned 
nuclear site in rural Hartsville, Tennessee. Locals mock the partially-constructed cooling 
tower as a “used beer can.”23 This chapter contextualizes that empty, four hundred 
million dollar concrete shell within the history of TVA’s controversial nuclear program 
and the longer arc of regional modernization. It traces the interactions between the 
Hartsville community and the TVA, how the agency assessed land values and local 
history, and why TVA’s image as a benevolent force in the Tennessee Valley soured 
further in the 1970s. “Nuclear Ghosts,” like many of the chapters before it, brings readers 
to the rural South that persisted even after many other “rural worlds” were lost.24 The 
chapter explores how nuclear power systems encouraged certain ways of valuing 
                                                
23 Local resident and former nuclear activist Faith Young shared this with me during a 
visit to Hartsville in January 2015.  
 
24 Jack Temple Kirby, Rural Worlds Lost: The American South, 1920-1960 (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1987).  
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environments and communities, and why it reinforced a type of built order between rural 
and metropolitan places. 
 To be sure, “Radioactive Dixie” is by no means a comprehensive history of every 
nuclear power plant or every nuclear controversy in the American South. When C. Vann 
Woodward reflected upon his career-defining work, Origins of the New South, he 
expressed his relief upon seeing the definite article—“the”—dropped from the title.25 
Choosing the definite article, “a,” for this study suggests a more limited framework, one 
that chooses snap-shots of nuclear controversies instead. Likewise, the nuclear engineers 
behind the scenes figure little into this study. While their stories are important, those 
perspectives are for future historians to uncover. This history, generally speaking, 
emphasizes what happened outside the reactors rather than inside them and is driven by 
the question about how technology is “an extension of human lives.”26  
 When Henry Waring Ball of Greenville, Mississippi, stood before electric light 
one evening in 1895, he found himself moved by its splendor, or what David Nye has 
called “the technological sublime.”27 He reckoned that fellow pedestrians must have 
“taken him for an idiot,” for the light was “so beautiful,” that he found himself transfixed 
by the sight.28 Southerners of a different era found themselves transfixed by the sight of 
cooling towers several hundred feet tall, rising out from kudzu-covered river gullies and 
                                                
25 Looking Back, 60.  
 
26 David Nye, Electrifying America: Social Meanings of a New Technology (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1990), ix,  
 
27 David E. Nye, American Technological Sublime (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1994).  
28 Edward L. Ayers, The Promise of the New South: Life After Reconstruction,  15th 
Anniversary Edition (Oxford University Press, 2007), 73.  
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the rolling Tennessee hills. Few, if any, described them as beautiful or magical. What an 
atomic powered future portended for the region remained unclear, and southerners 
wrestled with the full constellation of meaning attached to nuclear power. The conflicts 
between another New South and preserving an older South collided as reactors were built 
and nuclear waste was buried, and those collisions comprise the core of “Radioactive 
Dixie.” 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
VISIONS OF A NUCLEAR SOUTH AND ANOTHER “NEW SOUTH” 
 
The South today is a marvelous mixture of romance and 
business, history and hurry, magnolias and steel mills, 
azaleas and acrilan, heaven and hell-bombs.1 
--William T. Polk, 1953 
 
 In a 1952 article entitled “Dixie is Jumping,” the author J.L. Rhodes observed that 
“atomic energy is one of the biggest things in Dixie at the present time.”2 The 
construction of Oak Ridge National Laboratory in 1943 and the Savannah River Plant in 
1951 marked the beginning of the American South’s nuclear history—a history 
envisioned by some as “regional salvation,” and in subsequent decades, as regional 
annihilation.3 Southern politicians and business leaders evangelized the atom’s grand 
possibilities, incorporating atomic energy into their vision of economic development after 
World War II. Perhaps the finest exposition of this early nuclear dream came from the 
                                                
1 William T. Polk, Southern Accent: From Uncle Remus to Oak Ridge (New York: 
William Morrow and Company 1953), 25.  
2 J.L. Rhodes, “Dixie is Jumping,” American Federationist 59, No. 2, February 1952, 22, 
29. 
3 Gabrielle Hecht uses this phrase to discuss two “nuclear regions” in France., see  
The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II 
(Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1998), 7.  
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governor of Florida, LeRoy Collins, in a 1956 speech given fittingly in Atlanta, the long-
standing beacon of New South optimism. 
 Drawing upon New South booster Henry Grady’s story of the rural funeral held in 
Georgia following the Civil War, where nothing but the corpse and the hole in the ground	  
were native, Collins peered into the region’s future and predicted that if the South did not 
embrace nuclear power quickly, a similar fate would befall them:  
 I suppose a nuclear counterpart of Grady’s tale of desolation would be a situation 
 in which the South dug its valuable uranium and thorium deposits and shipped 
 them off to Ohio for refining, while Illinois processed the material into fuel 
 elements for use in California reactors. Then the ‘waste,’ the radioactive fission 
 products, would perhaps be returned here for burial in the swamps of Florida. 
 Could this be our role in nuclear energy 20 years from now? We must face the 
 fact that it is not impossible. Be we southerners must not let it happen.1  
  
 Atomic energy presented a chance for “economic emancipation” and an 
opportunity to become a “true equalizer between the North and South.” Collins called 
upon southerners to “bring the atom to the South” in a joint, interstate fashion.2  In the 
same year the Southern Manifesto was issued, which upheld states’ rights and white 
supremacy in the fight against civil rights progress, Governor Collins seemingly offered a 
path to regional redemption, one without the endless complications of dismantling Jim 
Crow segregation, the bedrock of Southern society.  While the South’s system of white 
                                                
1 Role of Atomic Energy in the South, Southern Regional Education Board, 
Recommendations of the Work Conference on Nuclear Energy, St. Petersburg, Florida, 
August 1-4, 1956.  
2 Role of Atomic Energy in the South, Southern Regional Education Board, 
Recommendations of the Work Conference on Nuclear Energy, St. Petersburg, Florida, 
August 1-4, 1956.  
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supremacy increasingly appeared archaic and out-of-step with modern America, the atom 
symbolized modernity, progress, and a future of endless promise and economic  
opportunity.3  In the 1950s, southern politicians, the nuclear industry, the Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC), and the region’s universities envisioned a new, nuclear South. Built 
upon a foundation of nuclear weapons production, which escalated as the Cold War 
heated up, southerners embraced atomic energy for many reasons. The expanding nuclear 
industry presented economic opportunity, the possibility to enhance the reputation and 
bolster the resources of southern universities, and to refashion the region’s identity. Early 
successes occurred in the region’s higher education system, as universities pursued 
funding from the AEC for nuclear engineering programs and other sciences. Only in the 
late 1960s, as utilities across the country became convinced about the commercial 
viability of nuclear power, did southern power companies embark upon a major effort to 
build nuclear power plants. Throughout the South, nuclear reactor projects were licensed 
and many were built. Despite the nuclear industry’s descriptions of the South as a 
“nuclear region” today, that fate appeared far less certain in the late 1970s, when the 
                                                
3 On regional identity in the twentieth century, see esp., Numan V. Bartley, The New 
South, 1945-1980 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995), 151-260; 
James C. Cobb, Away down South: A History of Southern Identity (Oxford  ; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 185-211; Karen L. Cox, Dreaming of Dixie: How the 
South Was Created in American Popular Culture (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2011); Jack Temple Kirby, Media-Made Dixie: The South in the 
American Imagination (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986); Angie Maxwell, The 
Indicted South: Public Criticism, Southern Inferiority, and the Politics of Whiteness 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014); Neil R. McMillen ed. Remaking 
Dixie: The Impact of World War II on the American South (Jackson: University Press of 
Mississippi, 1997); John Shelton Reed, The Enduring South: Subcultural Persistence in 
Mass Society (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1974).  
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entire industry experienced an array of obstacles. Until then, however, the region’s 
nuclear proponents celebrated an atomic-powered future.  
 Promoters of atomic energy in the American South came from a closely related 
network of elected officials, state agencies devoted to promoting atomic energy, the 
Atomic Energy Commission, defense installations, southern universities, and an 
emerging nuclear industry. While this trend largely materialized after World War II, the 
advocacy for nuclear power fits within a longer thread in southern history, beginning with 
the late nineteenth century efforts of southern boosters who sought industrialization, 
development, and modernization. In the post WWII period, those efforts accelerated as 
federal funds poured into defense and research-oriented projects.4 Atomic energy 
promised an extension of those lucrative contracts and potentially private industry as 
well. Southerners also saw atomic energy as a political and cultural tool.5 Anthropologist 
                                                
 4 Numan V. Bartley, The New South, 1945-1980; James C. Cobb, Industrialization and 
Southern Society, 1877-1984 (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1984); The 
Selling of the South: The Southern Crusade for Industrial Development 1936-1990. 2nd 
ed. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993); Kari Frederickson, Cold War Dixie  
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2013); Bruce J. Schulman, From Cotton Belt to 
Sunbelt: Federal Policy, Economic Development, and the Transformation of the South, 
1938-1980 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994).  
5 On technological enthusiasm in American history, see David E. Nye, American 
Technological Sublime (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1994). For atomic enthusiasm, see 
Steven L. Del Sesto, “Wasn’t the Future of Nuclear Engineering Wonderful?” in Joseph 
J. Corn, ed., Imagining Tomorrow: History, Technology, and the American Future 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986). For cultural and social meanings of electricity in 
American history, see David E. Nye, Electrifying America: Social Meanings of a New 
Technology, 1880-1940 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992).  On technology and social 
progress, see Steven L. Goldman, Science, Technology, and Social Progress (Lehigh 
University Press, 1989).  
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Joseph Masco has argued that nuclear weapons engendered a banalization of mass death 
and nuclear ruination in the United States, which constituted a powerful form of  
“radioactive nation-building.”6 The advocacy of nuclear development in the American 
South constituted a type of radioactive region-building, to borrow Masco’s phrase. 
Radioactive region-building took on heightened importance as the South’s de jure 
segregation faced increasing scrutiny in the 1950s. Similarly, the regional turn towards 
nuclear power occupied an important place in a broader history of energy and technology 
in the South driven by the project of modernization fueled by cheap electricity.7 Electrical 
systems are not a  “thing” separate from society and culture, nor do they merely have 
                                                
6 Joseph Masco The Nuclear Borderlands: The Manhattan Project in Post-Cold War New 
Mexico (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2006), 25.  
 7 For literature that discusses the relationship between energy, electricity, and 
modernization in the South, see: Raymond Arsenault, "The End of the Long Hot 
Summer; The Air Conditioner and Southern Culture," Journal of Southern History 50 
(November 1984), 597-628. Edward L. Ayers, The Promise of the New South: Life After 
Reconstruction - 15th Anniversary Edition (Oxford University Press, 2007), 72-74. 
Christopher J. Manganiello, Southern Water, Southern Power: How the Politics of Cheap 
Energy and Water Scarcity Shaped a Region (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2015); “Hitching the New South to ‘White Coal’: Water and Power, 
1890-1933.” Journal of Southern History,  no. 2 (May 2012): 255-292; David Nye, 
Electrifying America: Social Meanings of a New Technology, 1880-1940 (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1990), 307-335; George Brown Tindall, The Emergence of the New South, 
1913-1945. A History of the South, v. 10 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1967), 71-75; J. Samuel. Walker, “The South and Nuclear Energy, 1954-62. ” 
Prologue 13 (Fall 1981): 175-91. On the history of regional power systems and how 
society and culture shape our energy systems, see Thomas P. Hughes, Networks of 
Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 
1983).  
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“impact.” Rather, “social contexts” shape our energy systems, and the South’s position in 
the 1950s encouraged atomic advocacy.8 
 In the United States, commercial nuclear power plants rely upon two basic 
designs. Only boiling-water reactors (BWR) or pressurized water reactors (PWR) are 
used for commercial purposes in the US, and because of this, a commercial nuclear plant 
in Illinois broadly resembles one in Alabama, with differences occurring in 
manufacturers used for parts, design modifications according to the utility or 
environment, quality of management, operation, and structural integrity. Nonetheless, 
nuclear power plants in the American South are more than technological artifacts; as 
Gabrielle Hecht has shown, nuclear reactors are artifacts that possess a “social, political, 
and culture life,” which interact with the world around them.9 For pro-nuclear advocates, 
nuclear power offered material advantages but also presented symbolic purposes. Nuclear 
boosters incorporated atomic energy into their “New South” rhetoric, harnessing the 
symbolic values of atomic energy, in addition to advertising the economic benefits.  
 Southern nuclear advocacy coincided with a broader effort after WWII to improve 
the South’s economy and to modernize the region, one spurred by wartime industries, 
research facilities, and federal funding.10 And as LeRoy Collins’ speech detailed, atomic 
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evangelizing echoed earlier New South schemes articulated by Henry Grady, the editor of 
Atlanta’s Constitution, and post-Reconstruction era southern boosters. The first iteration 
of the term “the New South” did not originate with Grady, although he proved to be an 
eloquent and popular spokesman for regional boosterism and a refashioning of southern 
identity. As early as 1862, a Union Officer “exhilarated by his army’s capture of the sea 
islands in South Carolina and Georgia” started publishing The New South, a newspaper 
for Federal troops in the area and one that few southerners read.11 The term, “the New 
South,” reappeared five years after the Confederacy’s defeat in the American Civil War, 
transformed by southerners searching for a positive symbol and “for a specific and 
indigenous movement of social, economic, and intellectual regeneration.”12 Following the 
Civil War, J.D.B. DeBow of  Debow’s Review and other like-minded southerners called 
for greater industrialization in the post-war South. Nineteenth century boosters 
envisioned a “New South,” one capable of matching the North in its economic 
opportunities and able to capitalize on the region’s many natural resources and pool of 
cheap labor.  
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 But as C. Vann Woodward and Paul Gaston have noted, New South boosters also 
invented an “Old South” in their quest to remake the region’s identity.13 By creating a 
kinder, gentler past, where the South’s system of slavery appeared benevolent, its people 
genteel, and Confederate soldiers resembled gallant heroes, southerners built the “New 
South” upon a romanticized retelling of southern history.14 In doing so, what Woodward 
described as myths of “incalculable potentialities,” the creation of the mythical Old South 
laid the groundwork for the development of Jim Crow segregation and the convoluted 
logic of white supremacy in the “New South.”15 While the myths surrounding the Old 
South reverberated well into the twentieth century and supported the “invented tradition” 
of segregation, what was actually “new” in the New South remained limited to pockets of 
industrialization, the slow creep of modern day consumerism, and the influx of a 
business-class into southern politics, one that challenged the political power of the older 
planter class.16 
 Despite the New South booster evangelism in the late nineteenth to early 
twentieth century, the region remained overwhelmingly poor with an agriculturally-based 
economy and sub-standard education system. As often mentioned, Franklin Roosevelt 
famously described the South as the “nation’s number one economic problem” in 1938.17 
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To ameliorate crushing poverty and limited economic opportunities, the federal 
government’s New Deal programs, such as the Rural Electrification Administration and 
the Tennessee Valley Authority, expanded access to electricity, exploited the Tennessee 
Valley’s waterways for hydroelectricity, improved agricultural practices, and created 
employment opportunities. Not since Reconstruction had the federal government’s 
presence in the South been as pronounced, and the incursion amounted to modest 
improvements, particularly in the Tennessee Valley region. More importantly, the New 
Deal reinforced the connection between federal funding, regional development, and 
cheap, readily available energy.18  
  From the 1930s onward, “the South’s dependency on the federal government 
increased,” as historian Bruce Schulman has documented.19 The emphasis, however, 
shifted from social welfare to different federal projects, especially defense and research-
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related installations.20 Coinciding with this change, southern political power moved away 
from the older ruling class of planters and “low-wage industrialists” to “business 
progressives” who emerged in the 1950s.21 The “new Whigs” of post-WWII southern 
politics retained their power by winning lucrative federal projects and funds that 
accelerated the region’s transformation.22 With the triumph of the business progressives, 
the “New South” quickly became more than a creed. Following WWII, a rural exodus 
occurred, sprawling metropolitan areas like Charlotte and Atlanta supplanted older 
southern centers of commerce, and the once “Solid South” underwent a political 
realignment from solidly Democratic to Republican.23 According to Numan Bartley, the 
South “possessed a modern economy” by 1960, and the region could be characterized as 
“predominately urban” with a majority of its population located in metropolitan areas.24 
The transition has been described by historians in various ways. C. Vann Woodward 
called the process the “Bulldozer Revolution,” Schulman succinctly phrased it “from 
cotton belt to sunbelt,” and James Cobb christened it “the selling of the South.” Whatever 
the name for the process, the second era of New South scheming visibly altered many 
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places, but as in the nineteenth century, the promise of progress and economic 
development produced uneven benefits and created unintended consequences.  
 While military and nuclear weapons installations figure into narratives about 
regional transformation after WWII, they spurred a more widespread interest in atomic 
energy. In 1955, the Southern Governors’ Conference initiated discussion about a 
“regional approach” to the nuclear industry, following this with a region-wide study 
about the feasibility of interstate compact between southern states, one committed to the 
“development of nuclear energy for the advancement of the region.”25 In the Southern 
Regional Education Board’s  (SREB) 1956 study, the report noted the recent trend of 
industry migrating to southern and western states, concluding that “atomic energy can 
help assure that continuance.”26 Unlike previous New South schemes, where the South 
“sought outside help,” Governor LeRoy Collins viewed the region’s quest to harness 
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atomic energy differently. Instead, atomic energy represented a “talisman” for a better 
South, one able to ward off the albatross of segregation.27  
And yet, even as nuclear advocates waved the atomic talisman, in the coming 
years, other southerners waved another symbol— the Confederate flag—signaling their 
defiance and commitment to preserving white supremacy. While other places heralded 
nuclear-related developments too, only in the American South did atomic energy’s 
symbolic possibilities compete with a foil of greater magnitude, at least in the United 
States. Even as this disjuncture occurred, the promise of science and technology 
seemingly smoothed over any barriers to remaking the region’s identity, and southerners 
set about finding ways to attract the nuclear industry to their towns, cities, and states.  
 Building upon these efforts, the Southern Regional Education Board (SREB) 
created a Regional Advisory Council on Nuclear Energy (RACNE) in 1957.28 The 
council announced its intention to launch a “many-sided offensive” for the “creation of a 
favorable climate for the development of the atom’s potential” in southern states and 
across the region. 29 In order to achieve these objections, the council laid the groundwork 
for a nuclear-oriented interstate compact: the Southern Interstate Nuclear Compact. 
Represented by the Southern Interstate Nuclear Board, the SINB intended to facilitate 
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cooperation between southern states, act as a liaison between the region and the federal 
government, and to promote the nuclear industry.30 Despite its unwieldy acronym, the 
SINB played a pivotal role shaping the region’s nuclear industry, the regulatory apparatus 
for atomic energy, and lobbying for federal funds. By 1962, due to the SINB’s efforts, 
Congress ratified the Southern Interstate Nuclear Compact, officially approving the 
SINB’s purpose to encourage development of atomic energy for the South’s economy 
and “the well-being of the region’s people.”31  In an era of massive resistance, where 
southerners fought the Supreme Court’s 1954 ruling that segregation in public education 
was unconstitutional, and provoked stand-offs between the federal government and 
southern states, the SINB represented an example of a cordial relationship with the 
federal government. While the SINB’s publications never explicitly discuss race or the 
upheaval massive resistance produced, the organization fulfilled dual functions—
promoting the nuclear industry and offering a counter-weight to the negative portrayal of 
the South as wholly hostile to the federal government and resistant to change.   
  Despite the enthusiasm surrounding atomic energy, early efforts by RACNE and 
SINB focused on education, research, regulations, and reactor design.32 During the late 
1950s, many southern utility companies viewed nuclear energy as an unnecessary source 
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of power, one hampered by poor economics and a need for greater efficiency.33 In a 
region of abundant fossil fuels, developing commercial nuclear power made little 
economic sense.34 Moreover, concern existed about the financial liability from a 
catastrophic accident as major barrier to commercial nuclear power.35 In a 1957 address 
on nuclear energy to the Southern Governors’ conference, G.O. Robinson reminded the 
audience that atomic energy was not a “panacea” for the region’s problems and cautioned 
that a “factual and realistic approach” was necessary “to put the atom to work.”36 Ten 
years later, southern utility companies embraced the promise of cheap electricity through 
nuclear power; but in the first decade of nuclear boosterism, southerners saw other 
avenues as more viable, particularly in terms of research and development. 
 Because of the barriers associated with nuclear power in the late 1950s, SINB 
directed their momentum towards atomic energy in research and education. Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory and the Savannah River Plant attracted engineers and scientists to 
the South, and early proponents viewed nuclear engineering as a way to bolster the 
reputation of southern universities and to attract federal funding for research facilities, 
particularly with experimental reactors, medical research, and agricultural programs. By 
expanding opportunities at southern universities, federal facilities, and other nuclear-
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related industries, the region could not only sustain its current influx of engineers and 
scientists, but also encourage more in-migration and possibly produce more native-born 
researchers and engineers. In 1950, the number of the engineers in the South lagged 
behind the national average, and the region’s nuclear proponents sought to address the 
deficiency by attracting federal funding, specifically through the Atomic Energy 
Commission, for greater offerings in nuclear-related fields at southern universities.37  
 Following World War II, the Atomic Energy Commission subsidized research 
facilities throughout the South, contributing to the “growth of science” in the region.38 
The AEC funded nuclear programs through purchasing equipment, providing matching 
funds, and loaned uranium fuel for experimental reactors. Other entities, such as the 
Department of Defense, National Science Foundation and NASA, also made significant 
contributions to these programs. From 1946 to 1965, the AEC contributed over sixty-
seven million dollars for operation and equipment to forty-universities in the South, with 
Duke University, Florida State University, the University of Virginia, and the University 
of Tennessee receiving the most substantial financial support.39 Federal funding towards 
atomic energy research undergirded larger changes at southern universities after WWII, 
where institutions once viewed as “distinctly regional” in “character and tradition,” 
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became global centers of technological and scientific innovation.40 Transforming 
southern institutions also meant larger societal and cultural changes. Fueled by education 
benefits for veterans after WWII, and an increase in federal funding, the region’s 
educational institutions expanded, and atomic energy represented a burgeoning, lucrative 
opportunity for southern universities.  
 In 1966, one southern scientist, Dr. William Pollard, a leading figure at Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory, noted that among the many factors driving the “growth of 
science” in the region was the addition of “increasingly expensive research facilities,” 
and universities across the South welcomed costly, experimental nuclear reactors—in 
part because of subsidies from the Atomic Energy Commission.41  ORNL possessed the 
world’s first “major research reactor,” an air-cooled natural uranium graphite reactor, 
which set the stage for a proliferation of experimental reactors in government facilities 
and at universities.42 Government-subsidized experimental reactors provided prestige and 
attracted prominent scientists and engineers, but they also fulfilled other objectives too.   
When the AEC  proposed building a particle accelerator in mid-1960s, William Pollard 
wrote to AEC Chairman Glenn Seaborg, lobbying for its placement in the South: “we feel 
that the South as a region deserves serious consideration. The number of universities in 
the South that pursue advanced research programs in the physical sciences has increased 
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substantially in the last two decades.”43 And yet, despite the growth in science at southern 
schools, Pollard conceded that research remained “small and substantially below other 
regions.” This regional difference, according to Pollard, contributed to the loss of the 
South’s “most important natural resource”: the “brilliant student” who either went 
untrained in the “frontier areas of physics” or sought “advanced education elsewhere, 
never to return to the region.” Continuing, Pollard argued that a particle accelerator might 
help the South achieve “equality” with other regions and better enable the nation to 
achieve a “balanced” scientific strength.” While “held back by its history,” Pollard noted 
that region now “is trying very hard to help itself.”44 When the region scored a series of 
“firsts” in nuclear research, the South’s nuclear advocates proudly advertised them and 
eagerly sought out more funding opportunities.  
 Among those leading the way was Clifford K. Beck, a native of North Carolina, 
who earned a PhD in physics from the University of North Carolina in 1942, worked at 
the Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant, and became the head of the physics department 
at North Carolina State University (NCSU), launching the first undergraduate and 
graduate programs in nuclear engineering.45 Adding to these accomplishments, Beck 
directed the efforts to design “the first privately owned nuclear reactor” or the “first 
university research reactor” in the United States, constructed at NCSU and licensed in 
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1953.46 Following NCSU’s lead, other southern schools soon acquired nuclear reactors. 
Georgia Institute of Technology gained a heavy-water reactor and the University of 
Florida acquired a small-scale reactor, while other universities planned research reactors 
for the future and many schools purchased particle accelerators (Van de Graff 
generators).47 Beck’s triumphs at NCSU, and the gradual expansion of the South’s 
nuclear programs, were echoed by other “firsts,” which Southern Interstate Nuclear 
Board’s 1962 report described under the banner “a region steps forward.”48    
 Despite these notable southern firsts, in the late 1950s and 1960s, the Southern 
Interstate Nuclear Board’s chief concern related to closing the education gap, citing the 
“firm knowledge” that “economic growth is inextricably linked to quality education.”49 
Among the problems confronting the South, the region lagged behind in teacher pay, 
suffered from an outmigration of talented graduates, and produced only six percent of the 
nation’s PhDs but possessed thirty percent of the nation’s population.50 Harnessing the 
atom’s potential also required redressing the South’s problems in education. For revenue 
poor states, federal funding in atomic energy provided a source of capital, which allowed 
universities to build cutting edge research facilities, lure scientists and engineers to 
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southern schools, and potentially train southerners in high-paying, rapidly expanding 
nuclear-related fields. From 1961 to 1962, the region’s private industry received over $38 
million dollars in contracts by the AEC and related contractors, giving further momentum 
to a growing network of industries tied to nuclear engineering and nuclear physics.51 In 
less than two decades since the construction of “the secret city,” Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory, in East Tennessee, atomic energy had become a significant source of federal 
funding, one that buoyed the region’s private industry and educational institutions.  
 Pro-nuclear advocates claimed other regional victories. Besides ratifying the first 
nuclear-oriented regional compact, Texas and South Carolina launched development 
programs—the first of their kind, and the Port of Charleston became the first port 
“cleared to handle radioactive materials.”52 More importantly, in 1962, Kentucky became 
the first “agreement” state to receive some regulatory and licensing authority from the 
federal government.53 As NRC historian J. Samuel Walker has noted, the South’s 
interests in industrial growth, and exploiting atomic energy’s potential, coincided with a 
long-standing commitment to “protecting states’ rights from federal infringement,” or 
“atomic rights,” as one newspaper headline put it.54  Kentucky’s maneuvers to retain 
some control over regulating and licensing nuclear energy and radioactive materials set 
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the template for agreements between states and the Atomic Energy Commission. Eight of 
the thirteen states to sign agreements with the AEC by 1966 hailed from the South, who 
justified wresting partial control from the AEC by citing concern for public health but 
also avoidance of “unduly restrictive” measures.55 An editorial in the South Carolina 
newspaper praised the “foresight” of the South who had “outstripped the rest of nation in 
assuming their right role in nuclear regulation,” and contributed to a “rare spectacle of the 
federal government’s yielding…a large measure of control back the states.”56 In this 
sense, the region’s history shaped its nuclear future; and in the case of Kentucky, vesting 
greater authority in the state contributed to the lax regulatory practices, which 
significantly contributed to the environmental contamination at the Maxey Flats 
radioactive waste repository in Hillsboro, Kentucky.  
 Even as atomic energy spurred growth at the region’s universities and federal 
facilities, commercial nuclear power attracted far more interest in the Midwest and 
Northeast, and California initially.57 Plentiful coal, oil, and hydroelectricity discouraged 
investment in nuclear power by southern utilities, who were generally stand-offish about 
building reactors in the early 1960s.58 Although southern utilities were slow to embrace 
nuclear power, the region’s first nuclear power plant was completed in 1962 and achieved 
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criticality, or sustained a nuclear reaction, in March 1963.59 A joint investment of $29 
million dollars by four companies, the Parr-Shoals plant, also known as the Carolinas-
Virginia Tube Reactor (CVTR), was located in Fairfield County, South Carolina.60  
 The plant’s arrival generated an enthusiastic response; an editorial in The State 
heralded South Carolina’s entry into the “atomic age,” describing nuclear power as 
“miraculous.”61 In the thrall of atomic energy, South Carolina Governor Ernest F. 
Hollings argued that “training for jobs in the nuclear age” was the “best way to lift” the 
state “from the bottom of the per capita income scale.”62Another editorial praised the Parr 
Shoals reactor, located along one of the region’s “historic rivers which once supported 
and carried the barges of cotton” and “now give us unbounded energy” with a “new and 
mysterious source of power.”63 While most reports offered little more than enthusiasm, 
other observers drew connections between the area’s past and the nuclear (or soon to be) 
present. 
 The home of the new reactor, Parr Shoals, was situated along the Broad River, 
and had been the site of a coal-burning steam electric plant and later a hydro-electric 
plant built in 1914. Contemporary observers noted the area’s history of power production 
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and its connection to the river, with one writer claiming that Parr Shoals “will have 
become the only place on earth where so many types of energies—water, coal, and the 
atom—have been used to make electricity.”64  The Parr Shoals plant produced an 
interplay between past and present, echoing broader connections between the new 
Nuclear South, the New South post-Reconstruction, and an even older history—one 
characterized by the Native American tribe, the Catawbas, who inhabited the area and 
“hunted in the pine forests” and “fished in Broad River.”65 The plant created a place 
“strange contrasts” between the “primeval sound of the forest” and “the steel symphony 
of the bulldozer.”66 Another writer similarly commented on the interplay between one 
energy system and another, noting that the “vanished” water powered mill had given way 
to the nuclear reactor with “spherical appendance like something out of a Buck Rogers 
world.”67  
 The meditations that new technology encouraged were not unique to nuclear 
power though. In 1914, at the opening of the Parr Shoals Generating Station, a hydro-
electric plant on the Broad River, Mayor Lewis Griffith of Columbia, South Carolina also 
pointed to the area’s past, one characterized by “Congaree Indians, who lived by hunting 
and fishing,” and the men who “fought in our wars” and whose fame “was recorded in 
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memory, history, and in monuments.”68 South Carolinian R. Charlton Wright, a director 
of Parr Shoals Power Company, espoused the “civilizing” power of electricity, with the 
“consumption of kilowatts” as the “modern measure of civilization.”69 According to 
Wright’s plans for harnessing the Broad River’s water power dated back to the “War 
Between the Sections,” when the city of Columbia was at its “lowest ebb,” and area 
residents embarked upon a “vigorous crusade” to produce energy using the river.70 
Efforts to harness the river’s power required environmental change, and the dam required 
for hydro-electric created the Parr Shoals reservoir, which originally encompassed 1,850 
acres.71 The arrival of hydro-power constituted the first major transformation in the 
Broad River, which has been widened continually over the course of the twentieth 
century through various energy-related projects.72  
                                                
68 “Hydro-Electric Plant Starts up Parr Shoals Generating station is Opened,” The State, 
May 31, 1914, 7.  
 
69 R. Charlton Wright, “Power from Parr Shoals Delivered in Columbia,” The State, 
October 3, 1914, 1; Poor’s Manual of Public Utilities; Street, Railway, Gas, Electric, 
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Co., 1914), 1145. 
 
70 R. Charlton Wright, “Power from Parr Shoals Delivered in Columbia,” The State, 
October 3, 1914, 1.  
 
71 “Environmental Report for License Renewal: VC Summer Nuclear Station,” Docket 
Number 50/395, License Number NPF-12, SCE&G. NRC Library, pg. 12. 
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72 Parr Shoals Relicensing Project, Research by Kleinschmidt (a consulting firm that 
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 Hydro-electricity constituted a renewable source of energy, one that would “flow 
perpetually,” long after other “fixed and definite” sources of energy, such has coal had 
been depleted.73 And as historian Christopher Manganiello has noted, the region’s 
waterways possessed “social and cultural meaning.”74 In 1914, the hydro-electric 
generating station represented a renewable energy source and a symbol of regional 
renewal. Like hydro-power, nuclear energy offered a potentially renewable source of 
power (particularly with breeder reactors) and served as a symbol for a New South, one 
quite different from its other image as backward, regressive, or broken. The Carolina-
Virginia Tube Reactor was as an experimental, demonstration plant, and only operated 
from 1963 to 1967, but it signaled a growing interest in commercial nuclear power.  
 Decades earlier, southern utility executives downplayed the region’s need for 
nuclear power, and the 1956 study conducted by the Work Conference on Nuclear 
Energy and sponsored by the Southern Regional Education Board concluded that little 
immediate need existed for nuclear power in the South. The report predicted that by 1965 
only a few southern states would experience a major impact by nuclear power plants: 
North Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Virginia, and Delaware (a member of the Southern 
Governor’s Conference). The study predicted an intermediate impact for South Carolina, 
Alabama, and Oklahoma (another member of the conference), and only a minor impact 
for the remaining states, particularly those with plentiful fossil fuels such as Texas, 
                                                
73 Ibid.  
 
74 Christopher J. Manganiello Southern Water, Southern Power: How the Politics of 
Cheap Energy and Water Scarcity Shaped a Region (Chapel Hill, NC., University of 
North Carolina Press, 2015), 6.  
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Louisiana, and Kentucky.75 In the 1950s, the conservative nature of utility companies 
resulted in an aversion to risk, in part because they attributed their success to “cautious 
business and engineering practices.”76 Even after light-water nuclear technology proved 
more commercially feasible in the early 1960s; with a few exceptions, most major utility 
companies viewed nuclear power as an unnecessary financial risk.77 In the South, this 
reluctance created a cautious climate where companies studied nuclear power as a future 
option but otherwise remained resistant to risking large sums of capital on a 
commercially unproven technology.   
 Several developments in the nuclear industry propelled the “great bandwagon 
market,” where utilities suddenly embraced nuclear power in the late 1960s. The 
bandwagon market rapidly changed the attitude towards commercial nuclear power in the 
South.78 Among those developments, in 1964, utility Jersey Central published a report 
arguing that building a nuclear reactor in the Northeast was more financially lucrative 
than a coal plant.79 While some challenged the validity of the report’s claims, others 
hailed it as a “economic breakthrough” for commercial nuclear power.80 Other 
developments in the utility industry that further contributed to changing perceptions 
                                                
75 Work Conference on Nuclear Energy: St. Petersburg, Florida (Southern Regional 
Education Board, Atomic Energy Section, August 1-4, 1956), 46.  
76 Walker, Containing the Atom, 27.  
 
77 Walker, Containing the Atom: Nuclear Regulation in a Changing Environment, 1963-
1971 (University of California Press, 1992), 27-28.  
  
78 Walker, 31.  
 
79 Walker, 30.  
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about nuclear power were “pooling arrangements,” which became popular after WWII.81 
Pooling arrangements between independent utility companies required joint investment in 
new facilities and power-sharing through “interconnections.”82 By combining resources, 
utility companies increased capital resources and fostered a willingness to invest in more 
expensive facilities, often based on speculative estimates of future energy consumption.83  
Moreover, a method called “design by extrapolation” where plant designers 
scaled “up” from smaller facility size to larger ones without practical experience 
operating large-scale reactors led to an uptick in proposed reactors.84 And finally, despite 
the slow growth of the nuclear power in the South initially, the Tennessee Valley 
Authority’s 1966 announcement of its plans to build two nuclear reactors changed 
perspectives. If TVA, located in an area with abundant coal, found nuclear power viable, 
perhaps other utilities should too. TVA’s decision accelerated the arrival of the great 
bandwagon market, where utilities went from reluctant to enthusiastic about the prospects 
of nuclear power.85 With TVA’s atomic declaration, and a host of other developments, 
utilities across the nation hopped on the nuclear bandwagon, with the market peaking in 
1966-1967.86 As LeRoy Collins envisioned a decade earlier, southern utility companies 
quickly pursued nuclear power plants as a viable option by the late 1960s. In the wake of 
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the bandwagon market, applications for nuclear plants proliferated throughout the US, 
but in the South, plans for nuclear power portended greater changes. According to one 
observer, the rapid adoption of nuclear power signaled a “new break of dawn,” after “a 
very dark night, the South is beginning to find itself a national leader.”87  
Following a tumultuous, violent period that culminated in the demise of Jim 
Crow, atomic energy supplied imagery that evoked a high-tech, prosperous future for a 
region and a people that had appeared antiquated and even primitive in national media. In 
November 1965, Florida Power and Light announced plans to build the region’s first 
commercial reactor, and other utilities quickly followed suit.88 The SINB’s annual report 
to the President christened 1966 as the “Year of Commitment” for the “development of 
the peaceful atom in the South.”89 In 1966 and 1967, plans for sixteen nuclear reactors 
were announced in SINB member states, which the organization hailed as a “$2.3 billion 
in twenty reactor generating units,” one that illustrated the South’s nuclear industry 
finally equaled and even surpassed other regions.90 Moreover, on July 21, 1966, 
Delaware Governor Charles Terry signed the Southern Interstate Nuclear Compact, 
which completed the ratification process, and the Southern Interstate Nuclear Board (and 
                                                
87 Reese Cleghorn, “The South is Now Harnessing the Atom,” The Atlanta Journal, 
February 23, 1966, Southern Interstate Nuclear Board, 1966 - Clippings, 
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88 “Nuclear and Space Technology: A New Dimension in Regional Economic 
Development,” (Southern Interstate Nuclear Board), 7.  
 
89 SINB’s Annual Report to the President, FF6, Box 44, Nuclear Commission, 1966, 
Governor Haydon Burns 1965-1967, State of Florida Archives.  
90 “Nuclear and Space Technology: A New Dimension in Regional Economic 
Development” (Southern Interstate Nuclear Board, 1968), 7-9.  
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compact) now represented seventeen southern states.91 After a decade of studying and 
lobbying for atomic energy, the SINB’s efforts materialized with significant financial 
investments and plans for nuclear power plants. 
 Of the South’s forty-one currently operating commercial nuclear reactors, the 
NRC granted thirty-nine construction licenses between 1966-1976 (see figure one). The 
surge in regional interest resulted in ten reactors achieving criticality, or “going online,” 
by 1976. By comparison, Midwestern and Northeastern states also vigorously pursued 
nuclear power. Before the mid-seventies, these regions had more operating reactors than 
the South, with nineteen reactors in the Midwest and eighteen in the Northeast.92 The 
West lagged behind for a number of reasons, primarily due to environment reasons, 
particularly seismic risks and aridity, and robust anti-nuclear sentiment in certain states.93  
 Although TVA’s aggressive pursuit of nuclear power accelerated the bandwagon 
market, the earliest operating reactors in the South were owned by a variety of utility 
companies and largely concentrated in states along the East Coast, such as Florida, 
Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina (see table one). By December 1975, ten 
nuclear reactors in the South achieved criticality—or went “online,” with a five to eight 
year period from receiving the construction permit to beginning commercial operation. 
                                                
91 SINB’s Annual Report to the President, FF6, Box 44, Nuclear Commission, 1966, 
Governor Haydon Burns 1965-1967, State of Florida Archives.  
 
92 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Information Digest, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
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After the first wave of reactors, the pace slowed from permit to operation, as regulations 
became more stringent and costs soared. From January 1976 to December 1980, nine 
reactors started commercial operation, with the average time spanning 7.5 years and at 
least three reactors requiring nine years from permit to operation. Of the remaining 
reactors in operation today, all twenty reactors received their construction permits 
between 1972 and 1977 but only began commercial operation from 1981 to 1996, with 
the average time from permit to operation increasing to nearly twelve years. TVA’s Watts 
Bar Unit 1, the last commercial nuclear reactor received its permit in 1973, and after a 
long odyssey, achieved criticality in 1996.  
 While the pace slowed considerably from the early pre-1976 licensing blitz, the 
South (see table two) contains more nuclear reactors than any other region—a product of 
a conducive political environment, lobbying efforts, and efforts to cultivate nuclear-
related programs at southern universities. If cancelled reactors are considered, the South 
would have surpassed other regions by an even greater degree (see figure three). This 
example of regional exceptionalism continues today. Since TVA’s Watts Barr went 
online in 1996, the nation’s only new reactors currently under construction or 
approaching commercial operation are located in the South. In Parr Shoals, South 
Carolina, where early proponents celebrated the arrival of hydroelectricity a century 
earlier, the first privately funded nuclear reactor operated from 1963 to 1967, and where 
the V.C Summer nuclear plant first began operation in 1984, two new reactors are under 
construction—V.C. Summer, Unit 2 and Unit 3. In 2016, TVA’s Watts Bar Unit 2 is 
scheduled to finally achieve criticality, and Georgia’s Vogtle Unit 3 and 4 are undergoing 
construction as well.  
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 Spearheading the South’s nuclear revival is the Southern States Energy Board 
(SSEB), the current-day iteration of the Southern Interstate Nuclear Board, renamed in 
the late 1970s to reflect a broader mission. Special interests groups like SINB and SSEB 
fly under the radar; they operate behind the scenes, orchestrating favorable legislation, 
subsidies, and act as well-financed coordinators and cheerleaders for an industry. These 
groups provide the mechanism where politicians, industry figures, academics, and federal 
officials coordinate the promotion, or at the very least, the existence of the region’s 
nuclear power industry and energy production.  
 The SSEB’s stated purpose is the development of the region’s energy resources 
generally, but nuclear advocacy remains a priority. Signaling a nuclear power revival, the 
Southern States Energy Board released a forty-page document entitled “Nuclear Energy: 
Cornerstone of Southern Living, Today and Tomorrow” in 2006. Recycling an older 
argument that cheap electricity fuels economic growth, and pointing to concerns about 
climate change, the SSEB argued that the “South’s thirst for electricity will require 
unprecedented growth in bulk power supply from nuclear and coal.”94 Echoing these 
themes, a March 2013 presentation given by the non-profit organization the Savannah 
River Site Community Reuse Organization and consulting firm, the Nuclear Worldwide 
Inc. (NWI), highlighted the South’s assets, calling it a “Nuclear region,” with a “nuclear 
friendly citizenry,” and noting that the “southeastern US is the center of gravity for 
nuclear energy development.”95  
                                                
94 Southern States Energy Board, “Nuclear Energy: Cornerstone of Southern Living, 
Today and Tomorrow” (SSEB, 2006).  
 
95 Savannah River Site Community Reuse Organization and Nuclear Worldwide Inc. 
(NWI), “Community Perspective on Managing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” March 14, 2013.   
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 Despite the nuclear industry’s recent rosy characterizations, and the celebratory 
declarations of the South’s “new atomic age” in the 1950s and 1960s, the proliferation of 
nuclear power plants in southern states has been widely debated and highly controversial. 
Nuclear projects highlighted differences in power and place; they sat uneasily in a region 
lurching between the Old South and the New South. Touring the region in the 1950s, 
writer William Polk noted that while an older southern economy relied upon cotton and 
tobacco, the New South manufactured consumer items and bombs. The H-bomb plant 
“rising in the Savannah River” symbolized the New South, and the double-cannon 
“which couldn’t hit a forest” in Athens, Georgia symbolized the past.96  If the region 
appears to possess a more loyal “nuclear citizenry” than elsewhere, this destiny appeared 
uncertain in the 1970s and 1980s, and the following chapters examine the making of a 
radioactive Dixie and what this history tells us about the modern South.  
 
TABLE 1.1: EARLY REACTORS IN THE US SOUTH  
Reactor Name  Location Company* Construction 
License  
Commercial 
Operation  
Arkansas 
Nuclear  Unit 1  
London, AR  Entergy  12/06/1968  12/19/1974  
Browns Ferry 
(Unit 1&2)  
Limestone 
County, AL  
Tennessee 
Valley Authority  
5/10/1967  8/1/1974 (1); 
3/1/1975 (2)  
Brunswick 
(Unit 2)  
Southport, NC Carolina Power 
& Light  
2/7/1970  11/3/1975  
Hatch (Unit 1)  Vidalia, GA  Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co.  
9/30/1969  12/31/1975  
                                                                                                                                            
 
96 Polk, 20-25.  
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Oconee (Unit 
1, 2, and 3)  
Seneca, SC  Duke Power  11/6/1967  7/15/1973; 
9/9/1974; 
12/16/1974  
Turkey Point 
(Unit 3 & 4)  
Homestead, 
FL  
Florida Power 
and Light  
4/27/1967  12/14/1972; 
9/7/1973  
 
TABLE 1.2: REGIONAL CATEGORIES 
Midwest Northeast South  West States without 
Commercial 
Nuclear Power 
(Current or 
Former)  
Illinois  
Missouri  
Nebraska  
Ohio  
Michigan  
Iowa  
Wisconsin  
Minnesota  
Kansas  
 
 
Pennsylvania  
Maryland  
Connecticut  
New York  
New Jersey  
New 
Hampshire  
Vermont  
Maine  
Massachusetts  
Delaware* 
 
Arkansas  
Alabama 
North Carolina 
South Carolina  
Texas  
Georgia 
Florida  
Virginia  
Tennessee  
Louisiana  
Mississippi  
 
Washington 
California  
Arizona  
Oregon  
Washington  
 
Alaska   
Colorado  
Hawaii  
Idaho  
Indiana  
Kentucky  
Montana  
Nevada  
New Mexico  
North Dakota   
South Dakota  
Rhode Island  
Utah  
West Virginia   
Wyoming  
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FIGURE 1. 1: CONSTRUCTION PERMIT LICENSES BY REGION 
 
FIGURE 1.2: COMMERCIAL REACTORS BY REGION  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE KUDZU AND THE REACTOR: NUCLEAR POWER ON THE 
MISSISSIPPI RIVER 
These people are out in Mississippi trying to operate a nuclear plant –they’re not 
qualified to operate a car.1   
I  think I know how people feel in countries such as those that are memorialized in novels 
like Animal Farm and 1984. You never know where you are. Power is total, arbitrary, 
and absolutely unconcerned with the interest of the ordinary citizens.  
---Bill Clinton (1986)  
 
 Without wings, there are three ways to see the Grand Gulf cooling tower: by boat, 
by car, or by looking east across the Mississippi River from Louisiana. Enterprising 
travelers might take the historic Natchez Trace, cross through Port Gibson, a small, 
historic and hard-pressed community, and then over a series of rural roads that seem to 
lead nowhere. Mississippi’s only nuclear reactor sits in the outer reaches of sparsely 
populated Claiborne County (population, 9,000), towering over rich farmland and river 
gullies consumed by kudzu. Any vague notions of nuclear power as a symbol of 
modernity and technological triumph appear out of joint with the surroundings. Hunting 
down nuclear reactors in rural Mississippi brings visitors to a land that time forgot. From 
a car, a distant view of the cooling tower surfaces first, framed by trees draped with
                                                
1 Congressional staffer Richard Udell, quoted in Bryan Burrough, “Nuclear Fission:  A 
Huge Atomic Plant,  Long Ignored, Stirs Up Fight at Middle South,”  Wall Street Journal,  
June 15, 1984. 
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 Spanish moss. Fortunate travelers might pass a few ambling cows wearing quizzical 
expressions, as if to ask why anyone would venture to this place. The power produced by 
the reactor leaves the kudzu landscape and moves elsewhere, to more populated, more 
developed towns and cities. That Grand Gulf tower, though, stands still, saturated in 
history, tragedy, and poverty. 
 The history of Grand Gulf emblematizes the New South’s muddled legacy, where 
the declarations of modernity, progress, and economic opportunity rarely ignited the 
kinds of economic transformation promised in the communities near nuclear power 
plants. When Grand Gulf neared commercial operation, debates ignited over rising utility 
rates, tax revenue distribution, corporate accountability, and federal regulation. Grand 
Gulf appeared less as a beacon of progress and far more as a debacle—one that ensnared 
ratepayers in three states and stripped a poor, predominantly African-American county of 
its ability to tax nuclear plants. In response, Grand Gulf stirred a populist revolt, where a 
new class of moderate southern Democrats, including Bill Clinton, adopted the issue, 
producing politically well-timed but much needed critiques about poverty, inequality, and 
corporate power in post-Watergate America and in the “new” South.1 In tandem, Public 
Service Commissions, rate-payers, and anti-nuclear activists joined the fray. The nuclear 
project hidden away in an isolated corner of Mississippi provoked a power grab in the 
South during the 1970s and 1980s.   
                                                
1 Historian Thomas R. Wellock describes the battle over the San Joaquin Nuclear Plant in 
populist terms. See Wellock, “Stick It in L.A.! Community Control and Nuclear Power in 
California’s Central Valley,” The Journal of American History 84, No. 3 (December 
1997): 942-978.  
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 Whether studying a nuclear reactor in the former-Soviet Union or in the United 
States, technological artifacts—especially high-risk ones—offer “ways of building order 
in this world.”2 In his 1980 article, “Do Artifacts Have Politics?,” Langdon Winner 
explored whether “technical things have political qualities,” and “can embody specific 
forms of power or authority.”3 Winner drew upon Lewis Mumford’s earlier assertion that 
two types of technologies have existed “side-by-side” historically, one democratic, and 
another authoritarian.4 Lewis Mumford’s binary between centralized, authoritarian 
technology and decentralized, democratic technology leaves little room for ambiguity, 
and historians of technology characterize his views as deterministic, albeit softened 
somewhat.5 Winner’s article, and the groundbreaking work of Thomas Parke Hughes, 
animated a discussion about the political and cultural dimensions of technology. 
Hughes’s work encouraged historians of technology to interpret technological 
development as a product of internal and external dynamics, rather than viewing 
engineers or technology as impermeable from influence. In this sense, political, cultural, 
economic, and environmental contexts shape technology. While contemporary scholars 
generally avoid notions of technological determinism, where technology itself drives 
history, I agree with Winner’s contention that some technologies require or rely upon 
                                                
2 Langdon Winner Do Artifacts Have Politics?  Daedalus, Vol. 109, No. 1 (Winter, 
1980): 121-136.  
 
3 Langdon Winner Do Artifacts Have Politics?  Daedalus, Vol. 109, No. 1 (Winter, 
1980): 121-136; 121.  
 
4 Lewis Mumford, “Authoritarian and Democratic Technics,” Technology and Culture 
Vol. 5, No. 1 (Winter 1964): 1-8.  
 
5 Merritt Roe Smith, “Technological Determinism in American Culture,” Does 
Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism, 2-35.  
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complementary systems of power and knowledge distribution. This chapter examines 
how certain technologies, or rather the systems constructed to manage them, invite 
particular arrangements of power. If technologies are formed by external and internal 
dynamics, and  offer ways of “building order” in our world, they can also embody 
political and cultural meanings grounded in specific local, regional, or national contexts. 
Technical artifacts often produce meaning in unexpected ways with considerable variance 
from one place to another, suggesting that even when structures are roughly the same, 
what these objects project may differ. 
   Grand Gulf and the “Most Broken Country”  
 The town of Grand Gulf largely exists as a ghost town today, dominated by 
Entergy’s plant and the Grand Gulf Military Park.6 Long before white settlers traveled 
there, indigenous people inhabited the area, and the nuclear plant occupies land that once 
contained a large burial mound dating to 50 A.D. to 200 A.D..7  Although two-thirds of 
the burial mound were bulldozed, and some were objects removed by “relic hunters,” 
archaeologists in the 1970s managed to excavate the mound, finding objects indicative of 
Hopewell culture, such as small pieces of pottery and pressed Copper.8  
                                                
6 Mississippi Historical Society Vol. V (University Press, Oxford, MS., 1902), Grand 
Gulf Vertical Files, State of Mississippi Archives. 
7 Samuel O. Brookes, “The Grand Gulf Mound: Salvage Excavation of an Early 
Marksville Burial Mound in Claiborne County, Mississippi” (Mississippi Department of 
Archives and History, Jackson, Mississippi, 1976), 4-5.  
 
8 Ibid., 6.  
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 Early white settlers named the area “Grand Gulph” for an eddy in the Mississippi 
River.9 By the 1820s, Grand Gulf was a “flourishing” community along the river, 
supported by the cotton trade, slavery, and its convenient location. Decades later, 
misfortune visited Grand Gulf through illness, environmental disaster, and war. During 
the 1850s alone, the town suffered through a yellow fever outbreak, a major fire, and a 
tornado. Following these disasters, the river’s path moved westward, causing the “Caving 
of the Gulf,” where much of the town caved into the Mississippi. A community once 
home to at least 900 residents dwindled to less than two hundred, or as another observer 
put it, “the place was left to die.”10   
 With the onset of the American Civil War, Grand Gulf’s existence appeared 
precarious once again because of its prime location near the river and Vicksburg. As 
Union troops moved through the area in 1862, General Ulysses Grant allegedly described 
Grand Gulf and the surrounding land as “the most broken country I ever saw. The whole 
country is a series of irregular ridges, divided by impassable ravines grown up with heavy 
timber, undergrowth and cane.”11 Despite the hostile terrain, Union forces routed 
Confederate troops in the spring of 1863.  In a letter to General William Sherman, Grant 
again described the area as “extremely broken” and concluded ominously that “the road 
                                                
9 Mississippi Historical Society Vol. V. (University Press, Oxford, MS., 1902), Grand 
Gulf Vertical Files, State of Mississippi Archives. 
10 Ibid.  
 
11 Katy McCaleb Headley (compiled by) Claiborne County, Mississippi: The Promised 
Land (Port Gibson-Claiborne County Historical Society, 1976), 358.  
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to Vicksburg is open.”12 In December 1864, the U.S.S. Rattler, a Union gunboat 
patrolling the area, ran aground during a heavy gale and sank, but not before “the rebels 
had set her upper works on fire.”13 Even if the Rattler’s demise granted Confederate 
troops momentary satisfaction, the calamities from war and from natural disasters 
doomed Grand Gulf. While the community never recovered from the trials of the mid-
nineteenth century, its history found a resurrection of sorts a century later.  In 1962, as 
white resistance to African-American civil rights reached a fever pitch in Mississippi, 
Governor Ross Barnett attended the dedication of the Grand Gulf Military Park, which 
continues to preserve the remnants of Grand Gulf—a historic church (not original to the 
area), scattered traces of the Civil War, and a crumbling cemetery mostly filled with 
victims of yellow fever. The park’s creation no doubt came from a revival of interest in 
the Civil War and southern history that coincided, not surprisingly, with the civil rights 
movement.  
 While the reactor sits nearby, ghosts, rather conveniently, remain unaffected by 
nuclear power. The predominately African-American community of Port Gibson, which 
General Grant purportedly described as “too beautiful to burn,” and the surrounding 
Claiborne County, live with a nuclear present. If not a ghost town, Claiborne County, like 
many other rural places, has experienced a slow decline in population and suffers from 
abysmally high poverty rates, with over thirty-three percent of residents living below the 
                                                
12 Letter from Gen. Grant to General Sherman, May 3, 1863 (Grand Gulf, Mississippi) 
Grant (U.S. Papers), State of Mississippi Archives, Jackson, Mississippi.  
13 Letter from Lieutenant Commander E.Y. McCauley, January 1, 1865, Official Records 
of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion Series I, Vol. 26 (U.S. 
Government Printing Office 1914), 769.  
 
  59 
poverty line.14 As historian Emilye Crosby has noted, slavery and sharecropping 
“shaped” interactions between black and white residents of Claiborne County “well into 
the twentieth century,” and the implications of those historic legacies remain visible 
today.15 The history of Entergy’s Grand Gulf plant and its location in Claiborne County 
matter for many reasons, among them, it illustrates the dilemma of rural communities in 
the modern South, the shortcomings of nuclear power as an economic engine, and the 
complicated political terrain during the post-civil rights period.  
 In 1972, Mississippi Power & Light, (MP&L) which was then a subsidiary of 
Middle South Utilities System (which later became Entergy), announced plans to build 
two nuclear reactors in Claiborne County.16 Because the financing of Grand Gulf 
exceeded the costs for one relatively small utility company, MSU created “Middle South 
Energy, Inc.,” which would technically own and pay for Grand Gulf, while MP&L would 
“design, construct, and operate” the plant.17 For clarity, the chapter refers to MP&L and 
not the larger subsidiary, MSE (a subsidiary of MSU). At the time, MP&L served forty-
four counties in Mississippi and over 200,000 customers. Like many other utilities during 
this period, MP&L’s plans for two reactors reflected the widespread belief that economic 
                                                
14 Claiborne County, United States Census, 2010, 
Quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/28/28021.html.  
 
15 Emilye Crosby Little Taste of Freedom: The Black Freedom Struggle in Claiborne 
County, Mississippi (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2005), 3.  
 
16 Middle South Utilities System was a holding company that included five companies: 
Arkansas Power and Light, MP&L, Louisiana Power & Light, New Orleans Public 
Service, and Arkansas-Missouri Power Company.  
 
17 U.S. Supreme Court, Mississippi Power v. Miss. Ex Rel Moore, No. 86-1970, Argued, 
Feb. 22, 1988, Decided, June 24, 1988.  
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growth and cheap, abundant energy correlated closely with one another and bloated 
estimates of power consumption in the immediate future.  
 The planned site encompassed 2300 acres bordering the Mississippi River and the 
Grand Gulf Military Park. As part of the licensing process, MP&L conducted an 
environmental assessment, and the formal environmental impact statement depicts Grand 
Gulf’s site as it existed in 1972. The flood plain of the river spanned sixty miles, flanked 
at its edges by loessial bluffs, which may have inspired Grant’s description of the 
inhospitable terrain, an unpredictable mix of a powerful river and unstable bluffs.18 Close 
to the river, the site also contained two lakes, swamp land, and pools of still water, which 
periodically disappeared during seasonal floods. Today, Grand Gulf’s reactor occupies 
the eastern part of the site separated from the river by bluffs with steep slopes.  
 When MP&L surveyed the aquatic species potentially affected by Grand Gulf, 
they noted that while over one hundred species of commercial and sport fish were found 
in the lower Mississippi, in recent years, deadly fish kills had curtailed a once abundant 
source. In the early 1960s, as Pete Daniel has traced, a series of “massive and disturbing” 
fish kills occurred in the lower Mississippi—south of Memphis. A number of chemicals 
contributed to the problem, among them endrin, used as an insecticide and rodenticide.19 
The fish kills of the 1960s demonstrated the dangers of industrial and agricultural run-off, 
in addition to unregulated hazardous waste disposal. Moreover, the incidents exposed 
their far-reaching effects; potent chemicals released upstream not only traveled 
                                                
18 MP&L, Environmental Report, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (1972), 2.5-1.  
 
19 MP&L, Environmental Report, 2.7-1; Pete Daniel, Toxic Drift: Pesticides and Health 
in the Post-War World II South (LSU Press, 2007), 84-85.  
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downstream, but fish absorbed these chemicals in surprising quantities, leading to the 
jarring image of hundred pound gar and thigh-thick catfish bleeding from their gills and 
dying in large numbers. Comparatively, thermal pollution from a nuclear reactor 
appeared far more benign.  
 Forests, mainly bottomland hardwoods and loessial bluff hardwoods, such as 
sugar-berry and sweet-gum trees, occupied much of the site. During summer-time, the 
forest’s understory revealed dewberries, while the bluffs put out poison ivy and Japanese 
honeysuckle, an invasive species that thrives in the warm climates.20 Grand Gulf’s forests 
and fauna were also home to over ninety-six avian species, as identified in 1972, ranging 
from Carolina chickadees to owls to bobwhite quail. The Middle Ground Island, in the 
site’s western portion, welcomed thousands of blackbirds for roosting. Amidst the 
thriving bird population were an array of mammals, reptiles, and amphibians.21 Even as 
natural and unnatural events left Grand Gulf bereft of humans, the terrain teemed with 
other life forms.  
 Like other environmental studies conducted in the early 1970s, the survey noted 
the possibility that certain rare or endangered species might inhabit the area: the red wolf 
(canis rufous), the puma (felis concolor), the American Alligator (Alligator 
Mississipensis), and the eskimo curlew (Numenius borealis).22 While alleged sightings of 
cougars in the southeastern United States still occur, other species have since disappeared 
from the region. The last reported sighting of the avian species, the eskimo curlew, in the 
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Southeast occurred in 1987. Near Grand Gulf, only one American Alligator was spotted 
during the survey, and no sightings of red wolves had been reported since 1946.23   
In this regard, Grand Gulf’s environmental impact statement (EIS) helps illustrate 
the site’s environment as it existed in 1972, but it also pointed to an environment that 
existed only in the abstract or the imaginary—perhaps somewhere a cougar or red wolf 
roamed. Nothing in the site’s two thousand acres constituted enough of an environmental 
jewel, according to MP&L and the federal government, to halt plans for Grand Gulf. 
After all, humans had abandoned much of the vine-swarmed river gullies a century prior. 
And unlike many other forms of industrial development, the large size of nuclear plant 
sites and relatively small portion of land used, in some ways, actually preserves the land 
from destruction.24  For Grand Gulf, MP&L estimated only 300 acres, ninety-percent of 
which was forested, required clearing.25  
 While MP&L noted alternative sites in its EIS, Grand Gulf proved more 
appealing for environmental reasons and allegedly because of the economic benefits for 
Claiborne County. MP&L’s EIS statement, which often included socioeconomic details, 
noted the county’s decline in population and economic opportunities over the course of 
the twentieth-century, underlining the high employment rate, low per capita income, and 
percentage of residents receiving public assistance. As the EIS stated, Claiborne County 
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“has long been one of the most impoverished areas in the United States,” and the other 
alternative sites possessed more economic resources.26 From MP&L’s perspective, 
Claiborne County offered an ideal setting for a nuclear plant. After several years of 
licensing procedures, and a public hearing that lasted only 17 and-a-half minutes, the 
Atomic Energy Commission granted MP&L a full authorization for construction in 
September 1974.27  
 At the ground-breaking ceremony one month later, Mississippi Governor William 
Waller extoled the moment; it provided “matchless evidence that Mississippi and her 
people are moving forward to a glorious destiny.”28 The president of nearby Alcorn State 
University (one of Mississippi’s historically black colleges), Dr. Walter Washington, 
praised the plant’s potential to raise the standard of living for “all citizens,” and other 
locals expressed their hope that the plant would breath “new life and a new prosperity” 
into the area.29 The ceremony, in some respects, resembled any other of its kind with 
vague platitudes about the future and the benefits of a project. Considering the area’s dire 
poverty and poor infrastructure though, a nuclear powered future meant tangible 
improvements and significant tax revenues. While the employment numbers touted by 
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utility companies never guaranteed local jobs, particularly in the South where 
construction work was at least partially comprised of union labor and required some 
degree of skill, the other benefits offered enough to engender community support. Even if 
that entailed living in the shadow of a nuclear reactor, a bargain likely appeared better 
than the alternative.  
 Despite this, some observers expressed skepticism about the project’s benefits for 
Claiborne County. In a pamphlet published by the Black Economic Research Center, 
which is undated but likely written before construction began, writer Joseph Huttie Jr. 
raised a number of concerns about Grand Gulf. Noting the county’s poverty, Huttie 
surmised that local residents saw the “station as a guaranteed way to a better and more 
productive life,” and because of this, posing questions to locals remained “difficult.”30 
Huttie contrasted the gross disparities between the average per capita income for 
Claiborne County residents, approximately $1,860 and the estimated wage for a Grand 
Gulf Construction worker—$23,000 to $26,000. Despite the promises made by MP&L 
officials, the pamphlet pointed to a study conducted by the utility itself, which conceded 
that construction workers would likely come from outside Claiborne County. In fact, as 
the document acutely notes, even the term “local” meant something different to MP&L; 
“local” translated to the nearby cities “Vicksburg, Natchez, or Jackson.” Even if the 
county received increased tax revenue, nothing guaranteed any sort of long-term, 
widespread economic development in Claiborne County itself. While anti-nuclear 
activists would oppose Grand Gulf for other reasons in the coming years, the pamphlet 
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redirected attention to equally relevant concerns. Among them, a project “with the 
magnitude of Grand Gulf” would soon occupy a predominantly black, impoverished 
county, where African-Americans had “historically been little more than second class 
citizens.”31  
Even though the locations of nuclear plants in the South do not strongly 
correspond to racial demographics, and Claiborne County possessed exceptional 
characteristics regarding poverty and demographics in comparison to other sites, Huttie 
rightly contended that history could not be “ignored.”32 In a place with few means, where 
equality and protection under federal law had routinely failed its black citizens, building a 
high-risk system of electrical generation raised serious questions. What guarantees would 
be made by local, state, and federal officials to guarantee the safety and the well-being of 
people whose safety and rights had been ignored or willfully neglected by such entities? 
Moreover, Huttie perceptively observed that even if the plant operated safely, Claiborne 
County’s future only offered minor changes, “in which the already rich get richer while 
the poor stay poor.”33  
Tornadoes, Toads, and Three Mile Island: Obstacles to Building Grand Gulf  
 Like many nuclear plants under construction in the 1970s and 1980s, Grand Gulf 
encountered obstacles—both internally and externally produced. Beyond general issues 
that utility companies confronted, such as rising costs and a moving regulatory target, 
Grand Gulf’s problems also reflected a larger power struggle, spanning three states and 
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ensnaring consumers, laborers, politicians, utility executives, public utility commissions, 
and the federal government. Recent scholarship on energy systems has emphasized the 
hidden or invisible nature of electricity, and the disjuncture between where energy is 
produced and what places receive that power.34 To a great extent, Grand Gulf exemplifies 
the generally hidden nature of our energy systems, where rural communities or “the 
hinterlands” supply large and medium sized cities with power.35 And yet, even though 
non-activists consumers rarely expressed concern for the places that contained coal or 
nuclear plants, debates about energy choices were highly visible in the 1970s and 1980s.  
 In part, the 1970s energy crisis and fears about nuclear accidents heightened 
concerns. As the debacle over Grand Gulf illustrates though, consumers in the late 1970s 
and 1980s confronted the threat of wildly escalating utility bills to pay for nuclear power 
plants. Unlike today, local and national media outlets covered these issues relentlessly, 
often portraying nuclear reactors as boondoggles and utility executives as exceedingly 
powerful, greedy, and irresponsible. If the environmental complexities, and metropolitan 
and rural inequities, were less perceptible to those outside of places like Claiborne 
County, consumers in Mississippi and elsewhere faced enormous rate increases, 
prompting widespread outrage about government and corporate accountability. Stories of 
faulty construction, neglect from regulators, and drug use at nuclear sites only 
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exacerbated the sense that utility companies had bungled their grand plans for nuclear 
power but hesitated little in asking for rate increases to pay for their mistakes. From the 
1970s to early 1980s, economic, environmental, and energy crises converged, 
invigorating concerns about what America’s energy future would look like, how it would 
affect the environment, and who would pay for it. These concerns reverberated in 
Mississippi, Arkansas, and Louisiana, as all three states found themselves with Grand 
Gulf’s hefty price tag. Before the rate debacle occurred though, a series of other issues 
emerged during Grand Gulf’s construction. While the problems do not warrant an 
extensive discussion, they illustrate why many people felt skeptical about nuclear power, 
the difficulty MP&L had adapting to an increasingly complicated regulatory landscape, 
and the reactions from Claiborne County residents.  
 Construction at Grand Gulf occurred for several years with little fanfare or media 
attention. Interest in the plant resurged in April 1978, when a tornado ripped through the 
Grand Gulf site. The tornado’s path was 1,500 to 1,800 feet wide, with winds upward of 
125 to 150 miles per hour.36 Construction cranes toppled from the storm’s force and 
collided into one cooling tower. The collision between the crane broke a large section 
from the upper section of the tower—an image that widely circulated and made the 
structure appear vulnerable.37 The utility responded to the incident by asserting that 
damage only resulted from an unusual collision, one that would not occur during normal 
operation, but hired outside firms to inspect the damage. The event made a facility 
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allegedly invulnerable to all natural disasters—barring truly exceptional events—seem 
vulnerable even to mid-range storm. Of more consequence than the repair costs or 
construction delays, the tornado reinserted Grand Gulf into the public mind and largely 
remained there for the next decade. Adding to the renewed interest, in the fall of 1978, a 
labor strike at Grand Gulf prompted a walk-out of over two hundred carpenters.38 It was a 
small disruption but portended greater obstacles in the future for Mississippi Power & 
Light.  
 The March 1979 accident at Three Mile Island galvanized anti-nuclear activism 
across the United States. Grand Gulf, which had been immune to the large protests 
elsewhere, faced scrutiny from a small cluster of anti-nuclear organizations in 
Mississippi. While the accident at TMI loomed large in the public’s mind (evidenced by 
archival sources and polling data), other recent events also drew skepticism from 
residents in western Mississippi.39 A year earlier, a federal report named a number of 
possible sites for nuclear waste storage, among them were three sites in Mississippi. 
Residents in Richton, Mississippi reacted coolly, with one man asking “How would you 
like to live on top of an atomic bomb?...That is the ground my grandchildren are living 
on.”40 While Governor Cliff Finch described the state’s position as “unalterably 
opposed,” the possibility for federal imposition—by the way of radioactive waste 
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storage—loomed into the 1980s and has been periodically suggested as a possibility in 
the past decade. The threat encouraged a small anti-nuclear movement in Mississippi, 
which intensified after the accident at Three Mile Island. 
 In the same month as TMI, Dr. Edmund Keiser, a University of Mississippi 
biologist discovered high levels of radiation in “deformed” toads near the Tatum salt 
dome, where underground nuclear testing had been conducted in the 1960s.41 The 
biologist believed the toads were possibly exposed to tritium, the radionuclide often 
found in water sources near nuclear sites. Keiser disclosed his suspicions with a local 
Sierra Club member but cautioned against informing media outlets before further 
testing.42 Testing showed high levels of radiation, specifically sodium-22, a radioactive 
isotope of sodium, but later investigations revealed that contaminated laboratory 
equipment produced abnormally high levels of radiation.43 The radioactive toad scare 
may have passed, but even unproven nuclear controversies produced suspicion, hurting 
the industry’s credibility.  
 As fears swirled, three hundred protestors descended upon Port Gibson in June 
1979.44 Like many anti-nuclear protests, activists passed out anti-nuclear literature and 
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gave speeches about the dangers of nuclear power, advertising the slogan frequently used 
by southern anti-nuclear activists: “No Nuke’s Y’all.” Recycling a common anti-nuclear 
spectacle, protestors released five hundred balloons with a warning card affixed: “The 
winds would be carrying radioactive contamination to this point. YOU would be 
contaminated.”45 Watching the protest, an electrician employed at Grand Gulf, levied a 
familiar critique at the anti-nuclear activists. Drawing a distinction between those who 
labored and those who protested, and underscoring the types of knowledge obtained from 
laboring onsite, the electrician urged the reporter to “take a look at these people around 
here,” and concluded that if protestors “worked for a living at this like I do, they wouldn’t 
be protesting.”46 The activists, primarily from Jackson and Hattiesburg, viewed the event 
as a way to educate locals and to raise alarm about the dangers of nuclear power, but 
expressed a “little disappointment” that few Port Gibson residents joined the protest.  
 Locals, in fact, were no strangers to protest. During the 1960s, the NAACP helped 
orchestrate a boycott of white merchants in Port Gibson.47 Even after Three Mile Island, 
the local stance towards Grand Gulf ranged from supportive to ambivalent. Sarah Pearson 
Crisler, publisher of the Port Gibson Reveille, described the plant as a “boon to the entire 
town,” and then underscored the difficulty outsiders might have of its upside: “You just 
have no idea what this plant means to us, economically.”48 The town librarian, Nancy 
Batton, disclosed her growing skepticism of the plant’s safety after the tornado incident, 
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but also informed reporters that no patron had requested information on nuclear energy in 
three years, adding “that kind of tells you something about how worried people are in 
Port Gibson.”49  
 Others expressed an ambivalent view towards the plant. Reporters found resident 
Hicks McNair fishing at a pond near Grand Gulf, who aptly surmised, “Maybe it’s 
dangerous and maybe’s not.”50  While the comment captured the kind of common sense 
interpretation that reporters gravitated towards, particularly when interviewing rural 
people fishing (an exhaustingly common trope), McNair’s observation also highlighted 
how attitudes towards technology shifted based on circumstance. The people of Claiborne 
County had few options for economic opportunity, and even as allegations and proven 
violations surfaced, the thread of ambivalence continued. While views for and against 
nuclear power are generally emphasized, McNair’s comment demonstrates the real 
albatross for the industry—an inability to remove the possibility of a severe accident, 
which led to neither strong support nor outright opposition in certain cases.  
 As the fervor around the tornado, TMI, and radioactive toads subsided, larger 
problems loomed for Mississippi Power & Light and its Grand Gulf plant. First, as a 
result of a general downturn in the nuclear industry, the company suspended construction 
on Grand Gulf’s second reactor unit in 1979.51 Beyond this industry-wide trend, where 
demand for energy dropped and new reactors appeared unnecessary, a rate-controversy 
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jeopardized Grand Gulf’s future in the early 1980s, when it became unclear who would 
pay for the plant and who would buy the power it produced. Adding to this, reports of 
excessive violations, falsified documents, and shoddy construction seriously encumbered 
the final licensing process. In part, the nuclear industry spent much of the 1980s adjusting 
to a post-TMI regulatory landscape, where tightening regulations forced substandard or 
lax management to overhaul their practices.  
 More broadly, the problems occurred during transitional period for the entire 
utility industry. The 1970s energy crisis, inflation, the environmental and anti-nuclear 
movements, “technological stasis” in utility hardware, and new policies challenged the 
“utility consensus” of decades past.52 During the early twentieth century, utility 
companies built “regional electric power empires,” which were poorly regulated and 
shakily financed.53 In an attempt to ameliorate the abuses of utilities, Congress passed the 
Public Utility Holding Company Act in 1935, which “abolished most utility holding 
companies except those providing economies and efficiencies to geographically 
contiguous utilities.”54 The act limited how utility companies were organized, and the 
New Deal programs like TVA and the Rural Electrification Agency also challenged the 
authority utility companies held. Despite these measures though, utility companies 
continued to operate through smaller holding companies, where the cost of building new 
power facilities often entailed “pooling” agreements between several smaller companies, 
                                                
52 Richard F. Hirsh, Power Loss: The Origins of Deregulation and Restructuring in the 
American Electric Utility System (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1999), 9, 53-55.  
53 James Williams, “Strictly Business: Notes on Deregulating Electricity,” Technology 
and Culture 42, No. 3 (July 2001): 627. 
 
54 Richard Hirsh, Power Loss, 41.  
 
  73 
sometimes in contiguous states. Moreover, utilities still operated as “natural monopolies,” 
whose arrangements were allowed because the product served the public good. Until the 
1970s, utility companies pursued a “grow and build” strategy, which promoted electricity 
consumption “in order to justify building new, more productive power plants,” and 
consumers enjoyed low energy prices.55  
 In the late 1970s, the landscape also changed for utility companies due to Jimmy 
Carter’s National Energy Plan. The “cornerstone” of Jimmy Carter’s plan was a piece of 
legislation known as PURPA, the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act of 1978.56 
According to James Williams, PURPA “eliminated rate structures,” which favored large 
users of electricity, and it forced utilities to potentially buy electricity from industrial 
generators or small scale energy producers—such as a solar farm.57 In practical terms, 
PURPA challenged the “grow and build” strategy utilities had long advocated, which 
encouraged unrestrained usage of electricity.58 The legislation encouraged the presence of 
“soft energy” generators, which made it easier for generators of wind, solar, and other 
nontraditional forms of power generation to compete with traditional utility companies. 
PURPA also encouraged deregulation in the utility industry, one that has had some 
positive consequences with diversifying power sources, but also opened the door for 
disastrous deregulation that resulted in California’s electricity crisis in 2000 and 2001.59 
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While many utility companies failed to anticipate the larger changes PURPA spurred, an 
executive from Mississippi Power & Light sent letters to mayors in their service area 
warning them of the dire consequences if PURPA passed: the “very survival of the 
United States as a free nation is [was] threatened by the bill.” 60 An uncertain political, 
economic, and regulatory climate placed utilities in a precarious position, and perhaps 
nowhere were these shifting sands more evident than with Grand Gulf’s rate debacle.  
Grand Gulf Becomes “Grand Goof”: Populist Outrage, Bill Clinton, and the Rate Crisis 
 Like most nuclear plants undergoing construction in the late 1970s, MP&L 
repeatedly pushed back Grand Gulf’s completion date, and as delays occurred, 
construction costs soared. Suddenly, in the early 1980s, the “largest construction project 
in Mississippi” had far exceeded anticipated costs and forecasts for power consumption 
had declined, leaving MP&L desperately searching for a means to uphold a financial 
agreement from a decade prior—when the outlook about energy consumption and 
construction costs appeared very different. In the case of Grand Gulf, several smaller 
utilities within its parent company, Middle-South Utilities, were part of a system 
agreement to pay for Grand Gulf and to buy some of its power. System agreements 
offered companies a feasible way of financing large-scale projects, especially nuclear 
reactors, which even by early estimates cost upwards of five-hundred million dollars—
per reactor. For Grand Gulf, Arkansas Power & Light, New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 
Louisiana Power & Light, and MP&L had committed, perhaps unknowingly, to pay for a 
certain percentage of Grand Gulf and to buy power from it in the future. Moreover, 
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MP&L officials allegedly informed Mississippi’s Public Service Commission in 1974 
that the utility’s financial obligations for the plant only amounted to nineteen percent.61  
 The battle over who would pay for Grand Gulf ensnared utility companies, public 
service commissions, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), state and 
local governments, and consumers. Described by the Wall Street Journal as “one of the 
largest and most complicated” cases ever presented to FERC, the legal and political fight 
over funding Grand Gulf exposed the vulnerability of even well-established utilities. The 
fight revealed the extent to which electric rates were a hot-button political issue.62 In 
tandem, the rate controversy underlined and acknowledged the ongoing problem of 
poverty, the former bread and butter of southern liberals that had been replaced by 
identity-politics and obscured by the so-called Americanization of Dixie. Even if the 
politicians and state officials who issued ominous warnings about the effects of thirty 
percent rate increases for poor constituents cared little about addressing ongoing, deep-
seeded poverty in Arkansas, Mississippi, and Louisiana, they rightly inferred that 
dramatic rate increases were politically disastrous. While our energy systems appear 
“invisible” to many people today, the controversies surrounding nuclear power and the 
crisis within the utility business turned into a hyper-visible issue in the late 1970s and 
1980s.  
 In 1974, Middle-South Utilities (MSU) developed the agreement for financing 
Grand Gulf, which divided the cost between its various subsidiaries located in 
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Mississippi, Louisiana, and Arkansas. Later testimony by then Arkansas Governor Bill 
Clinton noted the surreptitious nature of the agreement; it was filed with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission but not published in the Federal Register—potentially leaving 
state public service commissions unaware of the implications.63  Then in 1977, according 
to Clinton’s testimony, Middle South Utilities president Floyd Lewis testified before 
Arkansas’s Public Service Commission that the state’s ratepayers would not be 
financially responsible for Grand Gulf if the power proved unneeded.64 Recalling the 
moment in 1986, Clinton stated that he would “never forget, if…[he lived] to be 100, the 
clear memory of …[Lewis] raising his right hand and taking oath…that we would not 
have to pay for Grand Gulf if we built all the power plants he wanted us to build.”65  
 At some point during 1979 or 1980, documents surfaced that showed AP&L had 
committed to paying for part of Grand Gulf, even if the power provided by the new plant 
was unnecessary.66 In 1980, Arkansas Power & Light left the agreement after the 
Arkansas Public Service Commission and then Attorney General Bill Clinton pressured 
Middle-South.67 The other subsidiaries reportedly signed a memorandum agreeing to 
AP&L’s exit, which pleased Arkansans but alarmed ratepayers in Mississippi and 
Louisiana. However, a formal agreement forced AP&L to guarantee loans to finance the 
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plant, but otherwise the arrangement still appeared amenable to Arkansas’s PSC, who 
feared massive rate increases as a result of Grand Gulf.68  
 As the news about the arrangement surfaced, MP&L spokesmen presented the 
possibility for buying a greater share of Grand Gulf’s power as a necessary measure to 
diversify a largely oil and natural-gas dependent regional energy system.69 But reports 
placed the potential for rate increases in stark terms. If MP&L’s allocation increased to 
over thirty-percent, a monthly electric bill that previously cost $52 dollars might soar to 
$113 dollars.70 With the national economy still sputtering in 1980, and the uneven pattern 
of economic development in the South post-World War II, many of MP&L’s customers 
could hardly afford a rate increase. In 1982, MSU’s plan for power allocation, once 
Grand Gulf went online, went before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC), while in that same year, Mississippi’s Public Service Commission demanded a 
hearing over the new cost allocations and possible rate increases.71   
 The call for a hearing by Mississippi’s Public Service Commission (MPSC) 
reflected the contentious and embittered relationship between MP&L and the MPSC, and 
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a more fundamental conflict between state officials and the federal government. MP&L 
attempted to evade a hearing, prompting condemnation from the state’s Attorney General 
Bill Allain:  
 MP&L came down here to the…[MPSC]…and got the certificate to build the  
 nuclear plant with the assurance to the commission that no more than 19 percent 
 would be used by MP&L. Now they’re running to Washington where they 
 think they will get better treatment and are thumbing their nose at the 
 commission.72 
 
As Allain suggested, MP&L’s lawyers claimed that only FERC “has exclusive 
jurisdiction” in this case and filed a motion to dismiss PSC’s order for a hearing.73 The 
stakes were much higher than increased rates; the fight over Grand Gulf threatened to 
permanently weaken the authority of states to regulate utilities. It also offered a chance 
for renewed consideration of corporate accountability and the stubborn issue of poverty. 
Attention to the latter had largely been superseded by interest in identity politics and 
social causes, but for a brief moment, the threat of increased rates prompted politicians to 
chip away at the Sunbelt façade of prosperity and progress. 
 Beyond official statements and testimony, other sources provide a good indication 
of MP&L’s views about the battle over Grand Gulf. In 1988, a former MP&L employee, 
Donald Colmer, published a book-length defense of the company and the project itself. 
Colmer blamed MP&L’s problems upon a shift in political winds, where certain 
gubernatorial administrations developed policies that reflected “regressive populism,” 
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breaking several decades of aggressive efforts to attract industry.74 With the gubernatorial 
election of Cliff Finch, a Mississippi Democrat who “sacked groceries…on his way to the 
Governor’s Mansion,” the presidential election of Jimmy Carter, and Bill Clinton’s 
gubernatorial victory in Arkansas, “populism was reborn with a vengeance.”75 Following 
Cliff Finch’s term, the election of the anti-nuclear Democrat, William F. Winter, like the 
election of Richard Riley in South Carolina, assured closer scrutiny of the nuclear 
industry and utility companies generally. Following Clinton’s lead, Bill Allain’s battle 
against MP&L also won him political points, and he succeeded Winter in 1984. From 
Colmer’s perspective, and likely many others, the populist-infused critique of utility 
companies, specifically Middle-South Utilities, brought about larger economic changes. 
Colmer characterized Jimmy Carter’s election as the “greatest tragedy” for electric 
customers in the “southern tier of states,” and lamented the anti-growth policies of so-
called populists who initiated the “heavy exodus of industry” from the United States.76   
 The populist fervor continued into 1983, when the Mississippi Public Service 
Commission, led by Lynn Havens, D.W. Snyder, and Norman Johnson, pressed MP&L 
for a public hearing on the issue, and after a series of legal skirmishes, a federal judge 
ruled backed MPSC’s request for a hearing.77 While the PSC hearing would not occur 
until June 1983, hearings before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission began in 
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March 1983. During those proceedings, public service commissions from Louisiana and 
Mississippi cited concerns about rate increases, in addition to MP&L and MSU’s 
concerted efforts to side-step state authority.78  
 Like the public service commissions in Arkansas and Mississippi, Louisiana’s 
state commission, along with the New Orleans City Council, expressed alarm at their 
financial obligation but also called for the return of Arkansas Power & Light to the 
agreement.79 By November 1983 though, the citizen group, Save Our Wetlands, decried 
the willingness of the New Orleans City Council to consider a referendum giving 
Louisiana Power & Light and New Orleans Public Service (MSU companies) exclusive 
access to their market for sixty years, described by the group as a “conspiracy between 
the City Council and the utilities.80 Despite the onslaught of criticism by public service 
commissions, citizen groups expressed doubt about their immunity from corruption.  The 
suit alleged that an earlier referendum which ceded complete control of New Orleans 
Public Service to the Louisiana Public Service Commission was “the only referendum in 
American history to be underwritten by a private corporation.”81 
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 The legal odyssey over cost-allocation and rate approvals required hearings before 
state public service commissions, primarily Mississippi’s, the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, and eventually the United States Supreme Court. In 1984, FERC’s 
administrative law judge ruled that all four generating companies should bear the cost of 
Grand Gulf and recommended AP&L’s allocation as thirty-six percent.82 Responding to 
this ruling, infuriated Arkansans allegedly mailed “hundreds of thousands of post cards” 
to President Ronald Reagan, insisting that Secretary of Energy Donald Hodel “advocate 
the ‘states’ rights’  position on this issue.”83 If Grand Gulf has faded from public memory 
today, in 1984, Arkansans named it the most important news story of the year.84 
Relishing in the furor, Governor Bill Clinton described the fight as “war,” and any 
payments from Arkansans for Grand Gulf would occur “over his dead body.”85  
 The frustration extended to Mississippi’s Public Service Commission, who 
relentlessly pursued a clear justification for any possible rate increases in the future and 
doggedly fought for the PSC’s right to intervene in such matters. After a series of bizarre 
hearings, where commissioners purposely mispronounced names, ridiculed one witness’s 
hair, and were photographed asleep during the hearings, the PSC ordered an extensive 
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audit of Grand Gulf in September 1984.86 Ignoring the recommendations by the Public 
Utilities Staff, the PSC selected Burkhalter and Company, an accounting firm based in 
Jackson, Mississippi, for the audit.87 Receiving over two million dollars for the audit, 
Burkhalter & Company found MP&L largely blame-free for Grand Gulf’s escalating 
costs, concluding that “factors causing major cost escalation and schedule slippage were 
industry-wide in nature and beyond the direct control of MP&L.”88  
 While the audit gave the PSC more substantial justification for a rate increase, 
corruption ran rampant throughout, as later federal investigations determined. On August 
11, 1987, the forty-year old lead auditor of Grand Gulf, David Charles, was found dead 
from carbon monoxide poisoning in the garage of his Jackson home.89 However, the 
coroner officially ruled the cause of death “undetermined,” and the FBI found his death 
suspicious enough to launch an investigation.90 Charles had been a friend and campaign 
aide for the hard-charging PSC Commissioners, D.W. Snyder and Lynn Havens, and 
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those ties presumably led the PSC to ignore other viable bids for the audit.91 Less than a 
year earlier, Snyder and Havens were indicted by a federal grand jury on charges of 
plotting to stall MP&L rate approval. According to the federal charges, Snyder and 
Havens attempted to force MP&L to settle a suit with United Gas Pipe Line Company, 
threatening that without an amendable settlement, MP&L would not receive a rate 
increase to pay for Grand Gulf. Havens and Snyder were allegedly bribed by Travis 
Ward, a Texas oilman, who provided free trips to Havens and Snyder, and possibly paid 
for David Charles’s trip to the Super Bowl in 1984. The core issue for federal 
investigators was whether the audit fraudulently ignored evidence of MP&L’s role in 
forcing “imprudent costs” onto consumers. Although family members cited Charles 
suffered from narcolepsy and may have fallen asleep in his vehicle, others expressed 
doubts. One friend, Barclay Rader, shared with reporters that Charles allegedly once said, 
“If they say I committed suicide, find the one who pulled the trigger.”92 The indictment 
of Haven and Snyder, along with the suspicious death of David Charles, call not only the 
audit’s conclusions into question but also taints the entire fight between the PSC and 
MP&L over rate increases.  
 In 1985 though, no corruption had yet surfaced in the Grand Gulf debacle, and 
there were more immediate concerns. Among them, the plant itself inched closer to 
officially going online and finally producing power. While MP&L and MSU officials 
sought rate relief approval, engineers readied Grand Gulf for its commercial debut, which 
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had been long-delayed after a series of obstacles and missteps. In 1982, the NRC granted 
MP&L a low-power license, and Unit One achieved criticality or “went online,” albeit on 
a much smaller scale than during commercial operation. However, due to a series of 
unresolved problems, the agency ordered the reactor to remain shut down until MP&L 
addressed the issues.93 For example, the NRC belatedly realized that technical 
specifications for Grand Gulf were borrowed from a model drawn from another plant, 
and thus, surveillance and safety procedures were not based upon Grand Gulf’s actual 
specifications.94 Grand Gulf employs a “Mark III” containment structure, which no 
operating commercial plant had at the time, so the discrepancy mattered.95 Only in 
September 1983 did the NRC grant permission for low-power operation, although a fire 
in the backup diesel generator delayed achieving criticality for another two weeks.96 A 
month later, the NRC revealed its investigation into allegations that MP&L falsified 
training data for workers at Grand Gulf. To MP&L’s credit, they self-reported the issue 
and then recertified workers, but they nonetheless ignored necessary worker 
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qualifications.97 Adding to problems, that same year, the NRC levied a $20,000 fine on 
MP&L after NRC inspector found a security guard asleep—while on duty.98 
Compounding the growing list of mistakes, the NRC levied another $12,000 fine on 
MP&L after the company allegedly failed to follow the proper administrative procedure 
after the diesel generator fire. The procedure ensured adequate communication  about 
what had been done in the aftermath, a vital aspect to managing a complex, high-risk 
technology.99  
  The violations or mishaps were not entirely unique to Grand Gulf, as media 
coverage from the period indicates. To be fair, some of the incidents covered by 
journalists were often minor in nature and were largely more illustrative of a complicated 
and evolving regulatory system created to govern complex technology than an imminent 
threat. Regulatory standards were a moving target, and turnover within the NRC also 
made expectations unpredictable. After the accident at Three Mile Island, the nuclear 
industry and the NRC underwent a period of increased scrutiny, and plants still under 
construction in the early 1980s were perhaps more likely to have aberrations or mishaps 
detected or reported. Nonetheless, some believed that Grand Gulf’s problems were 
exceptional, particularly from the anti-nuclear camp. In 1984, Congressional staffer 
Richard Udell, working for Rep. Edmund Markey (D-MA), claimed that “these people 
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are out in Mississippi trying to operate a nuclear plant –they’re not qualified to operate a 
car.”100  
 The denunciation prompted a swift response. Led by Rep. Jerry Huckaby (D-LA), 
twenty-four members of the Congressional Interior Committee complained to Chairman 
Morris Udall (D-AZ) that Udell’s remark was a “blatant slur aimed at Southerners.”101 
For MP&L, the accusations of incompetence from Udell and others implied more a slur 
on southerners; it disparaged a great accomplishment. MP&L’s Donald Lutken described 
Grand Gulf as the “eighth wonder of the modern world,” while former employee Donald 
Comer likened the plant to “Jack’s beanstalk,” which “sprang up in Claiborne County 
when grinding poverty hovered over the land like a perverse giant.”102 Whether Grand 
Gulf constituted the world’s “eighth wonder” or  a “Grand Goof,” as labeled by critics, 
the NRC eventually granted MP&L a full-power license, and the plant began commercial 
operation in July 1985.103 And yet, Grand Gulf’s entry into producing power, despite the 
previous hiccups, was overshadowed by the ongoing controversy surrounding rate 
increases.  
 By 1985, MP&L’s financial crisis spiraled further out of control. On June 13, 
1985, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) sustained the ruling that all 
four generating companies (AP&L, NOPSI, MP&L, LP&L) should share the cost of 
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Grand Gulf.104 In practical terms, the ruling meant rate increases for consumers. While 
FERC alleviated some of the pressure on MP&L, purportedly on the verge of bankruptcy, 
MSU’s subsidiaries called for rate increases.105  Despite their previously staunch 
resistance, in September 1985, Mississippi’s Public Service Commission granted MP&L 
a three-year rate increase.106 Meanwhile, the 8th Circuit Court dealt a blow to Arkansans 
by ruling that AP&L could seek a rate increase, one that allowed the subsidiary to pay for 
Grand Gulf and recover profit for its shareholders.107  Like MPSC, Arkansas’s Public 
Service Commission also settled with AP&L, and granted rate relief, in part motivated by 
a desire to avoid federal intervention and larger rate-increase.108 Senator Dale Bumpers 
(D-AR) expressed dire warnings that rate increases would make “a Sahara out of my 
state,” and contemporary observers pointed to Reynolds Metals closing two aluminum 
plants days after the rate hike as evidence of its effects.109  
 To be sure, the rate increases disrupted a long-standing benefit touted by southern 
politicians: cheap electricity. And yet, like professional sports teams who hold 
metropolitan areas hostage with their demands for expensive facilities, Reynolds Metals 
escaped the villainous portrayals that MP&L experienced. The very product that utilities 
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provided, one that had allowed the companies to exist as “natural monopolies” since they 
served the public good,  heightened scrutiny directed at their practices—which other 
corporations ducked. Amidst a deregulatory, free trade climate, corporations somehow 
remained unscathed, and southern politicians—both Republican and Democrat—had 
become so accustomed to offering corporate incentives that when companies like 
Reynolds laid off 1,000 workers in Arkansas, only Middle-South Utilities appeared as the 
boogeyman.  
 Nonetheless, Arkansas politicians drove efforts to enhance the powers of state 
public service commissions. Even before FERC’s official ruling in July 1985, Senator 
Dale Bumpers (D-AR) and Senator David Pryor (D-AR) cosponsored legislation to 
address the limited means state commissions possessed in setting rates. The Ratepayer 
Protection Act of 1985 lingered before Congressional committees and never passed. 
More notable was the testimony of an aspiring politician, Bill Clinton, who supported the 
bill and whose personal history with the Grand Gulf controversy began in 1977.  
 In his testimony, given in July 1986, Clinton articulated the fundamental issues at 
stake, while also detailing how the fight over Grand Gulf shaped his own outlook on 
power, corporate accountability, and poverty. Stating the controversy had “consumed a 
fair amount” of his public life, Clinton blamed his trust in the assurances of MSU 
President Floyd Lewis on naivety and youthfulness, concluding that he “believed [then] 
that you could believe anybody’s word if they gave it under oath and realized that they 
could perjure themselves if they did not tell the truth.”110 While some satirized Clinton’s 
fight against MSU as a “thinly veiled political aid,” his testimony and other public 
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statements highlighted issues of long-standing importance to the American South but also 
about the nature of corporate regulation in the United States.111 For Clinton, removing the 
states’ authority to regulate utilities and to intervene when companies betrayed their 
promises or acted imprudently, disproportionately skewed the balance of power towards 
the federal government, or worse, private interests. According to Clinton, the effect of 
this imbalance and corporate favoritism was disorienting:  
 I  think I know how people feel in countries such as those that are memorialized 
 in novels like Animal Farm and 1984. You never know where you are. Power is 
 total, arbitrary, and absolutely unconcerned with the interest of the ordinary 
 citizens.112 
 
Whatever his motivations, Clinton articulated a populist message aimed at the 
contradictions within the federal government and Ronald Reagan’s administration. 
Calling the Grand Gulf debacle a “profoundly disturbing harbinger,” Clinton goaded 
Reagan’s administration, citing the dispute as “real chance” to “get the federal 
government off our backs.”113  The new sources of power, as Clinton stated, now 
appeared abstract and total in their authority.  
 During his testimony, Clinton chiseled away at the acceptance of greed as a best 
practice and the indifference of the federal government. More striking, the testimony, in 
its revelation of the region’s endemic poverty, challenged a vision of the modern South, 
one characterized by metropolitan growth, southern lifestyle magazines, and embrace of 
the hallmarks of the 1980s economy—technology, real estate, finance, and defense 
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spending. Clinton’s testimony alleged that underneath the glossy surface, one that rate 
increases of twenty or thirty percent threatened to expose, existed a very different reality, 
where some people could barely afford to pay their bills at their current rate:  
 So what we have here is a case where, in the case of Middle South, the poorest 
 people  in the United States of America, in States with higher than average 
 unemployment rates, higher than average poverty rates, and how higher than 
 average utility bills, are being told you are a second-class citizen. You cannot 
 come to Washington and have your concerns heard. Nobody knows what you are 
 living like out  there…maybe living on $200 a month…We do not  care what 
 happens to you. We are going to give the utility its money no matter how stupid 
 the decision was, how arrogant it was, or what your State was promised.114 
 
 As historian Judith Stein has detailed, both major political parties failed to address 
major shifts in American economy during the 1970s—changes they were partly 
responsible for. While Reagan-era cuts towards social-welfare programs hurt 
impoverished communities, more damaging was the decline in manufacturing and labor 
unions, acquiescence to corporate greed, and federal policies that encouraged 
deindustrialization and limited investment into sectors of production—all patterns that 
politicians in the 1970s addressed inadequately.115 To be poor in the eighties, as Clinton’s 
testimony underscored, implied a kind of statelessness, where the government colluded 
with corporations, the chasm between the powerful and the seemingly powerless grew, 
and those with power appeared blithely unaware of the repercussions.  
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 Confirming Clinton’s suspicions, the US Supreme Court ruled on the Grand Gulf 
case in 1988. Prior to the ruling, in 1985, Mississippi’s Public Service Commission 
granted MP&L a rate increase, supported by the audit led by David Charles, who died of 
carbon monoxide poisoning two months after the Supreme Court’s ruling. The state’s 
attorney general and several consumer groups challenged MPSC’s authority to increase 
rates, charging that the grounds of prudence were not sufficiently shown. The case went 
before the Mississippi Supreme Court, who agreed that “prudence” in avoiding excessive 
cost had not been demonstrated, challenging FERC’s ability to “pre-emptively” rule on 
questions of rates or determine prudence. Resisting this view, the US Supreme Court 
ruled that “Mississippi’s effort to invade the province of federal authority must be 
rejected” and reversed the ruling. Historically, Mississippians had crafted a variety of 
ways to “invade” or curtail federal authority but for less noble purposes. Nonetheless, 
after the ruling, further negotiations over what form rate increases would take, and how 
much power each subsidiary would buy occurred over the next several years.  
   Race, Taxes, and the Distribution of Power  
 As the rate controversy continued, another issue surfaced regarding the 
distribution of tax payments from Grand Gulf.  While not as closely followed as the rate 
controversy, which affected consumers in three states, the massive tax payments from 
Grand Gulf produced very similar questions about poverty, inequality, corruption, and 
greed. In the early 1970s, when MP&L sought to build Grand Gulf, among the benefits 
cited for Claiborne County were increased tax revenues. Generally, nuclear plants offer 
revenue-poor rural areas a significant, long-term means of improving local infrastructure, 
public services, and schools. Living near a nuclear plant poses a risk to local populations, 
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and one important means of off-setting that risk entails boosting the county’s coffers with 
large tax payments. In 1983, some Mississippi state legislators, believing that Claiborne 
County, despite its poverty and limited opportunities, was “getting too much a ‘good 
thing,’ ” introduced a measure to redistribute property tax payments from Grand Gulf.116 
 Similar measures had been introduced in previous years, but legislators continued 
their pursuit. Instead of Claiborne County receiving most of the property tax payments 
from Grand Gulf, legislators proposed “redistributing” the wealth to all of MP&L’s 
service counties, conveniently ignoring the fact that those communities did not live by the 
nuclear reactor. The initial measure proposed redistributing seventy-five percent of 
property tax paid by MP&L to all service counties.117 Rep. Fred Banks, Jr. of Jackson 
questioned “why should one small county have all that property to tax far beyond the 
needs of that county.”  Legislators proposed redistribution occur based upon how much 
electricity counties consumed, and in the case of Rep. Banks’s constituents, Hinds 
County, where the city of Jackson is located, stood to gain the most from the 
redistribution. Echoing Banks, Rep. Dick Hall of Jackson mused, “We’re talking about 
totally different numbers than we have before. We’re talking about 21st century 
legislation. We never dreamed of values like this.”118  
 While some legislators salivated over millions of dollars in added tax revenue, 
others expressed their frustration and near bewilderment at the situation. Rep. Charles 
Sheppard of Lorman, a small town near Grand Gulf, declared that a county’s ability to 
                                                
116 Cliff Trevens, “Grand Gulf tax dollar controversy,” Clarion Ledger, February 8, 1983.  
 
117 Ibid.  
 
118 Ibid.  
 
  93 
tax property within its borders was “a Constitutional right,” and that the measure exposed 
divisions between rural communities and urban areas. Evan Doss, Claiborne County’s tax 
assessor, and the state’s first African-American elected to the position in 1973, concluded 
that the legislators’ maneuvering was “a racist thing simply because black people are 
controlling the money.”119 Doss, not immune to corruptive influences either, underscored 
the pressing needs of Claiborne County residents: “We’re on the bottom right now. 
We’ve got poverty running rampant…Oh God, there are so many things we need to 
do.”120  
 The numbers bore out a slightly different picture, although not one of prosperity.  
In 1982 alone, Claiborne County received ten million dollars in tax payments from Grand 
Gulf. Moreover, due to the plant’s construction, the local economy had grown and 
unemployment reduced, dropping from over 12.4 percent in 1971 to 7.6 percent in 1981, 
and the median family income improved from $4,583 in 1969 to $13,904 in 1979.121 The 
country’s wealth in terms of tax collection grew considerably, but the employment and 
income statistics were illusory. With the boost, Claiborne County climbed county 
rankings in income. However, what those rankings actually suggested was not that 
Claiborne County’s problems had disappeared, but that many Mississippians still lived in 
abject poverty. Once temporary construction worked ended, the local economy faced a 
downturn, and the long-standing problems of poverty in a predominantly rural 
community remained.  
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 The legislation failed in 1983, but legislators doggedly reintroduced the measure 
until it passed. In part, the threat of increased rates for all MP&L consumers supported 
their logic that Claiborne County needed to share its newfound wealth.122 In 1986, the 
House Ways and Means Committee approved a bill that exempted Grand Gulf from local 
property taxes, approximately $14 million annually, and instead imposed “a state charge 
of 2 percent of the value,” or approximately $16 million. From this measure, Claiborne 
County would receive fifty percent of the payments in 1987, with a five percent reduction 
annually until 1991 and receive thirty percent after that date. The new bill required ten 
percent to go into state’s general fund, and the remaining money redistributed to the other 
forty-four counties—on the basis of their electricity consumption.123 Ironically, Governor 
Bill Allain, who crusaded against MP&L as attorney general and governor, signed the bill 
into law in April 1986—and the spirit of “populist vengeance” withered in political 
compromise. Then in June 1986, Mississippians voted on a  referendum, one that would 
further diminish Claiborne County’s power to tax. In a narrow approval, 50.6 percent of 
voters approved a constitutional amendment, Section 112, that essentially stripped the 
ability of local governments to tax nuclear power plants and gave the state legislature 
those powers instead.124 Referendum opponents in Claiborne County charged the 
amendment violated the Civil Rights Act of 1965 and levied accusations of racial 
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motivations.125 Like the rate controversy, the issue lingered in Mississippi courts, and 
attorneys for Claiborne County fought for a more equitable settlement until 1990, while 
tax revenue accumulated undispersed.  
 Finally, on June 26, 1990, Governor Ray Mabus (Dem.) signed into law an 
official settlement. The bill raised the revenue Grand Gulf’s owners would pay from $16 
million to $20 million and required reimbursement to Claiborne County, the city of Port 
Gibson, the school system, and the state for loss of property taxes (in lieu of). From the 
$20 million, the bills dictated that Claiborne County receive $8 million annually, Port 
Gibson receive $640,000 annually, the state of Mississippi receive $1.2 million, and the 
rest of the funds would be distributed to MP&L’s remaining service counties. Of $17 
million in an escrow fund that accumulated during the protracted litigation, Claiborne 
County received $2 million and an additional $500,000 went to an emergency 
management agency in case of a nuclear accident.126 The settlement guaranteed a still 
sizable amount of revenue for Claiborne County, but the ability to tax nuclear plants 
within their borders ultimately became the purview of the state. The battle over 
distributing tax revenue, while less glamorous than other topics, captured the struggle 
over power in a changing political landscape, one with new political actors and perhaps 
older lingering suspicions about African-American political power, fading paternalist 
tendencies, and a pot of money too large for an anti-tax state to ignore.  
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 Despite denials from legislators, Mississippi’s history made the cries of poverty, 
inequality, and race in the tax dispute difficult to deny. A poor, rural, predominantly 
black county had its power to tax certain property within its own borders removed and 
legally enshrined in the state’s constitution. Echoing a past where white southerners used 
arcane legal loopholes to deny African-Americans the rights of citizenship, legislators 
had pursued—since 1972—control of Grand Gulf’s tax revenue. In the Grand Gulf tax 
controversy, vestiges of the South’s past confronted a new era, where the “search for 
equality” gave way to the “search for usable political power,” which sometimes entailed 
betraying your own community.127  
 During his long term as Claiborne County’s tax assessor from 1972 to 1995, Evan 
Doss, Jr., gained political power and financial resources from his position. In 1996, 
Mississippi’s Office of the State Auditor (OSA) demanded repayment of $260,600 from 
Doss, stating that as tax assessor, he misappropriated funds. Attorney General Mike 
Moore then filed charges stating that Doss, in fact, embezzled $652,368 from Claiborne 
County tax collections from 1993 to1996 (even after his period as assessor). Doss 
repeatedly denied the allegations, describing the charges as a “slap in [his] face.”128 The 
evidence, however, suggested that Doss had engaged in a “lapping scheme,” where tax 
records appear in order, but bank deposits show missing sums of money. These schemes 
can go undetected for long periods of time until the source of income covering the 
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shortages disappears, or in Doss’s case, he stepped down from the position to run for 
office, disrupting the scheme.   
 Doss’s problems continued with a federal indictment. He decried the accusations 
as politically-motivated—not an unreasonable position. Whatever the motivations, the 
evidence against Doss’s actions was staggering; he robbed the people of Claiborne 
County for years, despite his protestations to the contrary. Phil Bryant, the state auditor in 
1997, concluded that “the citizens of Claiborne County were not well served by Evan 
Doss. His violation of the trust placed in him is legendary in Mississippi.”129 In May 
1997, a jury convicted Doss on all nine counts, and a judge sentenced him to four years in 
prison and fined him $186,000 dollars.130  
 Even with the evidence clearly stacked against his innocence, Doss claimed the 
prosecutors were racially-motivated, a charge they denied. Judge David Bramlette 
(appointed by George H. Bush) cited character, not race, as the reason for Doss’s 
convictions, concluding that “this defendant served himself” instead of Claiborne 
County.131 Doss’s white collar crimes haunted him even in prison, after he and his sister, 
Leola Dickey, attempted to illegally conceal assets after declaring bankruptcy.132 
Although Doss’s innocence seems unlikely, dislodging race entirely from the 
investigation and his prosecution is difficult, but those forms of prejudice and hostility 
operate in subtle ways that are more challenging to prove. In recent years, Doss has 
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resurrected himself, at least to some extent, serving as the president of the NAACP’s 
local chapter and participating in local Nuclear Regulatory Commission hearings, 
advocating perhaps for the people of Claiborne County.  
 As for the Grand Gulf nuclear plant, it continues to operate today, perched above 
a place defined by tragedy and decay. Newspaper reports in the 1960s, before MP&L 
announced its plans, described Grand Gulf as a “ghost town” but celebrated the recent 
arrival of the newly christened Grand Gulf Military Park, whose creation commemorated 
the “glory of Grand Gulf.”133 In 1962, glorifying American Civil War history reeked of 
subtext, one infused by the growing threats to white supremacy by the civil rights 
movement. Decades later, when former MP&L employee Donald Colmer waxed 
nostalgic about Grand Gulf’s nuclear reactor, he characterized the plant’s prominent 
cooling tower in surprisingly stark terms: “in one of the poorest counties of the poorest of 
states stands a towering symbol of power.”134  
 Nearly thirty years later, the statement needs little revision. If not the poorest 
county in Mississippi, Claiborne County suffers from high poverty, and anywhere from 
thirty to forty percent of residents live below the poverty line. Signs of the impoverished 
present, with its vacant businesses and dilapidated homes, sit uncomfortably alongside 
vestiges of the past. Visitors might come to see Port Gibson’s First Presbyterian Church 
(c. 1859), with its iconic hand perched atop the steeple, or explore the crumbling 
headstones of Grand Gulf’s cemetery. After that, they might drive a few miles further, 
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along winding back roads that stretch deep into the piney woods to find the “Ruins of 
Windsor,” where the charred columns of a former plantation display another towering 
symbol of power—opulence built upon a troubled history. More likely, visitors seek the 
ruins of Windsor for what local guides describe as a window into the “glorious” southern 
past.  
 Nuclear power plants produce discordant scenery, or perhaps make traces of the 
past and the present more visible, and these symbols of power transform in different 
contexts. In 1974, scholar Langdon Winner visited Diablo Canyon in central California, 
where construction for the Diablo Canyon nuclear plant had begun years earlier. Against 
the backdrop of the Pacific coast, with its spectacular jagged rocks and “blanket of surf,” 
stood the future nuclear reactors housed in two giant domes that “looked slightly obscene 
like breasts protruding from some oversized goddess.”135 Looking beyond the site, 
Winner spotted a California grey whale, which “shot a tall stream of vapor from its blow 
hole and into the air and then disappeared into the ocean.”136 What Winner described as a 
“chance juxtaposition” set into stark relief two symbols: “the power of nature and of 
human artifice.”137 For Winner, and likely the thousands of protestors arrested at Diablo 
Canyon in the 1980s, nuclear reactors had no place along a beautiful stretch of Pacific 
coastline, especially one where potential seismic activity posed a terrifying worst case 
scenario. Grand Gulf, tucked between river gullies and kudzu vines, and on the banks of 
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the “big muddy,” perhaps strikes some as less spectacular. There are no jagged ocean 
coves or whales spouting vapor, but ghosts linger in the ravines of what General Ulysses 
Grant called “the most broken country” he ever saw. These are the kinds of places that 
outsiders might find unspectacular, and yet, the sight of a heron, alone and pensive, along 
the banks of the Mississippi captures those two symbols of power—nature and 
technology jostling for position—just as well.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
THE LOUISIANA WAY AND THE REACTOR: NUCLEAR POWER ON 
THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER  
 
 Two hundred miles south, Waterford Unit 3, one of two nuclear reactors in 
Louisiana, sits squarely between the Mississippi River and Lake Pontchartrain, and 
twenty-five miles north of New Orleans. St. Charles Parish, where Waterford is located, 
contains a larger population (approximately 50,000) and greater industry than Claiborne 
County. Nestled between chemical plants and pipelines, the area, and river parishes like 
it, have been dubbed “cancer alley” due to the high rate of industrial emissions and 
cancer among its residents. And like the stretch between Vicksburg and Natchez, 
Mississippi, where visitors can follow the “Blues Trail” along Highway 51, or gawk at 
historic plantation homes, St. Charles Parish and the adjacent areas also contain traces of 
the past, with many of its former sugar plantations restored, while others remain buried 
beneath the industrial present. Waterford, like Grand Gulf, occupy in-between spaces, 
where vestiges of an older history confront New South schemes, and the short twenty five 
miles between New Orleans and Waterford seems better measured in time and culture 
than by distance on a map.  
 Grand Gulf and Waterford share a common river and a common owner, the utility 
conglomerate Entergy, and both are situated in places deeply embedded in southern 
history. Waterford’s single reactor helps power the vast industrial corridor between Baton 
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Rouge and New Orleans and generates electricity for consumers throughout Entergy’s 
service area. Like Grand Gulf, the Waterford site and surrounding area contains a rich 
history, one forged in an older economy built upon insatiable appetites and human 
bondage. And like Grand Gulf, the history of Waterford demonstrates the ways in which 
energy systems, or rather the systems humans devise, build order in our world.1  
 As Langdon Winner contended, social and political orders can bear their imprint 
upon technologies, and large-scale, high risk technologies invite these imprints. Nuclear 
power plants, while federally regulated, still require coordination between local and state 
governments, and the utilities themselves. Waterford, if roughly similar to other reactors, 
bore the marks of the “Louisiana way,” where corporations received lavish incentives 
from the state and expected little scrutiny of their methods. Waterford’s history, like 
Grand Gulf, illustrates a vast regulatory system adjusting to a post-Three Mile Island 
world and the difficulties of managing large-scale engineering projects.  
 Waterford Unit 3, a nuclear reactor placed in one of the most vulnerable areas in 
the country—to both “natural” and unnatural disasters, offers a window into an evolving 
and imperfect system of risk assessment. Long before Hurricane Katrina made landfall in 
2005, the construction of Waterford highlighted a growing “technological disaster 
subculture” in southern Louisiana.2  Even if residents in the river parishes and New 
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Orleans had become accustomed to oil spills and hazardous chemical releases, the 
introduction of a nuclear plant forced many to reckon with a variety of worst case 
scenarios. As Ted Steinberg has observed, “natural” disasters or “acts of God,” in modern 
America are rarely disasters solely of divine providence but rather a collision between 
man-made and natural forces.3  As Waterford’s history shows, the systems for assessing 
risk and locating nuclear reactors reflect value judgments about people, places, and 
ultimately, what our society and government chooses to save from “acts of God,” or in 
the case of nuclear power, from human error or “normal accidents.”4  
 The Waterford plant is located in Killona, a census-designated place in St. Charles 
Parish, one of the many “river parishes” adjacent to the Mississippi River.5 Like the other 
river parishes between Baton Rouge and New Orleans, industry, especially petrochemical 
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industries, have become a well-established part of the landscape. Along the corridor, the 
presence of both heavy industry and historic rural communities create what scholar 
Barbara Allen calls a “strange juxtaposition.”6 Directly across from Waterford, the 
Bonnet Carré spillway diverts floodwaters from the Mississippi River into Lake 
Pontchartrain when necessary. Built after the Great Flood in 1927, the spillway and the 
levees along the river offer another reminder of an uneasy alliance between man, nature, 
and technology.7  
 The site surrounding Waterford was once known as the “German Coast,” coined 
after Germans first settled the area in the early 18th century.8 Karl Friedrich 
d’Arensbourg, led establishment of a German community in the area, which included 
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building his own residence near the Waterford site.9 Descendants of the D’Arensbourgs 
owned the land until 1849, when the land was purchased by William B. Whitehead and 
Company. The documentary record and archaeology surveys suggest that sugar cane 
cultivation began as early as 1828 on site, and several plantations were likely 
consolidated in the mid-19th century. In 1879, Richard Milliken officially named the 
property the Waterford Plantation. A year later, black workers from Waterford and the 
nearby Dugan Plantation (Killona) joined together in a labor  strike for higher wages. 
Strikes spread to eighteen plantations, and federal troops eventually intervened.10 But 
otherwise, the Waterford site quietly operated as a sugar mill until 1951.  
 Waterford’s three thousand acre site was typical of former sugar cane plantations, 
with the northern section’s environment formerly used to cultivate sugar cane, while the 
southern half remained “uncultivated,” wooded swamp and marshland.11 The site’s 
environment resembled other marshland and swamps in the area, with oaks forests and 
cypress gum trees, a diverse avian population, amphibians, and many reptiles, including 
the American alligator, considered an endangered species until 1987.12  In 1963, 
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Louisiana Power & Light (LPL) bought the Waterford site, built two steam generator 
plants and then began construction on the Waterford nuclear plant in the 1970s. While 
fragments of the site’s history remain, including sections of the overseer’s home and 
tenant housing built after the Civil War, the most-intact marker of Waterford’s past is the 
“plantation bell,” which was donated to LP&L and is now preserved on site. The 
plantation bell and the nuclear reactor capture the river corridor landscape, with its 
“bizarre backdrop,” to borrow Barbara Allen’s phrase, where the plantation past meets an 
industrial present.13  
 Decades earlier, Louisiana’s growing oil industry attracted industry to the area, 
but by the mid-twentieth, heavy industry also flocked towards the river corridor, with 
companies buying former plantation land for petro-chemical plants and other industrial 
purposes.14 This stretch of river also contains the Port of South Louisiana, which extends 
fifty-four miles long and ranks among the top five ports in the country for tonnage.15  
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Because of lucrative incentives, including ten year tax exemptions from property tax and 
easy access for shipping, industries streamed into the river parishes.16 By the early 1970s, 
numerous chemical companies were located near the site. Less than a mile from 
Waterford, Hooker Chemical manufactured caustic sodas and chlorine, with a capacity to 
produce nearly one billion pounds of chlorine annually. Other facilities included the 
Union Carbide plant, which produced organic chemicals, and as late as 1981, could store 
up to 482 million pounds of hazardous materials. In addition to chemical and 
petrochemical facilities, according to a 1981 safety evaluation, forty-three major 
pipelines, described as “potentially hazardous,” carrying industrial liquids and gases were 
located within five miles of the Waterford site.”17  
 Living near the industrial matrix were several small communities. Killona, a 
predominantly African-American community with approximately one thousand residents 
circa 1977, sits a mile from Waterford.18 Across the river, the community of Norco 
contained several thousand residents living near a major Shell refinery. Twenty-five 
miles south was the city of New Orleans. But like other rural places, urban areas located 
twenty or thirty miles away often seem much further, and that perception of distance has 
undoubtedly only grown. The contrast between a small, rural community like Killona and 
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New Orleans make the two places seem worlds apart. Connecting those worlds are power 
lines, flowing from rural spaces into energy-hungry metropolitan areas.  
 Efforts to attract nuclear-related business, and industry generally, accelerated in 
the 1950s and 1960s. Louisiana and other southern states engaged in a “race to the 
bottom” promising lavish-tax incentives, less stringent pollution controls, and passing 
right-to-work laws in order to attract industry to their states.19 Seizing the nuclear 
momentum, the state of Louisiana ratified the Southern Interstate Nuclear Compact in 
1960. Two years later, the state legislature passed the Nuclear Energy Act, which created 
a Division of Radiation Control, an agency that regulated the use of radiation and 
radioactive materials within the state, and transferred certain regulatory responsibilities 
from the federal government to the state of Louisiana.20 To promote nuclear-oriented 
development, the act also created a Board of Nuclear Energy in 1962.21 Led by Clarence 
“Taddy” Aycock, who served three consecutive terms as lieutenant governor from 1960-
72, the Board initially advertised Louisiana’s amenable climate for businesses using 
radiation, promising “the advantages offered” were “unequaled by any other state.”22 
Among those advantages, the state lured industry by offering an exemption for a total of 
ten years from local property taxes, while another legislative measure ensured industries 
would receive “fair tax treatment” afterwards. Still other measures further incentivized 
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businesses by offering natural gas at lower rates, and allowed “political subdivisions” to 
issue bonds to construct plants for new manufacturers.23  
 Utilities also benefited from these inducements. Joining the nuclear band-wagon, 
Louisiana Power & Light announced their plans to build the Waterford nuclear plant in 
1970.24 Two years later, the AEC granted LP&L a construction exemption that allowed 
the company to begin excavation below the levee onsite, part of the massive series of 
levees constructed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.25 By 1973, LP&L submitted 
their “final” environmental impact statement, although another more detailed EIS would 
be published in 1981.  
 The licensing process moved slowly though. Congressman David Treen, the first 
Republican representative from Louisiana elected since the turn of the century (and a 
future governor), represented the district where Waterford was located and wrote to AEC 
Chairwoman Dixie Lee Ray, to “strongly request that the application process be 
expedited” because Louisiana Power & Light was “entitled to prompt action.”26 The AEC 
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responded coolly to Treen’s request, and four years after LP&L’s initial announcement, 
on February 19, 1974, a public hearing finally occurred—the final step before receiving a 
full construction permit. Unlike Grand Gulf’s hearing, which reportedly lasted for 
seventeen minutes and generated little opposition initially, concerns about Waterford 
were more prevalent, particularly from residents in New Orleans.  
 The opposition reflected growing concerns about water quality and industrial 
pollution in Louisiana. The city of New Orleans drew its drinking water from the 
Mississippi River, and industries frequently discharged their contaminants into the river, 
essentially treating the river as a “sink” for industrial waste.27 In fact, Waterford’s safety 
analysis report, describe the river as the “ultimate heat sink,” where heat is discharged 
into the river to cool the plant.28 During the late 1960s, the problem had grown to such an 
extent that treatment facilities were unable to rid the city’s drinking water of “chemical” 
and “oily” tastes.29 Given this context, Waterford’s location and reliance upon the river 
understandably made some residents nervous. LP&L’s Waterford design employs a 
“once through” system, which draws and discharges water directly from and into the 
Mississippi River, compared to a system that requires a cooling tower and reuses water 
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for cooling purposes.30 Some feared that Waterford’s release of radiation might harm 
aquatic species and further pollute an already severely polluted section of the Mississippi 
River.31  
 Among those expressing their concerns, the hearing featured one formal 
intervenor, Robert Head, publisher of a local alternative newspaper, Nola Express, and 
his lawyer. Head’s interventions addressed a number of issues, including radiation 
monitoring, technical design issues, and the effects upon aquatic biota.32 In addition to 
Head, the NRC granted thirty-eight individuals “limited appearances,” which allowed for 
brief statements.33 Local environmental organizations embraced the opportunity, despite 
their doubts about the Atomic Energy Commission’s desire to incorporate the public’s 
input into their decision making. Although some pointed to Waterford-specific issues, 
others used the hearing for a broader platform. Ross Vincent, president of the Ecology 
Center of Louisiana, argued that technical issues obscured the “real issues” at stake. 
According to Vincent, the debates surrounding Waterford extended far beyond radiation 
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monitoring or design schematics: “people here in Louisiana are beginning to raise 
questions about high-ways and bridges, about development in the wetlands, about 
excessive energy consumption and the need for facilities such as Waterford.”34 In this 
sense, debates about nuclear power intersected with an array of other concerns about 
energy and the environment, which refracted onto one another. Simplified further, 
Vincent laid bare the fundamental question Waterford raised; it involved “the way in 
which people in this area perceive their collective future.”35 For a growing number of 
people, a better collective future required greater care for an interconnected environment 
and more public input about local energy systems.  
 The public hearings were intended to counter accusations that the nuclear industry 
and the federal government were overly secretive and ignored community input, and 
reflected an effort to establish greater credibility with the public.  While the hearings 
rarely satisfied activists, they nonetheless allowed limited public participation and put 
pressure on utility companies and regulatory agencies, particularly with environmental 
issues, evacuation plans, and other safety concerns. With the hearings finished, the 
Atomic Energy Commission finally issued LP&L a construction permit on November 14, 
1974, and full-scale construction began.36  
                                                
34 Statement of J. Ross Vincent, Ecology Center of Louisiana, Feb. 19, 1974, Hearing 
Before An Atomic Safety and Licensing Board of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 
Folder: Waterford, #3, 1971-76, Box 2, Department of Justice, Matter of Louisiana 
Power & Light, Co. 1971-1984, State of Louisiana Archives (LSA).  
35 Statement of J. Ross Vincent, Ecology Center of Louisiana, Feb. 19, 1974, Hearing 
Before An Atomic Safety and Licensing Board of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 
Folder: Waterford, #3, 1971-76, Box 2, Department of Justice, Matter of Louisiana 
Power & Light, Co. 1971-1984, State of Louisiana Archives.  
36 “LP&L Gets Permit for Atomic Plant,” The Ruston Daily Leader, November 20, 1974.  
  113 
 Like many other nuclear plants built during the late 1970s, obtaining a 
construction permit rarely portended an obstacle-free path and opposition to the plant 
continued. The opposition took three forms: formal legal interventions, organized protest, 
and small-scale, individual expressions through letters to Louisiana’s leaders. A number 
of local organizations including Save Our Wetlands, the Oystershell Alliance, the Sierra 
Club’s New Orleans branch and Delta Chapter, and the Louisiana Ecology Center, 
actively protested or heartily scrutinized Waterford 3. Public protests occurred in 1978 
and 1979, with later protests slightly more invigorated by the accident at Three Mile 
Island. In May 1978, local media reported that a motorcade of seventy-five cars drove 
from New Orleans to the Waterford site, and two-hundred protestors held a three hour 
event, delivering speeches, chanting “No Nukes!,” and carrying anti-nuclear signs.37 
Days after TMI, in April 1979, protestors, led by the Oystershell gathered outside city 
hall in New Orleans, “trying to get Mayor Ernest Morial to oppose construction” of 
Waterford.38 In their signature slogan, protestors in New Orleans nodded to the area’s 
culinary heritage and a terrifying nuclear powered future: “How do you like your oysters? 
Raw, Fried, or Radioactive?”39 
 On the legal front, Save Our Wetlands (SOWL), a local organization, filed several 
lawsuits, which usually represented a collective effort with other local, anti-nuclear and 
environmental groups.40 In December 1977, the group filed a lawsuit against LP&L and 
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the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which contended that Waterford had lowered 
property values for several developments near Lake Pontchartrain and that the Price-
Anderson Act, which initially set liability for a nuclear accident at $560 million dollars, 
inadequately protected residents from any financial losses incurred from nuclear 
accidents.41 SOWL has gained notoriety in recent years for another lawsuit they filed in 
1977. Uniting a broad base of opposition in St. Tammany parish, SOWL filed suit against 
the US Army Corps of Engineers for their barrier plan, “which included levees and 
structures to impede a storm surge from entering Lake Pontchartrain.”42  
When Hurricane Betsy arrived onshore in September 1965, massive flooding 
occurred in New Orleans. In response, Congress authorized funding for a barrier plan.43 
With the passage of the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) in 1969 and the 
added requirement of filing an environmental impact statement, opponents to the barrier 
plan gained the ability to more effectively halt developments that potentially endangered 
the environment.44 The court issued an injunction against certain components of the 
barrier plan, due to an “inadequate environmental impact statement,” and the Corps 
shifted their focus from the barrier plan to a “high-level option,” which Craig Colten has 
argued was more acceptable to the public and less damaging to the environment. 
Residents in St. Tammany opposed having storm water diverted into their community, 
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while environmentalists worried the barrier plan encouraged unimpeded development in 
local wetlands.45 The new plan focused on preventing “overtopping of the outfall canals,” 
which required higher levees, and “not keeping the storm surge” out of Lake 
Pontchartrain.46 Over the next several decades, the plan had various levels of completion, 
faced delays in environmental assessment, continued public opposition to local impacts, 
and other complications. After the levees broke following Hurricane Katrina in 2005, 
conservative media quickly latched onto the 1977 lawsuit, claiming that 
environmentalists caused the devastating flooding that occurred in New Orleans. It was a 
convenient scapegoat for a much more complicated problem, which obscured the broad-
based opposition to the barrier plan in the 1970s, the flawed approach of the Corps of 
Engineers, the vast environmental changes development had produced in southern 
Louisiana, and an array of other factors that made the city vulnerable to catastrophic 
flooding.47  
 While SOWL’s 1977 lawsuits might appear unrelated, they reflected a growing 
awareness that southern Louisiana’s fragile ecosystems and large bodies of water made 
not only its environment vulnerable but also underscored the vulnerability of people 
living there too. Moreover, there were no easy answers to these problems. Beyond the 
court room, anti-nuclear and environmental organizations, along with residents generally, 
expressed other concerns about rate increases, thermal pollution, and evacuation 
measures. Regarding the latter, residents living near Waterford 3, whether in the river 
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parishes or twenty-five miles southeast in New Orleans, feared LP&L and the NRC had 
not properly planned for a full-scale evacuation. In part, Hurricane Betsy in 1965 
dramatically showed how natural disasters could undermine man-made protections 
against flooding.  
  In Case of Emergency: Louisiana’s “Disaster Subculture”   
More fundamentally though, driving across the vast expanse of water and bayous 
into New Orleans visually reinforces the difficulty of evacuation and the city’s 
vulnerability. The knowledge that the Mississippi River might swell her banks, break the 
levees, and terrify “her silly children back into humility,” as William Alexander Percy 
once wrote, loomed large despite efforts by the US Army Corps of Engineers to create a 
better flood protection system.48 Natural disasters, whether through river floods or 
hurricanes, only further demonstrated the precarious state in which the city existed, and 
one that residents were well-acquainted with. Other nuclear plants prompted concerns 
about evacuation, but perhaps nowhere else was it more pronounced than with the 
Waterford plant. Adding to the fears about nuclear accidents or catastrophic flooding, the 
burgeoning petro and chemical industry along the river lent another layer of gravity to the 
situation, one that LP&L and the NRC acknowledged as a legitimate danger.49 The 
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construction of Waterford and hazardous industries along the Mississippi combined with 
older, natural threats—very much the embodiment of a risk society that straddled long-
standing risks with new, manufactured risks.50  
 With the accident at Three Mile Island on March 28, 1979, fears of inadequate 
evacuation plans heightened, especially for those living in New Orleans. Early plans only 
included evacuating residents from a ten-mile radius, and the New Orleans metropolitan 
area sat twenty-five miles downriver with no easy means of evacuating. In the days 
following the accident, New Orleans Mayor Ernest Morial assuaged few fears, candidly 
stating that “due to limited road capacity” it was “not possible to evacuate the entire 
metropolitan area in short period of time.”51 According to Morial, the City Office of Civil 
Defense prepared another solution: housing up to “900,000 persons in the city’s fallout 
shelters for two weeks.”52 When writers for Baton Rouge’s alternative publication Gris 
Gris called Orleans Parish’s Civil Defense Director Charles Erdmann about the fallout 
plan, he “laughed into the phone,” and asked the staff, “Where would you put a million 
people?”53 Fears of inadequate evacuation plans and entrapment lingered in the years 
following TMI. Writing in 1982, a resident of Vacherie, north of Waterford, noted the 
confluence of environment, industry, and dense populations that made evacuation 
especially difficult: “…with bayou lands and wet lands to the rear. All surrounding areas, 
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except the wet lands, are densely populated, industrialized and evacuation is greatly 
limited.”54  
 To the NRC’s credit, their 1981 safety assessment of Waterford reflects a 
concerted effort by the agency following TMI which required utilities, particularly for 
units under construction, to revise their environmental impact statements and safety 
evaluations. In the assessment, they concluded that the flood potential at Waterford could 
occur from three different scenarios: storm surge from a “probable maximum hurricane,” 
levee failures during Mississippi River floods, and local “intense” precipitation.55 Of the 
possible hurricane paths, the NRC considered a hurricane approach from the Head of 
Passes, or the mouth of the Mississippi River, to be the most critical. Even with a levee 
failure and maximum probable hurricane, the NRC determined that that site’s flood 
protection, which gave Waterford’s nuclear island an additional thirty-feet barrier from 
flood waters, as adequate.56  While the NRC deemed Waterford’s system as largely 
hurricane proof, the NRC was less convinced about the site’s adequacy for a probable 
maximum flood-induced levee failure. The agency found that if a severe flooding 
scenario occurred, a possibility existed that levees would be topped near the Waterford 
site, and called for LP&L to provide a more thorough analysis and consideration of a 
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“nearly instantaneous failure of the levee,” and characterized LP&L’s estimate for 
flooding scenarios as conservative.57  
 Regarding evacuation plans, the safety assessment gives little insight into what an 
evacuation would look like in practice, detailing instead the federal, state, and local 
agencies involved and noting the necessity of emergency drills. The NRC had, in fact, 
required LP&L to revise their emergency plans, but even in a post-TMI world, the plans 
only obliquely hinted at what that process would entail. Due a law passed by the 
Louisiana state legislature, Act 449, the primary responsibility for emergency plans and 
coordinating actions between agencies resided with the Assistant Secretary of the Office 
of Environmental Affairs. Commenting on the tangled regulatory matrix, one New 
Orleans resident lamented that the state and local authorities “charged with protecting our 
safety” were “simply accepting the questionable federal contention hook, line, and 
sinker!”58 In other words, faith in Waterford’s safety required faith in the state’s ability to 
not only prepare adequately but also to execute those plans accordingly.59 Calls for a 
better evacuation plan, did however, encourage state agencies to provide a more detailed 
strategy, and in 1982, officials announced that if a serious nuclear accident occurred, 
school buses would transport populations from St. John Parish to East Baton Rouge 
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Parish, temporarily housing evacuees in Baton Rouge’s Centroplex.60 While plans for 
evacuating populations in the more immediate St. Charles Parish, where the plant was 
located, were not mentioned, the image of school buses hastily carrying large numbers of 
people away from the “plume exposure pathway,” appears absurd in a post-Katrina 
world, but residents then felt skeptical too. Writing to Congresswoman Lindy Boggs (D-
LA), one New Orleans resident asked, “Please help stop licensing of Waterford 3—Help 
us make our lives a little more secure.”61  
 A series of industrial mishaps in St. Charles Parish no doubt added to residents’ 
skepticism towards high-risk technology and hazardous industries. In one study 
conducted for FEMA in 1983, sociologists from Ohio State described how St. Charles 
Parish, grounded in a long history of natural disasters, had been more recently shaped by 
the “acceleration” of technological accidents. The study’s authors concluded that recent 
events strengthened a local “technological disaster subculture,” while surmising that 
“whatever the balance between the natural and the technological, it does appear that some 
there is some kind of disaster subculture in this part of Louisiana.”62 Prompting the study, 
on December 11, 1982, a chemical storage tank exploded at the Union Carbide plant in 
                                                
60 “LP&L evacuation plan nearly done,” State-Items, July 29, 1982.  
 
61 Leslie Lesperance (last name unclear), to Rep. Lindy Boggs, Folder: 1984, Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, Waterford 3, Box 1616, Lindy Boggs Papers, LaRC, Tulane 
University.   
62 “Evacuation Behavior: Case Study of the Taft, Louisiana Chemical Tank Explosion 
Incident,” Report for FEMA, May 1983, Disaster Research Center, Ohio State 
University, 17, F: WSES – Emer. Response, Box 2, Department of Justice, Matter of 
Louisiana Power & Light, Co. 1971-1984, Accession Number: P1991-137.   
 
  121 
Taft, located less than two miles away from Waterford.63 The tank contained 
approximately 45,000 gallons of acrolein, a highly toxic, flammable, and colorless 
liquid.64  The only major property damage occurred onsite, but a period of risk to public 
health required the evacuation of an estimated 17,000 people.  
Other recent disasters and accidents only reinforced the claim of one local 
official, who described St. Charles as the “most high disaster risk location in the state.”65 
Two years earlier, a tank truck carrying ammonia, a chemical of which the parish 
reportedly had the highest concentration of in “the free world,” crashed into a train, 
killing three people after they suffocated from inhaling the gas. Adding to the tally, in 
1981, a train transporting hydrocarbon derailed near a major refinery, forcing the 
evacuation of people nearby. The following year numerous accidents occurred, including 
a Norwegian tanker spilling ammonia into the Mississippi River, a major fertilizer spill 
on the “river road” (the main road that runs along the Mississippi River), a gas and water 
spill from a 140,000 barrel storage tank at a petroleum company, chlorine escaped from a 
pipeline, flammable propylene gas leaked from major refinery’s dock, and a nearby 
refinery’s pipeline erupted into flames and spilled oil. Finally, in March 1982, a Liberian 
tanker crashed into a tugboat, spilling four thousand gallons of crude oil into the river and 
causing a massive fire, where flames soared 100 feet high.66 And even though the 1983 
study found St. Charles parish authorities generally well-prepared and communicative 
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about emergency plans, the fact remained that people living near the industrial corridor, 
or downriver from it, had good reason to feel skepticism towards industry and high-risk 
technology. 
Building a Nuclear Reactor the Louisiana Way: Incompetence, Corruption, and the 
Construction of Waterford 
 For LP&L, revising evacuation plans likely appeared secondary to more 
immediate, pressing internal complications. Although Grand Gulf suffered from safety 
issues, the rate controversy elicited far more attention. Waterford’s situation reversed the 
two. Rate increases posed a small challenge, and technical problems occupied center 
stage. As early as 1979, an external audit indicated that LP&L’s ability to monitor 
construction and technical quality was severely limited by a lack of staff. Describing the 
technical staff as “extremely lean,” LP&L had four engineers and one technician 
monitoring the construction of Waterford 3.67 The report’s authors were aware of no 
“other nuclear project in the country wherein construction” had such limited monitoring, 
and warned that despite the presence of four “hardworking, dedicated, and loyal 
individuals” assigned to the job, they could not “adequately cover those facets of 
construction that should be covered.”68 In part, Waterford’s growing list of problems 
occurred, according to the report, because the individuals hired to monitor construction 
spent more time dealing with paperwork and attending meetings than actively observing 
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and problem-solving onsite. Employees spent more time approving order contracts than 
providing guidance with technical issues. Moreover, nuclear plants generally relied upon 
contract companies, in this case, EBASCO, to supply labor, employees, or engineering 
feedback, and this decentralized piece-meal method posed problems during construction, 
both at Waterford and elsewhere. The report concluded that while employees from 
contract firms generally tried to serve the interests of their company and LP&L, 
“potential conflicts of corporate interests” existed and carried serious financial 
ramifications, since LP&L ultimately paid the bill for construction costs.69 In tandem, the 
review also strongly encouraged LP&L to better coordinate with EBASCO for NRC 
inspections, or else their credibility would “start to erode” with the agency.70 The 
obstacles Waterford faced broadly resembled other nuclear plants, but as the external 
review indicated, understaffing and lack of expertise in vital areas of plant construction, 
such as LP&L having a well-trained electrical engineer to better oversee cable pulling, 
made the plant uniquely troubled.  
 The depth of Waterford’s issues emerged when LP&L pursued a power license in 
the early 1980s. After reviewing LP&L’s application for an operating license, the NRC 
announced in July 1981 that the company could only receive a power license after 
resolving a “number of outstanding items.”71 The NRC then published an interim report 
that detailed Waterford’s numerous, unresolved problems, among them, “the lack of 
nuclear experience throughout the organization and the apparent lack of appreciation by 
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high-level management of the magnitude of the project it is undertaking.”72 More 
daunting, the NRC argued that preparing LP&L’s management and staff for Waterford’s 
operation would require an “extraordinary effort.”73 The agency’s heightened sense of 
urgency reflected the seriousness of LP&L’s situation, but it also showed the NRC’s 
desire to regain lost credibility too. By the NRC’s own admission, its predecessor, the 
Atomic Energy Commission, “performed little inspection,” at nuclear plants under 
construction before 1968, and “only minimal guidance was available.”74 Regulatory 
oversight tightened in the 1972 and 1973, but “major changes” occurred after Three Mile 
Island.75 In this changing climate, the NRC revised its own procedures, and its 
interactions with LP&L show the improvements made in safety inspections but also 
persistent shortcomings.  
 Less than a year after the agency’s stern warning, the situation had seemingly 
improved, and the NRC expressed their confidence in LP&L’s overhaul of managerial 
and safety issues, stating there was “reasonable assurance” Waterford could be operated 
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“without undue risk.”76 In December 1982, the NRC proposed issuing LP&L a $20,000 
fine for alleged violations involving the “failure of LP&L to sufficiently control” their 
quality assurance program that oversaw the plant’s four emergency core cooling systems. 
To LP&L’s credit, their prime contractor, EBASCO had violated NRC regulations in 
their development of the cooling systems, and LP&L reported the problem after an audit 
and investigation. NRC only detected the severity of the problem after LP&L’s self-
reporting and a subsequent on-site visit. The problems with the onsite cooling systems 
extended beyond documentation, and an NRC inspector concluded that the system’s 
“built condition” also contained “numerous” deficiencies and discrepancies.77 According 
to the NRC, the problems resulted from LP&L’s minimal staffing to quality assurance 
and inadequate oversight over its contractors, as the external review warned in 1979.78 
This resulted in emergency core cooling system components that contained installation 
errors and schematics that did not match “actual field installation.” Or in other words, not 
only were critical safety features incorrectly installed, but there were also gross gaps in 
records and installation work out of compliance with regulations.79 The revelations in 
1982 hinted at larger, deep-seeded problems, which seemingly reached into every facet of 
the plant’s operation.  
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 As LP&L sought to redress the NRC’s recommendations, more allegations 
surfaced in 1983 and 1984. After a series of articles in The Gambit, a New Orleans 
weekly newspaper, revealed the findings of the external audits in the 1970s, and former 
employees publicly alleged poor quality assurance and compromises in plant safety, 
LP&L found itself mired in controversy again. Central to Waterford’s new scandal was 
the plant’s very foundation—down to the concrete poured. The nuclear reactor, the 
containment shield, and other essential components for creating nuclear power are built 
upon a so-called “nuclear island,” an industry term for the part of the plant located on a 
substantial concrete base-mat with reinforcing shields where the most sensitive aspects of 
a nuclear plant are held. Nuclear islands are constructed, in theory, to withstand aerial 
bombardments, high winds, floods, and the thick concrete base mats underneath are 
intended to withstand seismic activity and other “unusual events,” to use the NRC’s 
terminology.  
 Reports about Waterford’s concrete problems first appeared in 1979. Workers 
discovered “honeycombing” as they constructed the reactor containment structure.80 
Honeycombing, the mottled appearance concrete gets when its improperly mixed or 
poured (inefficient vibrations causes separation), can signal deeper structural weaknesses. 
This problem appeared around the same time as the NRC dismissed claims of shoddy 
construction by a former contract employee, Robert Liesen. While LP&L described 
Liesen as a “disgruntled employee,” he claimed otherwise, alleging the company fired 
him for insisting upon quality control. The NRC rejected his claims.81 Behind the scenes, 
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of course, the external review conducted in the same year supported his complaints—at 
least in terms of quality control. And in 1981, the NRC also admonished LP&L for those 
same issues, but in 1979, the agency had yet to overhaul their approach.  
 Even before publicized reports appeared, cracks in the reactor building’s concrete 
base mat in the reactor building were discovered in 1977, but the NRC determined those 
cracks would close with the placement of the reactor building (on top of the basemat).82 
One EBASCO engineer onsite dismissed the cracks as serious but conceded “that part 
was unanticipated.”83 For some, ordinary construction hiccups like these possessed an 
exaggerated quality in the context of nuclear power, and newspapers frequently reported 
on minor issues during the late 1970s and 1980s.   
 More troubling, in May 1983, local journalist Ron Ridenhour, best known as the 
Army soldier whose investigation broke open the story of the 1968 My Lai Massacre in 
South Vietnam, reported that cracks in the foundation continued, along with water 
seepage, describing the problem as a “serious design flaw” which “may threaten the 
integrity of the nuclear reactor itself.”84 Ridenhour pointed to the area’s so-called “jelly 
ground” near the Mississippi River, or “water-charged sand,” which now held a, 
“enormous, concrete and steel boat,” as the culprit.85 In the months thereafter, the NRC 
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sent a team to investigate the cracks further, determining the weight from structures on 
the base mat caused the cracks, but that “the foundation provides adequate support.”86 
 Despite the NRC’s conclusions, the concrete controversy persisted into 1984, as 
LP&L desperately sought an operating license. From a series of special inspections and 
evaluations, a more thorough picture of why cracks appeared in Waterford’s base mat 
emerged. According to NRC documents, during the initial concrete pouring, violations of 
“specification requirements,” such as using substandard concrete, occurred. In May 1984, 
an independent consultant, however, concluded that construction was “adequate” and the 
violations were inconsequential to the base mat’s structural integrity, and in fact, 
exceeded the standards required by the American Concrete Institute.87  
Looking at the correspondence and records today, the public scrutiny of nearly 
every aspect of Waterford’s construction is astounding; no mistake appeared too small for 
intervenors or local journalists, who made much ado about concrete, pipes, and 
everything in-between. Given the array of industrial mishaps, Three Mile Island, and the 
ever-present environmental vulnerability in southern Louisiana though, this concern, 
while not wholly unique to Waterford, makes sense. Living in a place where floods, 
hurricanes, and chemical explosions were not uncommon only intensified the 
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“consequences of modernity.”88 With trust in institutions and expertise eroding, and risk 
seemingly proliferating, public scrutiny of mundane details, like concrete, became 
newsworthy. The NRC had launched their own investigation as well, sending a team to 
Waterford to inspect further.  
 This heightened scrutiny, from the public and the NRC, frustrated LP&L’s 
executives to no end. In response to the NRC’s special investigation into Waterford, NRC 
officials held a meeting with LP&L’s top brass in Bethesda in June 1984. LP&L 
executive R.S. “Mike” Leddick complained about the “process…where so time and effort 
is spent protecting the allegers, many of who which I would have pinned a medal on if I 
could have identified them, for telling me in a timely fashion what problems I might have 
had, that it’s been hard, hard to communicate.”89 The “process” Leddick referred to, in 
this case, included the NRC’s team directly seeking out people at Waterford to discuss 
issues, conducting field inspections, going through documents on site. This level of 
involvement was new for the NRC. By their own admission, detecting problems late in 
the construction stage usually involved “a situation where someone brings us a box of 
allegations or a box of affidavits” and says, “those are my allegations.”90 While local 
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activists accused the NRC of a “regulatory cover-up,” the reality was more complicated.91 
From NRC documents and the meeting transcript, they were not as complicit as critics 
charged.  
 The NRC’s team identified a number of problems with LP&L’s management of 
Waterford. Among them, the agency found the credentials, backgrounds, and education 
of quality control inspectors had not been properly verified, nor did it meet federal 
standards. Adding to this, LP&L’s system of record keeping either suffered from 
complete disorganization, neglect, or more troubling, deliberate concealment. The NRC 
admonished LP&L executives for missing non-conformance reports, which document 
any unusual or non-standard occurrences, claiming that at least twelve reports “had either 
been destroyed, thrown away or couldn’t be located.” These reports, according to agency 
officials, contained the plant’s “historical record” and made it “very difficult” to 
determine the impact on “the integrity or the safety of the system.” Darryl Eisenhut, the 
Director of NRC Licensing, chided LP&L’s representatives further, urging them to “be a 
lot more sensitive to…what does this all tell you about what’s been going on in...quality 
control at your plant for the last few years…you really need to look at the root cause of 
these problems.”92  Adding to the chorus was NRC official Harold Denton, a native North 
Carolinian, graduate in nuclear engineering from North Carolina State, and Jimmy 
Carter’s go-to NRC official during the TMI crisis in 1979.93 Scolding LP&L’s executives 
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at the June 1984 meeting, Denton reminded the company of their failure to meet the 
NRC’s standards in a “number of areas,” and that those problems “had been kicking 
around for sometime and have not been faced up to.”94  
If LP&L could grease the palms of Louisiana politicians, or at the very least 
create a favorable regulatory climate at the state level, the NRC after Three Mile Island 
represented a new challenge. The company’s failure to adequately address long-standing 
issues, and respect the gravity of the situation, seems more egregious in light of the fact 
that they paid no property taxes for the first ten years of Waterford’s construction.  
 Less than a year after the meeting between the NRC and LP&L, on March 16, 
1985, the agency gave LP&L an operating license, but commercial operation remained 
delayed. Several months later, the agency issued a major civil penalty of $130,000 for 
violations discovered during inspection and older problems associated with the 
company’s Quality Assurance Program. Although NRC fines often seem comically small 
compared to the billions of dollars spent on nuclear plants, the civil penalty underscored 
the seriousness of the violations, and at the very least, made for poor publicity. NRC 
extended LP&L’s response period from thirty to sixty days because of the “extensive” 
nature of the violations.95 The penalties represented the end of a fifteen-year odyssey, a 
settling of scores before Waterford began operation commercially, which finally occurred 
on September 24, 1985. Louisiana’s other nuclear reactor, River Bend Unit 1, also owned 
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by LP&L (and Middle-South or later Entergy), began operation a month later near the 
town of St. Francisville about 100 miles northwest of Waterford.  
 Like so many other nuclear plants, Waterford 3 emerged from the controversy-
laden, highly fractious climate of the 1970s and early 1980s, and then quietly operated, 
sending power to the grid and generally raising few eyebrows. While Waterford’s 
operation has not been without problems, or temporary shut-downs, like many others, the 
nuclear plants so feared and hotly contested in decades prior have largely receded into the 
backdrop. Except for the communities living near nuclear plants, and the remnants of the 
anti-nuclear movement, most Americans spend little, if any, time thinking about the 
reactors in our midst. This “invisibility” perhaps reflects a broader cognitive dissonance 
between energy production and energy consumption. It also reflects the massive overhaul 
within the nuclear industry and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission after Three Mile 
Island.  In tandem, public pressure and dogged reporting by journalists, at both local and 
national media outlets, no doubt contributed to a safer and more reliable system—at least 
when compared to the gross failings in the late 1960s and 1970s. Early watchdogs, within 
and outside the inner circle, have shaped the nuclear industry and helped transform 
unprepared and arguably neglectful regulatory apparatus for the massive challenges 
building nuclear reactors posed.  
 On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall in southern Louisiana, and 
three nuclear reactors—all owned by Entergy—laid in its path: Waterford, River Bend, 
and Grand Gulf. Waterford’s location made it the most vulnerable to the storm’s wind 
and rain; the levees only promised thirty feet of protection from floodwaters if they held. 
In a story characterized by failures to prepare, to engineer sound flood protection, and to 
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provide for society’s least able to evacuate, Waterford rode out the storm without 
catastrophe. The plan coordinated between the NRC and LP&L worked. As Katrina 
churned, officials and employees prepared Waterford for the worst-case scenario, and one 
day before landfall, LP&L shut the reactor down. Phone lines stopped working after local 
flooding occurred, but staff onsite continued communication with officials through 
satellite phones and maintained necessary power through diesel generators after losing 
connection to the power grid. The nuclear industry and LP&L issued self-congratulatory 
statements following the disaster, capitalizing on a moment of colossal failures from 
every other end. Of course, they benefited from not experiencing catastrophic levee 
ruptures or massive flooding; the worst case scenario happened twenty-file miles south in 
New Orleans. There was no great plan for the poor, the elderly, or the poor and black in a 
city 80 percent underwater.96 No steel and concrete nuclear island shielded them from the 
wind, the rain, and the flood.  
 Writing in the 1990s, sociologists Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck explored the 
relationship between risk and modernity in The Consequences of Modernity and Risk 
Society: Towards A New Modernity, respectively. The interpretations diverge in certain 
areas, but both scholars argued that certain risks, such as radiation, superseded class 
                                                
96 Scott Frickel also explores the vast amount of other chemicals, liquids, and waste that 
combined in the flood waters, and the difficulty of determining the full extent of the 
problem, see Frickel, “On Missing New Orleans: Lost Knowledge and Knowledge Gaps 
in an Urban Hazardscape,” Environmental History 13 (October 2008): 643-650. For other 
post-Katrina analyses, see Carolyn Kolb, “Crescent City, Post-Apocalypse,” Technology 
& Culture 47, No. 1 (January 2006): 108-111; Kent B. Germany, “The Politics of Poverty 
and History: Racial Inequality and the Long Prelude to Katrina,” The Journal of 
American History (December 2007), 743-751; Christopher Morris, The Big Muddy, 204-
224. Martin Reuss, “Searching for Sophocles on Bourbon Street,” Technology & Culture 
47, No. 1 (January 2006): 349-356; Ted Steinberg, Acts of God.  
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distinctions and otherness. Although Giddens and Beck conceded that the less privileged 
experience risk differently, the consequences of modernity, whether “atomic fallout or 
ecological disaster,” left humanity with a more egalitarian form of risk, one that Beck 
argued would “boomerang” back to even the “rich and powerful.”97 As climate change 
threatens, the “world risk society” Beck saw developing seems close to the mark. The 
widespread fears of radiation and inadequate evacuation measures during Waterford’s 
construction underscore the generalized sense of risk, that extended across lines of class, 
race and ethnicity, and sex. But as Giddens and Beck noted, distribution of risk matters, 
and there are “always losers” and “winners” in risk societies.98   
 When presidential hopeful Jesse Jackson delivered a speech at Tulane University 
in 1984, he outlined those differences. Jackson lamented the recent controversies with 
Waterford and feared the effects of nuclear accident upon the impoverished, stating: “The 
poor already cannot afford to buy water, and the air is not for sale…yet!”99 Continuing 
on, Jackson argued that the “real obscenity” was the “millions of dollars” supporting 
racist regimes in South Africa, and criticized Middle South Utilities for using the uranium 
mined “by tens of thousands of black men held in virtual slavery by the most abhorrent 
government on the face of the earth—the white supremacist government in Pretoria.” 
                                                
97 Beck, Risk Society: Towards A New Modernity (London: SAGE Publications, 1992), 
23.  
 
98 Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity; Beck, Risk Society, 23.  
 
99 Jesse Jackson, speech, May 4th, 1984, Tulane University, Folder: WSES Safety Inves., 
Box 2, Department of Justice, Matter of Louisiana Power & Light, Co. 1971-1984. 
Accession Number: P1991-137.   
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Jackson alleged the utilities companies justified their actions by its cheap price but never 
managed to ask why South Africa’s uranium remained cheap. The answer, Jackson 
argued, was “the same reason cotton was king in the Old South.”100 Nuclear power 
systems “offer ways of building order” in our world, from the people who mine uranium 
and live with its dangerous by-products to the rural places that house nuclear reactors.101 
Today, Waterford churns out power atop a former sugar cane plantation, where modern 
appetites for electricity meet a past driven by an insatiable appetite for sugar. Risk looms 
over everyone in southern Louisiana, whether from natural or unnatural means, but the 
ordering continues—same as it ever was.  
                                                
100 Jesse Jackson, speech, May 4th, 1984, Tulane University, Folder: WSES Safety Inves., 
Box 2, Department of Justice, Matter of Louisiana Power & Light, Co. 1971-1984, 
Accession Number: P1991-137.    
101 Winner, 127.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
  
THE NUCLEAR BURDEN OF SOUTHERN HISTORY: RADIOACTIVE 
WASTE AND ENVIRONMENTAL IDENTITIES 
 
 
Kreeg Antwoord: I think…the big story will be the disappearance of the Barnwell, South 
 Carolina nuclear dump… 
 
Mitzi Molnar: But don't you think the Debbie Boone kidnapping will be a bigger  story 
 than the nuclear dump disappearance? After all, the public is more  interested in 
people disappearing than dumps!” ---Saturday Night Live (April 22, 1978)1 
 
 
 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, rural Barnwell, South Carolina sat at the center 
of the nuclear waste debate, and not only because it became, at one point, the dumping 
ground for approximately 85 percent of the nation’s radioactive garbage.2 While the 
Savannah River Site, which occupies parts of Aiken, Allendale, and Barnwell counties, 
has garnered more scholarly attention, the Barnwell community nearly achieved the 
nuclear trifecta of being the site of major investment in defense technology, nuclear
                                                
1 “Next Week in Review,” Saturday Night Live, Season 3, Episode 18, April 22, 1978.  
2 “South Carolina Governor Orders Curb of 50% in Nuclear Dumping,” New York Times, 
Nov 1, 1979, A18.  
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 reprocessing, and waste disposal.1 While the plans for all three never fully materialized 
the initial vision for expanding upon what SRS started in 1951 resembles the “technology 
corridors” aggressively pursued today; except for its rural location.2  Barnwell’s low-
level radioactive waste site (LLW) exemplifies South Carolina’s investment in the 
nuclear industry, where according to one observer, “ ‘King Cotton’ was deposed only 
have been replaced by another king: Plutonium.”3 Owned by the corporation Chem-
Nuclear, the LLW repository was part of a larger effort to transform a rural agricultural 
economy into a high-tech industrial one—a Nuclear Valley in the US South.4   
 The history of Barnwell’s waste facility is, on one hand, very much a local 
history. It is the story of one community’s support for a radioactive burial ground amidst 
vociferous opposition.  On the other hand, this micro-history is about a national problem 
and a regional quest for nuclear industry. Barnwell’s LLW site underscores a 
fundamental issue surrounding “nuclear things;” radioactive materials require a 
permanent burial repository, and few communities or politicians willingly allow them in 
                                                
 1 The Savannah River Site was known as Savannah River Plant until 1989. For clarity, I 
refer to it as SRS. For a history of SRS situated within the context of southern history, 
see: Kari Frederickson, Cold War Dixie: Militarization and Modernization in the 
American South (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 2013).  
2 The LLW site is located in the town of Snelling in Barnwell county,  approximately five 
miles from the city of Barnwell. Historically, the site has been associated with 
“Barnwell” generally, far more than its technical location in Snelling, and I use 
“Barnwell” to refer to the site location and surrounding community.  
 
3 “Savannah River Women’s Peace Encampment,” Great Speckled Bird, Vol. 10, No. 3, 
(July 1984), Georgia State University Library; http://digitalcollections.library.gsu.edu.  
4 Chem-Nuclear is now a subsidiary of Energy Solutions.  
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their backyards.5 Studying Barnwell’s LLW facility illuminates a hidden history of waste 
in post-World War II America, one that shaped rural environs and spurred serious 
consideration about balancing economic and environmental needs.6 This chapter analyzes 
the political processes, economic visions, and policy failures that facilitated the 
establishment of the low-level waste site in South Carolina and an inequitable system of 
waste disposal where three (now four) states are responsible for burying the nation’s low-
level nuclear waste and much of their high-level waste.7 By shifting the scholarly focus to 
the eastern United States from the more well-documented western nuclear story, the 
history of Barnwell’s repository demonstrates how America’s nuclear legacy has 
embedded itself in communities and in landscapes across the country, transforming rural 
                                                
5 For phrase, see Gabrielle Hecht, “The Power of Nuclear Things," Technology and 
Culture 51, No. 1 (January 2010): 1-30.  
 
6 For the best historical analysis of waste in America, see Martin V. Melosi, Garbage In 
The Cities: Refuse Reform and the Environment. (University of Pittsburgh Pre, 2004).  
7 On nuclear waste, see Donald L. Barlett and James B. Steele, Forevermore, Nuclear 
Waste in America (New York: W.W. Norton, 1985.; Robert J. Duffy, Nuclear Politics in 
America: A History and Theory of Government Regulation (Lawrence, Kan: University 
Press of Kansas, 1997); Kristin Shrader-Frechette, Burying Uncertainty: Risk and the 
Case against Geological Disposal of Nuclear Waste (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1993); Jacob Darwin Hamblin, Poison in the Well: Radioactive Waste in the 
Oceans at the Dawn of the Nuclear Age (New Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers University Press, 
2008); Gerald Jacob, Site Unseen: The Politics of Siting a Nuclear Waste Repository 
(Pittsburgh, Pa: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990) ; Valerie Kuletz, The Tainted 
Desert: Environmental Ruin in the American West (Psychology Press, 1998); Richard B. 
Stewart and Jane Stewart, Fuel Cycle to Nowhere: U.S. Law and Policy on Nuclear 
Waste (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2011); Walker, The Road to Yucca 
Mountain.  
7 Stewart and Stewart, Fuel Cycle to Nowhere, 146. 
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spaces into radioactive environments.8 Finally, Barnwell’s history is part of a regional 
story—a radioactive Dixie, where twenty-seven million cubic feet of nuclear waste now 
decays in South Carolina.9 If the older “burden of southern history,” as C. Vann 
                                                
8 For nuclear history in the US with attention to environment, see esp., Len Ackland, 
Making a Real Killing: Rocky Flats and the Nuclear West (Albuquerque: University of 
New Mexico Press, 1999); Stephen Bocking, “Ecosystems, Ecologists, and the Atom: 
Environmental Research at Oak Ridge National Laboratory,” Journal of the History of 
Biology 28, No. 1 (Spring, 1995): 1-47; Kate Brown, Plutopia: Nuclear Families, Atomic 
Cities, and the Great Soviet and American Plutonium Disasters (Oxford University Press, 
2013); Ryan H. Edgington Range Wars: The Environmental Contest for White Sands 
Missile Range (University of Nebraska Press, 2014).  John M. Findlay and Bruce William 
Hevly. Atomic Frontier Days: Hanford And the American West. (Seattle: Center for the 
Study of the Pacific Northwest in association with University of Washington Press, 
2011); Jacob Darwin Hamblin, Poison in the Well: Radioactive Waste in the Oceans at 
the Dawn of the Nuclear Age (New Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers University Press, 2008) 
Valerie Kuletz, The Tainted Desert: Environmental Ruin in the American West 
(Psychology Press, 1998); Joseph Masco, The Nuclear Borderlands: The Manhattan 
Project in Post-Cold War New Mexico (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 
2006); Max Singleton Power, America’s Nuclear Wastelands: Politics, Accountability, 
and Cleanup (Pullman, Wash: Washington State University Press, 2008); Traci Brynne 
Voyles, Wastelanding: Legacies of Uranium Mining in Navajo Country (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2015); J. Samuel Walker, Containing the Atom: Nuclear 
Regulation in a Changing Environment, 1963-1971 (University of California Press, 
1992); Thomas Raymond Wellock, Critical Masses: Opposition to Nuclear Power in 
California, 1958-1978 (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1998). For non-
western examples, see David Allen Burke, Atomic Testing in Mississippi Project Dribble 
and the Quest for Nuclear Weapons Treaty Verification in the Cold War Era (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2012); Kari Frederickson, Cold War Dixie 
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2013); Andrew Jenks, “Model City USA: The 
Environmental Cost of Victory in World War II and the Cold War,” Environmental 
History 12 (July 2007): 552-77.  
9 Jim Overton, ed., “Tower of Babel: A Special Report on the Nuclear Industry,” 
Southern Exposure 7, No. 4 (Winter 1979);  Samuel. Walker, “The South and Nuclear 
Energy, 1954-62. ” Prologue 13 (Fall 1981): 175-91 
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Woodward put it, manifested itself through the past, a new burden requires monitoring 
Barnwell’s nuclear waste for centuries ahead.  
 In the late 1970s, an uproar ignited over South Carolina’s nuclear trade. Anti-
nuclear activists in the state characterized it in regional terms, deeming it the South’s 
“disproportionate burden.”10 Many other South Carolinians expressed outrage about their 
state serving as the nation’s trash can. In response, the rural community of Barnwell 
supported Chem-Nuclear’s facility more strongly than before, and in doing so, they 
transformed a marker of environmental inequality into a marker of pride.11 While others 
feared radioactive waste, many in Barnwell proudly extolled its virtues and denied the 
                                                
10 Palmetto Alliance materials, Folder: Topical Files: Barnwell, Nuclear Reprocessing 
Plant, 1979, Box 24, Palmetto Alliance Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of 
South Carolina.  
 11 For studies of environmental inequity after WWII, see esp. Barbara L. Allen, Uneasy 
Alchemy: Citizens and Experts in Louisiana’s Chemical Corridor Disputes (Cambridge, 
Mass: The MIT Press, 2003); Joyce M. Barry, Standing Our Ground: Women, 
Environmental Justice, and the Fight to End Mountaintop Removal (Athens, Ohio: Ohio 
University Press, 2012); Robert Bullard, Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class, and 
Environmental Quality. 3rd ed. (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 2000), William D. 
Bryan, “Poverty, Industry, and Environmental Quality: Weighing Paths to Economic 
Development at the Dawn of the Environmental Era.” Environmental History 16 (July 
2011): 492–522, Andrew Hurley, Environmental Inequalities: Class, Race, and 
Industrial Pollution in Gary, Indiana, 1945-1980. (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1995); Ellen Griffith Spears, Baptized in PCBs Race, Pollution ,and 
Justice in an All-American Town (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 
2014); Eileen McGurty, Transforming Environmentalism: Warren County, PCBs, and the 
Origins of Environmental Justice  (New Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers University Press, 
2007); For rural examples, see Pete Daniel, Toxic Drift: Pesticides and Health in the 
Post-World War II South (Louisiana State University Press, 2007); Linda Nash, 
Inescapable Ecologies (Berkeley, US: University of California Press, 2007). For global 
scope with poverty as framework, see Rob Nixon, Slow Violence and the 
Environmentalism of the Poor (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011).  
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risks the nuclear industry entailed. As activists and non-activists alike bemoaned the state 
and the region’s new identity as radioactive places, Barnwell touted an environmental 
identity others loathed.  
 The conflict between the struggling rural community of Barnwell and the rest of 
South Carolina provides a compelling portrait of how the industrialization and 
commercialization of the South, along with the rise of modern environmentalism, 
presented poverty stricken areas with a conundrum: How could rural communities 
survive without accepting federal or corporate development—particularly risky 
industries?12 The voices of Barnwell residents illustrate the dilemmas faced in rural 
communities as independent farming became financially unfeasible, families migrated to 
booming metropolitan areas, and jobs hemorrhaged. For these residents, economic needs 
as well as social and cultural values, dictated their position, superseding modern 
environmental values. 13 To others, the Chem-Nuclear site appeared as a Faustian 
bargain; it was, as one South Carolinian argued, better to have “poverty than 
pestilence.”14 Barnwell’s story is a history of that bargain and its place in the economic, 
social, and environmental transformation of the South from “Cotton Belt to Sunbelt.”15   
                                                
12 For a broad overview of the dilemma between economic growth and environmental 
concerns in the 1970s, see James Cobb, “Natural and Environmental Resources and 
Industrial Development,” in Industrialization and Southern Society, 1877-1984. New 
Perspectives on the South (Lexington, Ky: University Press of Kentucky, 1984): 121-135.  
 
14 Letter from Robert A. Clardy to Richard Riley, April 5, 1979, Richard Riley Papers, 
Box 1, Energy Files, 1979-80, Folder: Nuclear Waste Correspondence, South Carolina 
Department of Archives and History.  
 
 15 For literature on the transformation of the U.S. South in the 20th century, see Numan V. 
Bartley The New South, 1945-1980. A History of the South, v. 11. Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1995. James Cobb, The Selling of the South: The 
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 Before moving into the origins of Barnwell’s contested terrain, the complicated 
matrix of waste by-products demands clarification. Two broad categories divide 
radioactive waste: high and low-level waste (HLW or LLW). Low-level waste ranges 
from innocuous medical scrubs to more highly-radioactive remnants of nuclear power 
production, which underscores the imprecise nature of the system. The United States 
currently has four low-level waste sites, and each of these sites has its own parameters for 
what it accepts, where it accepts it from, and how much it accepts. Untangling even these 
knots is complex—never mind the more vexing question of where high-level waste goes. 
Depending on who is assessing the risks of radioactive waste, the spectrum between high 
and low level can vary.  
 From the public’s perception, waste categories merge into an amorphous one, thus 
making any and all nuclear waste appear equally dangerous. For those in the nuclear 
industry or the NRC, the gradient is more distilled, with certain types of waste presenting 
real hazards and others negligible. These discrepancies have historically created a chasm 
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between policy-makers, industry experts, activists, and the public. In Barnwell’s case, 
approximately 75 percent of the waste is defined as “fuel-cycle” (i.e. from nuclear power 
production) and 25 percent came from non-fuel cycle purposes (i.e. research and 
medicine).16  
South Carolina’s entrée into the nuclear waste business began with the 
development of the Savannah River Site (SRS). Built in 1951, SRS became one of many 
Cold War military installation projects churning out the necessary components for 
expanding the nation’s nuclear arsenal. SRS served as the state’s largest employer in the 
mid-twentieth century, and functioned as a symbol of American technological 
supremacy, Cold War demands, and regional modernization.17 Moreover, SRS’s 
development launched the state’s friendly relationship with all things nuclear.  Today, 
SRS houses high-level nuclear waste, primarily due to a lack of suitable disposal sites 
elsewhere. With the delay in opening the long-awaited high-level depository at Yucca 
Mountain in Nevada, high-level waste remains in disposal purgatory: no use and no place 
for burial either. South Carolina’s investment in a nuclear economy provided economic 
benefits coupled with long-term environmental risks.  
The development of the Savannah River Site transformed Aiken County, an area 
bordering South Carolina and Georgia. Even today, a drive through Barnwell county 
                                                
16 Division of Waste Management, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Environmental Assessment for the Barnwell 
Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility,” NUREG-0879, completed November 1981, 
published January 1982.  
 
17 Kari A. Frederickson, Cold War Dixie: Militarization and Modernization in the 
American South (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 2013).  
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suggests that the region’s transformation only extended so far, leaving large swaths of 
land unscathed from the hallmarks of twentieth century development: suburbanization 
and sprawl. Despite its proximity to SRS, Barnwell County remains rural, dotted with 
bucolic pastures and a few chain stores present in many small towns. Thus, Barnwell’s 
landscape is defined by competing claims – one to an agrarian past and the other to an 
aspirational suburban landscape. Already home to part of the Savannah River Site, and 
with ample land available, Barnwell County welcomed the nuclear industry as perhaps its 
most important lever for economic development, and encouraged the siting of the low-
level radioactive waste site and a controversial nuclear reprocessing plant built by Allied-
General but never operational.18  
Chem-Nuclear’s pursuit of the Barnwell site began in the late 1960s, and was 
soon followed by a two year long licensing process, a brief delay compared to later 
licensing odysseys of countless nuclear power plants. The initial reaction to the disposal 
site was one of muted concern, and some politicians questioned the wisdom of South 
Carolina’s seemingly breezy acceptance of radioactive waste. Former chemical engineer 
and State Senator Gilbert E. McMillan (R-Aiken) warned his colleagues of such dangers 
in March 1970: “I know when you pollute with atomic waste you pollute forever, and I 
submit that South Carolina should not becoming a dumping ground for atomic waste.”19 
Still, the public hearing for the repository received little attention, and no one opposed to 
                                                
18 See Kari Frederickson, Cold War Dixie. 
 
19 The State, March 4, 1970.  
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the site attended the one and only hearing.20 Originally, the proposed facility consisted of 
a seventeen-acre area in Barnwell, which no doubt appeared miniscule contrasted with 
SRS’s expansive reach (SRS occupies approximately 198,344 acres). Unlike SRS, with 
its massive relocation program that dislocated an entire community, Chem-Nuclear 
required far less land and promised additional revenue for the rural county.21  
In 1971, Chem-Nuclear Inc., entered into a 99-year lease  (at $50 a year) with the 
state of South Carolina, after undergoing a two-year licensing process.22 A bargain by 
any metric, it included various tax payments to both the state and to Barnwell County and 
financial contributions to an “extended care fund.”23 These terms have been modified, to 
some extent, over the following decades, but the fundamental agreement remains the 
same.  
For the first five years of operation, the site occupied the original seventeen acres 
but vastly expanded in 1975 to 235 acres. In conjunction, the initial 99-year lease soon 
extended to 2075. The expansion occurred for three reasons. First, the amount of low-
level radioactive waste had sharply increased, thus requiring more land for disposal and 
opportunities for greater profit. Second, tritium plumes, bodies of radioactive water and 
vapor which can affect water aquifers, at the Barnwell site necessitated a greater amount 
                                                
20 Audio Recording, March 4, 1971, Barnwell, SC, DHEC Records, South Carolina State 
Archives, Columbia, South Carolina.  
 
21Louise Cassels, The Unexpected Exodus: How the Cold War Displaced One Southern 
Town Paperback ed. (Columbia, S.C: University of South Carolina Press, 2007).  
22 South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC), 
“Commercial Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal in South Carolina,” March 2007, 
http://www.scdhec.gov/HomeAndEnvironment/Docs/commercial_low_level.pdf. 
 
23 A decommissioning trust fund was established in 1981. 
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of land as well. And finally, multiple commercial low-level waste sites closed: Maxey 
Flats in Kentucky (1977), West Valley in New York (1975), and Sheffield in Illinois 
(1978).24 What started as a small disposal site transformed into a sizeable estate of 
radioactive garbage. The volume of nuclear waste skyrocketed, growing from 50,219 
cubic feet in volume to over 600,000 cubic feet in 1975. By 1979, Barnwell’s nuclear site 
contained over two million cubic feet of low-level nuclear waste, all buried in shallow 
trenches.25  Today, the ground beneath those 235 acres contains approximately twenty-
eight million cubic feet of nuclear waste. By comparison, the Empire State Building has a 
volume of thirty-seven million cubic feet. With the addition of SRS’s nuclear waste, 
perhaps the entire building would be filled to capacity. 
In a brief period of three years, with three commercial nuclear waste sites closing, 
South Carolina, Washington, and Nevada remained the only states willing to bury the 
nation’s low-level radioactive waste.26 This sharp inequity set off a political, and 
arguably environmental, crisis on a national scale. A democratic nation had inadvertently 
become inegalitarian in its waste disposal, raising the question of whether democratic 
means offered any resolution to the crisis, and how much input the public should have, if 
any, in the storage of radioactive waste. 27 Coinciding with the low-level waste dilemma 
                                                
24 See “Site History and Environmental Monitoring Report for Sheffield Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Disposal Site,” State of Illinois, Illinois Emergency Management 
Agency, 2009, http://www.illinois.gov/iema/NRS/Documents/SheffieldReport.pdf.  
 
25 DHEC, “Commercial Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal in South Carolina.” 
 
26 Walker, Yucca Mountain, 125, 128-131. 
 
27 See Langdon Winner’s “Do Artifacts Have Politics?” Daedalus 109, no. 1, Modern 
Technology: Problem or Opportunity? (Winter, 1980): 121-136.  
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in the 1970s-1980s, the Department of Energy faced the difficult task of finding 
repositories for high-level radioactive waste from nuclear weapons production, further 
highlighting the problem of siting and community input.28  
The looming nuclear waste crisis illustrated the difficulties of managing the need 
for burial, while negating the political fall-out. For the governors of South Carolina, 
Washington, and Nevada, this posed a serious problem, for themselves and for their 
constituents. The issues surrounding high and low-level waste demanded federal, state, 
and local governments work together effectively; a challenging prospect for any problem 
much less one as complicated and fraught with controversy as radioactive waste. A 
haphazardly organized means of disposal, one that relegated waste to a few states, no 
longer sufficed.  
As others have observed, no coherent policy had been adopted to effectively 
handle the increasing amounts of radioactive waste the United States produced.29 Without 
a clear agenda for waste disposal, a potentially manageable problem evolved into a full-
fledged national controversy, with South Carolina at the forefront. In a 1976 
congressional hearing, George D. Debuchananne of the U.S. Geologic Survey, 
concluded, “The question then may well be asked: Why don't we have, systematic site 
selection criteria? The answer, if it is to be found, lies within the failure of any Federal 
Government agency directly or, indirectly involved in disposal site criteria study and 
determination to step forward and provide energetic leadership in a critical area of public 
                                                
28 Among the possible sites of interest were salt domes in Louisiana, Mississippi, and 
Texas. See “Possible Waste Sites Listed,” New York Times, March 30, 1983, A18.  
 
29 Walker, Road to Yucca Mountain; Richard B. Stewart and Jane Stewart, Fuel Cycle to 
Nowhere: U.S. Law and Policy on Nuclear Waste.  
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policy.”30 Debuchananne’s comment underscored the general stance towards nuclear 
waste policy: not now, later.  
Further complicating matters, by the late seventies, the public’s heightened sense 
of environmental awareness and general uneasiness about the nuclear industry created a 
policy log-jam of sorts, with the intended goal of a more equitable system. If possible in 
the abstract (a creation of policy wonks), the regional compact system would prove more 
difficult to carry out. In 1978, the nuclear crisis remained unresolved, and the temporary 
closings of the Beatty, Nevada and Richland, Washington low-level sites, resulted in an 
enormous influx of nuclear waste importation to Chem-Nuclear’s Barnwell site. For 
Chem-Nuclear, the political crisis elsewhere created a boon. By the late seventies, South 
Carolina received approximately 77-85 percent of the nation’s low-level nuclear waste, 
and in 1978, the numbers soared even further.31  
Even as Chem-Nuclear’s site vastly expanded in the mid-seventies, and the waste 
volume increased, Barnwell residents welcomed it. While the industry’s presence 
generated jobs, Barnwell County received much need tax revenue from the site. As a 
rural county with few resources and a small tax base, the Chem-Nuclear site promised 
additional funding for local schools, parks, and other government services. By 
entrenching themselves in the community, the company reinforced their advertising 
slogan, “We’re the good guys,” an unconcealed public relations campaign to ward off 
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accusations of corporate malevolence.32 When Barnwell stood poised to become home to 
Allied-General’s nuclear reprocessing facility in the 1970s, residents strongly supported a 
project that others deemed unsafe and unnecessary. Amidst pastures and Confederate 
memorials, the nuclear industry seemingly promised the same kind of growth that 
neighboring county, Aiken, experienced decades earlier with the Savannah River Site.  
The political situation in South Carolina proved favorable for Chem-Nuclear and 
Barnwell county for several years. During his tenure as governor from 1975 to 1979, 
James B. Edwards, an oral surgeon who was the first Republican elected governor in the 
Palmetto State since Reconstruction and who was later appointed as Secretary of Energy 
under the Reagan administration, staunchly supported the state’s nuclear industry. 
Testifying before the Senate in 1978, Edwards reminded the committee of the nuclear 
industry’s economic significance for South Carolina:   
I might just add to expand a little bit on the job situation, when $1.235 billion 
 worth of new industry moves into South Carolina this year, you know that is 
 a big figure. I can't even translate that, being an old country boy, how much 
 money that is…If we have not had nuclear energy to give us that opportunity, we 
 would not have jobs for people.33 
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While Edwards acknowledged the need for a comprehensive plan for radioactive 
waste disposal, he reinforced South Carolina’s commitment to the nuclear industry.34 
Like many southern boosters before him, jobs and revenue superseded other concerns. 
Even though his claims to “being an old country boy” were given in jest, Edwards 
skillfully deferred any further knowledge about the nuclear related industries by aligning 
himself not with industry experts, but rather with laymen—a form of pro-nuclear 
populism perhaps.  
Two years later, the political winds shifted due to a change in leadership, the 
proliferating amount of waste shipped to South Carolina, the election of Richard Riley as 
governor of the state (at the time, governors could not be re-elected), and most 
importantly, Three Mile Island (TMI). Although the accident at Three Mile Island in 
1979 wrought major changes in safety and regulation in the commercial nuclear industry, 
the event also invigorated the nuclear waste debate in South Carolina. Calling for a 
reappraisal of the state’s nuclear waste intake and its blind-eye to the consequences of the 
nuclear industry, Richard Riley, a Democrat who later served as Bill Clinton’s Secretary 
of Education, disrupted a long-standing pattern toward unencumbered regional 
development, Panglossian in its ethos.  
 Until the catastrophe at Chernobyl in 1986, the reactor meltdown at the Three 
Mile Island nuclear plant in Central Pennsylvania was the most prominent accident in 
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commercial nuclear power.35 Three Mile Island (TMI) vividly demonstrated the dangers 
of nuclear technology gone awry, shook the nation’s tenuous faith in the safety of nuclear 
energy, and gave vigor to anti-nuclear activism.36 Plans to ship TMI’s high-level nuclear 
waste to the Savannah River Site jeopardized South Carolina’s friendliness with the 
industry, after the public became alarmed by the news. For Governor Richard Riley, the 
event proved politically expedient.37 Instead of accepting TMI’s waste, Riley appeared as 
a hero, successfully blocking other states’ radioactive waste. Riley justified his decision 
by addressing the South Carolina’s larger nuclear waste problem. Citing the large volume 
of high level and low-level waste buried in the state, Riley asserted, “South Carolina can 
no longer be the path of least resistance in seeking the national answer to nuclear waste 
disposal.”38  
For nearly a decade, Chem-Nuclear quietly operated the facilities with little 
complaint, although it drew the ire of anti-nuclear activists.39 Anti-nuclear activists had 
been embroiled in a decade-long movement against the proliferation of nuclear power 
and defense technology in the state, but these groups were still largely outside the 
mainstream until the late seventies, when the anti-nuclear movement gained a wider 
following.  Despite the increased efforts by activists, including public protests in 1978, 
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and a slow stream of news reports on the site, the issue essentially remained dormant 
until Gov. Richard Riley’s well-publicized refusal to accept high-level nuclear waste 
from the Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear meltdown in April 1979. What to do with 
TMI’s nuclear by-products set off a battle over nuclear waste in South Carolina.  
Richard Riley’s stance brought greater awareness to the increased volume of low-
level radioactive waste in the state, gripping South Carolinians’ attention. Adding to the 
furor, a number of environmental catastrophes, including the Love Canal toxic saga in 
New York, triggered anxiety about industrial pollution and hazardous waste.40 The 
visible presence of commercial nuclear power plants, federal defense sites, and high and 
low-level nuclear waste in the state, in addition to the increased coverage of 
environmental disasters, made many South Carolinians anxious about the future and the 
consequences of living in a nuclear state. Moreover, Riley’s public refusal exposed the 
Chem-Nuclear site’s central problem. Due to the Interstate Commerce Clause, if South 
Carolina accepted radioactive waste from one state, any other state could bury their 
nuclear garbage within its borders.41 By presenting South Carolina as a victim of federal 
incursion rather than as the product of its own design, Riley’s refusal aroused public 
support, even as it undermined serious appraisals of the state’s shortsightedness in 1971.   
Sparked by Gov. Riley’s well-publicized invocation of state pride, and its 
continued use by the media, other state politicians, and national activist organizations, 
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South Carolinians readily employed similar rhetoric.42 The wholesale acceptance of the 
nation’s low-level nuclear waste became an affront to South Carolinians’ pride. The 
debacle transformed their state into the “nation’s sacrificial lamb.”43 Upon congratulating 
Gov. Riley’s efforts in April 1979, South Carolinian Stephanie Connor declared: “South 
Carolina is not a garbage can for the rest of the United States!”44  Shocked by the ruinous 
implications of their state’s burgeoning nuclear-waste industry, South Carolinians 
demanded equitable distribution of low-level nuclear waste. 
In one letter to Governor Riley, an infuriated Camellia Lane of Surfside, SC, 
asserted: “Why does S.C. have to be the ‘dumping ground’? When I read articles such as 
the enclosed I get furious! And I’m not alone – just 1 of thousands. I’m middle class, 42 
yr old, a wife…I’m not a nut either.”45 If middle class, middle aged wives were angered, 
the political implications for Richard Riley and others loomed that much larger. By the 
late seventies, the Barnwell issue extended beyond local anti-nuclear groups and became 
a key issue adopted by South Carolina’s chapter of the League of Women Voters, 
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spearheaded by state politician Harriet Keyserling and LWV member Mary Kelly. Those 
groups also effectively broadened interest in the issue—particularly with female voters 
and mothers especially.46  
While other environmental inequities remained largely hidden or ignored by the 
public, the perception that South Carolina had been unduly assigned the role of  nation’s 
garbage can for radioactive waste stirred people from complacency.47  Richard Riley’s 
popular appeal, efforts by a diverse coalition of citizen groups and anti-nuclear 
organizations, and a national spotlight sparked interest among formerly disinterested 
citizens. Adding to the uproar, a 20/20 news program on the state’s nuclear waste woes 
vexed South Carolinians, and many immediately wrote to Gov. Riley about their 
concerns after seeing the broadcast.48-49 The dramatization of low-level nuclear waste 
likely compelled residents to enter the fracas. In her letter to Gov. Richard Riley, South 
Carolinian Novella Garrison expressed her dismay: “I have just seen a television program 
which has me outraged. The program revealed that South Carolina is the dumping ground 
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for the nuclear waste of not only the United States, but also other countries.”50 Harriet B. 
Vinson of Greenville, expressed a similar sense of urgency: “Last night I watched 20/20 
on Channel 12, WLOS, Asheville, and I knew that today I MUST write to you to find out 
what I can do to get this stopped.”51 The national broadcast served as another painful 
reminder of the state’s role as the nation’s dumping ground, the cost of industrial 
development, and the failure of policy-makers to create an equitable system for waste 
disposal.  
The crisis also sparked rumination about South Carolina’s natural beauty and 
economic potential from residents, as they wrestled with the problems of poverty and 
preserving the environment. Sheila McClaine, resident of rural North, South Carolina, 
warned that with unfettered development the state could “become just as homely and 
unsightly as some of the less fortunate states than our own.”52 By comparing South 
Carolina to the rest of the nation, many citizens expressed a holistic view of the state’s 
environment, linking the majestic coastal areas to Barnwell and the southeastern 
lowlands. Stephanie Connor, the sophomore at Georgetown University, implored Gov. 
Riley to protect the state’s natural beauty, linking the state’s aesthetic appeal to the 
character of its people:  
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 South Carolina is a beautiful state and one of the few states left which is 
 developing and moving forward, instead of stagnating and decaying. I think you 
 agree that progress should be encouraged, but tempered so that we do not sacrifice 
 the beauty of the state and the unharried friendliness of the people.53  
 
Fears of radiation, a strong attachment to place, and a sense of injustice compelled many 
of the state’s residents to call for better waste disposal policies. Constituent 
correspondence written during the crisis underscored a desire to preserve some 
redeemable form of the past through preserving the environment.  
 As they considered their state’s trade in radioactive waste, South Carolinians 
weighed the consequences of industrial development. Conflicted about the greater costs 
of unchecked growth, Robert Clardy of Pelzer, South Carolina, professed that he, “Mr. 
Average Citizen,” preferred “poverty to pestilence.”54 Clardy found it mysterious that the 
state “could trade a status as one of the poorest states in the nation to one of the most 
dangerous.”55  Deborah Johnson mused, “We must be incredibly desperate, uniformed, or 
stupid.” Johnson continued, “I would hate to see South Carolina commit themselves to 
becoming the nuclear dumping ground of the nation, simply because they had been sold 
the line that this was an economic boondoggle.”56 Sheila McClaine, of North, South 
Carolina, questioned industry’s unimpeded march through the state, while underscoring 
                                                
53 Letter from Stephanie Conner to Richard Riley, April 21, 1979, Riley Papers, Box 1, 
Energy Files, 1979-80, Folder: Nuclear Waste Correspondence, SCDAH.  
54 Letter from Robert A. Clardy to Richard Riley, April 5, 1979, Riley Papers, Box 1, 
Energy Files, 1979-80, Folder: Nuclear Waste Correspondence, SCDAH.  
 
55 Ibid. 
56 Letter from Deborah Johnson to Butler Derrick, June 8, 1977, Butler Derrick Papers, 
Box 4, Folder: Pub, Gen, 1977, Energy, Nuclear, General, South Carolina Modern 
Political Collections (SCPC).  
  157 
the need for economic growth: “There can be no denying the need for industry and 
productivity in our growing state, but again, some of the construction seems totally 
unneeded. For example, the new mall being built in Orangeburg seems to serve no life-
saving purpose.”57 While the nuclear waste issue intersected with specific concerns about 
environmental and health risks, it also highlighted more general dilemmas about 
economic development: how could one of the “poorest states” give its citizens better 
opportunities without committing themselves to “pestilence”?58  
Even as South Carolinians acknowledged the economic benefits of industrial 
development, a strong current of anxiety remained. The passionate response following 
Governor Riley’s refusal to accept Three Mile Island’s nuclear waste reflected concerns 
about environmental contamination and the public health risks associated with radiation. 
The fears expressed by South Carolinians mirrored an upswing in national concerns about 
nuclear power and radioactive waste. As historian Samuel Hays has noted, “little thought 
had been given by either industry or the AEC [Atomic Energy Commission] to the 
disposal of radioactive waste” until the last half of the 1970s.59 As public concern 
increased, nuclear enthusiasts faced the difficult task of assuaging fears.60 In a letter to 
Congressman Butler Derrick of South Carolina’s Third District, Frances Rodgers 
envisioned an eerie future: “No humans, no animals, might as well blow us up…We will 
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all die of cancer.”61 Another resident, Deborah Johnson, characterized the public as 
“zombie-like,” and feared the capitol lawn would be littered with “malformed babies, 
sterile men and women, and lethally irradiated bodies.” Johnson wondered what horrible 
tragedy would have to occur “before the nuclear risk” was “taken seriously in this 
state.”62 The threat of radioactivity, invisible and seemingly uncontrollable, powerfully 
underscored the dilemma between economic growth and maintaining proper regulation 
for the environment and public health.  
In Barnwell, economic development and community preservation took 
precedence over environmental and public health concerns, placing them at odds with 
anti-nuclear activists and many others in South Carolina. Surrounded by critics, the 
people of Barnwell clung tighter to the nuclear waste site, recasting a marker of 
environmental inequity into a point of pride. Living near a radioactive waste repository 
produced a stigma different from ordinary landfills or even hazardous waste sites. 
Radiation conjured images of mutation, defective genes, and deformed children. A 
community living with  twenty-seven million cubic feet of nuclear waste invited new 
categories of difference. To live in Barnwell carried the weight of uncertainty—never 
knowing what made you sick, why relatives died of cancer, or children had birth 
defects.63 A nuclear economy requires a commitment to uncertainty and accepting an 
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inability to find solid explanations for mortal or ordinary occurrences like cancer. Even as 
SRS officials, Chem-Nuclear employees, and state officials monitored the area’s nuclear 
sites and promised a safe operation, the scale of Barnwell’s radioactive waste repository 
made it nearly impossible to separate the community’s identity from its atomic trade. In 
response, locals transformed their albatross. 
At the forefront of the Barnwell debate, aging state representative Solomon Blatt 
tenaciously fought the nuclear waste opposition even as his health failed. Blatt’s political 
power, forged over five decades, gave Barnwell County and its municipality a stiff 
rebuttal to the anti-Chem Nuclear opposition. In 1985, a year before his death, a ninety 
year-old Blatt offered a fiery proclamation:  
We live on top of the dump, as they call it. We call it a fine industry serving not only 
South Carolina but the nation…Why would you want to interfere with what we’re doing 
down there if we like it? Why do you want to run the little county of Barnwell and tell us 
what industry we have and we won’t?64 
 
Blatt, the ever-savvy politician, reversed the David and Goliath in the nuclear waste 
debate. Barnwell appeared as “the little county,” bullied by certain political factions and 
their environmentalist allies. For Blatt and the people of Barnwell, local autonomy 
reigned over other matters.  
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In a curious brand of localism, Blatt and other pro-Chem Nuclear supporters to 
the area, welcomed “newcomers” so long as they supported the dump, and resisted 
outsiders, those who posed a danger to Barnwell’s identity and economic viability. In a 
letter to Barnwell city council chairman, T.E. Richardson, Blatt expressed his desire to 
protect local residents “from a large group of obnoxious and unworthy citizens spilling 
themselves over us in our section of the state.”65  Blatt welcomed “newcomers,” with ties 
to industry, reflecting upon the benefits of these additions to the community, “Our town 
and county is a better town and county for the newcomers who have moved in and lived 
among us. Barnwell is making progress as the result of these industries being in our 
midst.”66 Blatt even insisted he knew “no one” in the community that opposed the 
industry.67 Pro-Chem Nuclear supporters delineated boundaries between “us” and “them” 
and carved those lines more aggressively as protests and national attention threatened 
greater scrutiny of Chem-Nuclear’s operation. As the public pushed for greater oversight 
and stricter regulations, pro-nuclear forces in Barnwell called for greater autonomy in 
their county’s industrial development.  
Many Barnwell citizens, and residents from adjacent Aiken County, firmly 
supported Chem-Nuclear and the nuclear industry. Drew Wilder, of the Barnwell 
Chamber of Commerce, seemed encouraged by the pro-nuclear sentiment in the area, 
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despite the “anti-nuclear mood of the country.”68 Wilder asserted the citizenry, “which 
has lived with the industry for nearly thirty years,” still “overwhelmingly” supported it.69 
According to the Chamber of Commerce’s survey, nearly eighty-three percent of 
Barnwell residents favored continued nuclear development and presumably the Chem-
Nuclear site, while forty-one percent considered themselves “NOT well informed on the 
subject.”70 The letter gives no indication of how many residents the council surveyed, but 
others expressed similar sentiments. One hundred Barnwell and Aiken County residents 
petitioned for the continued development of the nuclear industry, citing its importance to 
the area.71 Barnwell resident Dennis Hutto doubted the legitimacy of environmentalists, 
describing them as a “very small minority of people” who “want to save a bird or tree 
from some type of harm that they don’t even know would be harmed in the first place.”72 
Hutto felt activists overlooked cases “where people actually froze to death from lack of 
heat.”73 For many locals, Barnwell’s economic life or death hinged upon the nuclear 
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industry.74 Without Chem-Nuclear, some Barnwell residents feared the community’s 
disappearance altogether. B.D. Plexico Jr., the last remaining new car dealer in town, 
bemoaned its disintegration: “there are many businesses that have been closed up. The 
town which I love and grew up in is rapidly becoming a ghost town.”75 An area farmer, 
skeptical of Barnwell’s safety, nonetheless confirmed that many Barnwellians, “felt it 
[Chem-Nuclear] was a salvation then for people to be able to remain in the area and have 
a decent job.”76 Chem-Nuclear appeared as vital life support for a hemorrhaging rural 
community.  
 For those living in Barnwell, Chem-Nuclear’s presence translated into 
employment opportunities  and greater revenue for the county. The site, at its peak, 
employed somewhere between 200-300 people approximately.77 In recent years, 
employment figures have dwindled to less than one hundred.78 Moreover, in 1985 alone, 
Barnwell County, “received $575,000 in fees and property taxes from Chem-Nuclear; the 
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town of Snelling (population 150) gained $50,000; and the state of South Carolina put 
more than 9 million into its treasury.”79 The benefits were tangible. Barnwell’s school 
system received approximately $500,000 over a period of five years in the late seventies, 
funding a variety of projects for new facilities.80 Because of the community’s small size, 
Chem-Nuclear’s impact in Barnwell was highly visible, benefiting the company as well. 
When outsiders attacked Chem-Nuclear, many perceived it as an attack upon their 
community too.  According to Dennis Shepard of South Carolina’s Department of Health 
and Environmental Control (DHEC), “a lot of the community sort of laughs [and 
laughed] at the outsiders who want to say how bad it is…This community has no more 
excess deaths from cancer, leukemia, any of the normal causes of death, than any other 
community would have.”81 Paradoxically, Barnwell’s radioactive garbage appeared as 
one way to extend the life of a rural town rather than a source of death and disease.  
 Unlike many other rural communities, Barnwell experienced a population growth 
during the seventies, with an approximately 25 percent increase.82 Before Chem-Nuclear 
opened the site, a housing survey in 1970 estimated that nearly 30 percent of housing in 
Barnwell was sub-standard, and at least an equal number lacked one or more plumbing 
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facilities and were overcrowded.83 Spurred by the construction of Allied-General’s 
nuclear reprocessing site and Chem-Nuclear’s presence, the county experienced a 
housing boom over the decade, growing from 5,384 dwellings to 7,282, a 35 percent 
increase.84 Unemployment, however, remained stubbornly high. In 1989,  Barnwell 
county’s unemployment rate ranked eighth in the state.85 And thus, the benefits were 
more akin to a “boom-town” than a sustained economic engine, one that would 
substantially boost employment and raise the standard of living in the way that SRS had 
done for Aiken county. Despite this, the Barnwell community arguably viewed even 
slight improvements as better than other alternatives and certainly good enough for 
hosting a LLW site.  
Although few Barnwell residents voiced trepidation about Chem-Nuclear’s 
repository, the accident at Three Mile Island provoked some anxiety among locals about 
environmental contamination. Mary Moore wrote to Gov. Riley that the accident “upset 
many of us in South Carolina, especially in Barnwell County.”86 Written in April 1979, 
the same month as the Three Mile Island accident, DeWitt Norwood Jr. echoed Moore’s 
sentiment. Norwood requested Riley prevent the importation of the site’s waste, and 
professed his belief that “most of the people in Barnwell County think as I do about the 
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matter.”87 To be sure, both writers were concerned with waste from Three Mile Island, 
not the more benign low-level waste shipped into the Chem-Nuclear facilities. The 
increasingly publicized nature of environmental disasters and risks gave incidents like 
Three Mile Island greater visibility and intensity and rattled the nerves of even some 
Barnwell residents. 
 In 1985, as the nuclear waste debate returned to the headlines, Susan Owen of 
Barnwell conceded the need for “economy,” but not an “economy that may one day make 
Barnwell a ghost town.”88 Owen, like B.D. Plexico Jr., envisioned Barnwell’s ghost town 
fate; however, environmental degradation would be the cause. Similarly, Owen urged 
Rep. Butler Derrick to preserve her community, by ending nuclear waste importation, not 
through its continuation. Owen’s conception of history and the future influenced her 
opinion, “My husband’s grandfather, spent his life helping Barnwell become a better 
place to live, for his family and friends. Now I fear for the future of my family living in 
this town.”89 Another Barnwellian, R.J. Baxley surmised, “If the thing starts leaking, it’ll 
contaminate everything to the ocean…The thing about it is, no matter where you’re going 
with it, the money man wants it. But, buddy, what good is a payroll when you’ve done 
and killed everybody around?”90 Darkly humorous and candid, Baxley’s comment 
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underscores the central predicament for a community and a state which staked its future 
upon the nuclear industry.  
 While the Barnwell controversy reached a crescendo in 1979, the debate 
continued well into the next decade, as state and federal officials negotiated a 
complicated nexus of environmental policy regulations. The Low-Level Nuclear 
Radioactive Policy Act (1980) and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (1982) allowed states to 
circumvent the Interstate Commerce Clause if they entered into a compact agreement 
with other states. As legal scholars Richard Stewart and Jane Stewart have noted, the 
compact system yielded a “regional approach” to nuclear-waste disposal rather than a 
centralized, federal one.91   
  In 1986, South Carolina then joined the Southeastern Waste Compact with eight 
other states, buoyed by North Carolina’s assurance that a nuclear waste site would be 
completed by 1992. The growing backlash against nuclear waste in North Carolina, along 
the curiously slow progress securing a site, led to South Carolina’s withdrawal from the 
compact in 1996, and North Carolina’s ban from using Chem-Nuclear’s  Barnwell 
facility. The resistance to fulfilling the state’s obligation, despite its nuclear reactors and 
Triangle-research facilities, could best summarized by Wilber Register, a Bladen County, 
NC County Board Commissioner, “It’s kind of like everybody wants to go to heaven, but 
nobody wants to die.”92 Widespread public apprehension, along with earlier examples of 
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poor management, thwarted any attempts to make nuclear waste disposal more 
equitable.93  
 Today, Washington, South Carolina, and Utah harbor most of the nation’s nuclear 
waste. More recently, a LLW facility has opened in Andrews, Texas, located in the arid 
western part of the state, but the “compact” to which Texas belongs only includes 
Vermont; and thus, one could reasonably conclude that the facility exists primarily for 
Texas generators.94 Over thirty years after the passage of a series of nuclear-waste related 
acts, little has changed, and the high-level waste repository Yucca Mountain (NV) has 
been officially stalled, most recently by President Obama’s administration—no doubt 
fueled by Senator Harry Reid’s political power.95 
 For South Carolina, the policy developments of the eighties alleviated a grossly 
disproportionate burden, but nonetheless left many questions unanswered, among them 
when the Barnwell facility might close. Other measures included the increase in a 
perpetual maintenance fee, forcing generators to pay a fair price for not simply waste 
disposal but also for the cost of decommissioning the site, going from the original fee of 
eight cents (per cubic foot) to over two dollars more recently.96 While this did not quiet 
the most vociferous critics, it assuaged a more widespread feeling of outrage among the 
public. Renewed support from the South Carolina Republican leaders in the 1990s, and 
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powerful nuclear waste lobby, ensured continued operation of the Barnwell site. In 1998, 
South Carolina joined a new compact, the Atlantic compact, thus limiting the number of 
states that can dispose of waste in Barnwell. Although the current influx of waste is 
significantly less than in previous decades, the importation of so-called low-level waste 
continues. 
 In 2002, the South Carolina General Assembly transferred nearly $50 million 
dollars from Barnwell’s Extended Care Fund, one of two funds created for monitoring 
and maintaining the site in the future, to the state’s general fund to meet a budget 
shortfall.97 Despite the legality of such a transfer, the ethics of it are less clear. Although 
the state of South Carolina has paid back the funds, it nonetheless used money 
demarcated for decommissioning and maintaining the Barnwell site over the long-term—
a vital aspect in protecting the public and the environment from approximately twenty-
eight million cubic feet of nuclear waste— to address budgetary missteps, raising 
questions about government accountability, especially as the Extended Care Fund 
balance has increased to over $145 million dollars.98 A skeptical observer might 
reasonably conclude that the funds remain vulnerable to future machinations.  
 As the environmentally disastrous situation at the former LLW site Maxey Flats 
demonstrated, low-level radioactive waste site can pose a significant threat to the 
surrounding ecosystem and to public health. Of greatest concern is the migration of 
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radioactive elements into the water supply. While Barnwell County proved more suitable 
than other areas, the disposal method, a technique called shallow land burial, left the area 
vulnerable to groundwater leaching into the shallow pits and then into other sources of 
water. Despite the waste’s high-tech origins, shallow-land burial techniques are rather 
simple, although not quite as crude as some might imagine. Disposal trenches, 
approximately five meters deep and two hundred meters in length, are, in fact, engineered 
pits, reinforced by sand, cement, and other materials to stabilize each trench and designed 
to minimize the effects of groundwater. Casks of nuclear waste, both from the fuel-cycle 
and non-fuel cycle materials (typically segregated), are laid atop one another in the 
trenches, stacked hierarchically depending on the level of radiation, so that more 
radioactive materials are buried deeper. Our own renderings of waste sites, either in the 
imagination or popular culture, evoke a different kind of disposal practice, one closer to a 
landfill than what lies beneath the grassy surface of Chem-Nuclear’s grounds. While 
Chem-Nuclear employee Michael Benjamin has conceded that burial practices have 
improved over the years, regulators have characterized the Barnwell site as well-
managed, especially when compared to notoriously ill-managed sites like Maxey Flats 
and Sheffield. 99  As a 1981 Environmental Assessment noted, “operating experience at 
many of the commercial low-level waste (LLW) disposal has been less than desirable. 
However…the Barnwell facility has been operated at the forefront of technology.”100 
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Despite commendable management practices and forecast modeling, the nuclear industry 
produces risks, and the very nature of radioactive materials creates the possibility for 
unintended consequences, some not immediately visible.  
In any disposal site, groundwater is one of the primary, if not the primary, cause 
for concern. As groundwater seeps into trenches, it creates the potential for radionuclides, 
specifically tritium and strontium-90, to spread into neighboring water sources, 
vegetation, and possibly expose humans to radiation. The presence of tritium and 
strontium-90 at disposal sites, while expected and arguably unavoidable by those within 
the nuclear industry, has been a source of criticism for anti-nuclear groups and concerned 
citizens, although claims of increased cancer rates, thyroid disorders, or leukemia are 
often speculative, generally contentious, and with occasionally suspect, independently 
generated data. And yet, the NRC and DHEC concluded in 1981 that “long term 
migration” was the “most important identified” problem with the Barnwell site.101  
 Tritium, a radioactive isotope of hydrogen, is the radionuclide most likely to 
migrate from groundwater into the water table, an area of saturated soil that exists at 
different depths beneath the surface depending on the location. If tritium leaches into the 
water table, it can create a “tritium plume,” a body of tritiated water and vapor moving 
through water aquifers that must be monitored regularly.102 Because tritium is considered 
the “heaviest isotope of hydrogen” it moves much like water through the ground, and 
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thus, its rate of migration is easier to predict but also difficult to contain.103 At the 
Barnwell LLW site, tritium plumes have been located, which have been monitored and 
documented over the past several decades. In recent years, DHEC and Chem-Nuclear 
have created a more open dialogue with the public, making maps of plume-locations and 
radiation activity available for access. 
While the public’s concern is one of a more immediate nature—the invisibility of 
radiation and the risks to public health, the larger question confronting South Carolina 
and Chem-Nuclear is the matter of not only controlling tritium plumes but also 
remediation. The ground beneath Barnwell, if not a highly dangerous environmental 
threat, must be monitored, controlled, and remediated for years to come. Tritium plumes 
present an expensive project at the very least. The costs of a LLW site continue for 
hundreds of years after waste disposal ends, and based upon a 2008 report, tritium 
remediation will cost anywhere from $23 to $140 million dollars and conceivably costs 
could increase.104 For now, the Barnwell “extended care fund” which Chem-Nuclear has 
contributed to since its inception will cover the costs of remediation, along with 
decommissioning and monitoring at least for several hundred years.105 Central to the 
dilemma about Barnwell’s low-level waste site, and nuclear controversies generally, is 
the unique time-scale of radioactive waste. In our own lives, the length of our contractual 
commitments is often much shorter, but nuclear power and waste, along with utilizing 
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radiation for research and medicine, require long-term commitments that extend beyond 
our lifetimes and into future generations. South Carolina’s commitment to low-level 
waste began in the seventies and will extend far beyond the lives of the politicians, 
developers, and citizens that made it initially possible. 
The outcry against South Carolina’s perceived role as the nation’s dumping 
ground typically prompted the solution: each state should bury their own waste. 
Proponents of this solution arguably failed to consider the political, economic, and 
cultural values of states less inclined to harbor nuclear waste dumps; and perhaps more 
importantly, failed to address the politics of waste. Barnwell resident Susan Owen 
questioned the decision to bury nuclear waste “where people’s lives and futures are not in 
jeopardy.”106 Owen then proposed this solution: “There’s plenty of unpopulated 
[underline Owen’s] wasteland that will not even grow weeds.” For Owen, Barnwell, 
South Carolina, was a populated place, despite its rural location and small number of 
residents. America’s wasteland, presumably in the deserts of the Southwest and Western 
regions, historically had been the dumping ground for nuclear waste, and Owen’s 
response proposed more of the same. South Carolinians opposed to the Barnwell dump 
perceived their state as decidedly non-wasteland but possibly underestimated outside 
perceptions. For the states refusing to bury their own nuclear waste, much less any other 
state’s, reflects a larger problem at stake. To outsiders, Barnwell, South Carolina may 
have seemed like a wasteland too.  
 The furor surrounding low-level nuclear waste demonstrates the problem with 
contemporary views surrounding the environment: the waste can always go somewhere 
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else. Those on either side of the debate continually missed a central issue behind the 
geography of waste disposal: the cost of consumption in the modern United States. 
Activists and non-activists alike, ignored what now seems readily apparent. Even if the 
location changed, football-field sized trenches of radioactive waste would still multiple. 
Because consumptive habits faced little criticism, simply shunting other states’ nuclear 
waste elsewhere appeared justifiable. Susan Owen’s solution, ship the nuclear waste to a 
so-called ecological “dead zone,” is less striking for its scientific inaccuracy than for its 
implications for the area that must contain radioactive waste. In her consideration of the 
environmental havoc wreaked by nuclear weapons in the West, writer Marilynne 
Robinson has defined wilderness as the place “where things can be done that would 
intolerable in populous landscape… If is no longer to be found in one place, we assume it 
exists in other places. So the loss of wilderness always seems only relative, and this 
somewhat mitigates any specific instance of abuse.”107 If not “wild” in the popular 
conception of wilderness, a place unaltered by human means, then Barnwell’s landscape 
fits Robinson’s definition rather well.  
 Located in the Atlantic Coastal Plains, the rolling hills of Barnwell and Aiken 
have long since been used, whether for farming, the ever-expansive SRS, or other 
industries such as pulp wood logging. Because of the SRS, according to a 1981 report, 
the federal government owns the majority of the land, while forests and agriculture also 
dominate the landscape.108 Multiple rivers and water sources are in close proximity to the 
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site, namely the Savannah River, the Salkehatchie River, and the Lower Three Runs 
Creek.109 Ranging from sandy soils to swamps, abundant pine forests cover the land 
surrounding the site and mostly deer, foxes, and small lizards, snakes, and birds populate 
the local ecosystem. At one time, other species such as eastern cougars possibly roamed 
the area, but by the time the Barnwell site opened in 1971, a great number of species, 
both animal and plant, were either eradicated, rare, or endangered in Barnwell county.110 
The site itself was used for pulpwood production and farming before Chem-Nuclear 
leased the land, so it had long been utilized for some form of industry.111 And now, it 
contains a vast and inconceivable amount of radioactive waste beneath layers of soil, 
clay, and sand—“intolerable in populous landscape.”112  
 Rural America, not simply the western United States, carries the burden of our 
radioactive past, present, and future. In a 1980 hearing before a Senate committee, 
Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) underscored this stark inequity, stating that “vast 
quantities of nuclear waste” are “scattered across rural America….Rural America will 
most likely become the repository for all of the country's nuclear wastes… 113   
Geographies of waste are complex, ranging from hazardous chemicals to landfills, where 
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trash of all varieties is forgotten, ignored, or as in developing countries, scoured for 
valuable (and dangerous) metals. For the people of Barnwell, and those dissecting the 
remnants of our discarded devices, waste takes on new meaning, a meaning quite 
different from those not well-attuned to the economic and social reasons for these 
bargains. Across the rural US South, the fears of Barnwell’s people have materialized:  
populations dwindled, houses and farms sold, and rural residents grasped for economic 
opportunities that would salvage the vestiges of the towns they loved. Sprawling 
metropolitan areas thrived, while ghost towns dotted the rural South. Barnwell’s last new 
car salesman, B.D. Plexico Jr., does not appear as someone who has been “sold a line,” 
but rather as someone who weighed the costs of the nuclear industry and decided 
preservation of his community overruled the risks.  
 Historian C. Vann Woodward described the vast changes afoot as the “Bulldozer 
Revolution.”114 The sprawling reordering of the South, combined with the toppling of 
“old monuments of regional distinctiveness” bound to white supremacy and human 
bondage, left people wondering if an American South existed at all. For Woodward, the 
“burden of southern history,” namely defeat and poverty, gave the region ongoing 
markers of difference. As much as the South appeared Americanized, a history of failure, 
guilt, and poverty defined the region and its people.115 Southerners, in Woodward’s 
estimation, did not share the same can-do attitude so engrained in American culture. 
While the region has neither a monopoly on poverty or radioactive waste, the South has 
new burdens—not necessarily defined by exceptionalism—but by a nuclear future. When 
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all the old monuments have crumbled, radionuclides beneath South Carolina’s soil will 
decay far more slowly, requiring centuries of environmental stewardship and new 
monuments of warning. 
 
FIGURE 4.1: BARNWELL’S NUCLEAR WASTE  
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CHAPTER FIVE  
 
JIMMY CARTER AND THE TROUBLE WITH EXPERTISE  
 
 Jimmy’s got more sides than the Pentagon and may prove nearly as dangerous. 
 He’s as hard to get a handle on as a greased pig, which is as elusive as a 
 lightning bug.”1 ---Larry L. King (1976)      
 …the President apparently felt he had to fish or cut bait between energy and  
  environment. He chose to cut environment. 
     ---Unnamed Carter Administration Official (1979) 
 
 On April 1, 1979, after attending Sunday school, President Jimmy Carter and First 
Lady Rosalyn Carter ventured into the control room of the Three Mile Island (TMI) 
nuclear power plant, where days earlier a “chain of events” caused the worst commercial 
nuclear accident in American history.2 Photographs from the Carters’ TMI tour showed 
the couple wearing rumpled, unfashionable yellow disposal shoe-covers and lacking 
presidential airs. While Carter’s willingness to investigate the accident himself and 
“learn firsthand from the scientists” demonstrated his deep-seeded commitment to the
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 nation’s energy issues, the popular television series Saturday Night Live found an 
abundance of comic material in Jimmy and Rosalyn Carter’s trip.1 A week after the 
partial meltdown at TMI, SNL lampooned the accident, and the Carters, in a skit entitled 
“The Pepsi Syndrome.”2  
  Offering an antidote to the widespread fears surrounding the accident, the 
gloomy anti-nuclear message of the recently released film The China Syndrome, and the 
media uproar over TMI, “The Pepsi Syndrome” depicts nuclear engineers as comically 
incompetent, overlooking the large “no soft drinks in the control room sign,” only to set 
off a nuclear meltdown after an engineer, played by Bill Murray, spills the soft-drink 
Pepsi on the reactor controls. A smarmy spin-doctor represents the nuclear industry, 
describing the core meltdown as a “surprise” and no worse than having a “chest x-ray 
over, and over, and over.” The Carters, played by Dan Akroyd and Laraine Newman, 
sheepishly enter the control room, wearing yellow hard-hats with their names 
emblazoned. While Rosalyn begs the president to tour the Hershey Factory instead, a 
hapless Jimmy Carter, reminds the plant employees of his nuclear expertise and his 
protective “yellow boots,” inspecting the “surprise” himself and unwittingly transforming 
into the 90 foot tall “amazing colossal president.” Even after his growth spurt, Carter 
remains the same – bumbling and ineffective in the face of calamity. A pointed parody of 
his southern roots, the ninety-foot tall Jimmy Carter then announces his newfound love 
for the similarly-tall janitor, an African-American woman (played by Garrett Morris), 
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who mutates after the engineers asked her to clean a “spill” in the nuclear reactor 
chamber.3 “The Pepsi Syndrome” accurately captured the public’s perception of Carter 
and of nuclear power, even as it exaggerated elements of the TMI accident.  
 Despite efforts to portray Carter as a “nuclear expert,” and his reputation for 
“technocratic precision,” the President’s claims to expertise worked as a double-edge 
sword, influencing how Americans responded to Carter’s presidency and his energy 
policy.4 Jimmy Carter found himself trapped between his desire for mastering policy 
issues, devising the best solutions in a rancorous political climate, and his public image as 
an energy expert and environmental steward. Embodying these dilemmas, Carter’s stance 
on two nuclear projects in the American South, the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing 
Plant (BNFP) and the Clinch River Breeder Reactor Project (CRBR), tested the 
president’s claims to nuclear expertise and his abilities to translate his knowledge into 
effective solutions.  
 To a great extent, BNFP and Clinch River represented the nuclear industry’s 
precarious future and a philosophy that had driven nuclear developments over several 
decades. Both projects represented technological solutions for the problems presented by 
the nuclear fuel cycle, reducing waste and creating a more efficient reactor. In terms of 
political consequences, the fate of BNFP and CRBR proved far more meaningful for 
shaping Carter’s presidency than the accident at Three Mile Island.  
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 Nuclear controversies of this sort provoked Jimmy Carter’s ire for their 
wastefulness and for their inherent risks, which he continually emphasized. Although 
Carter rightly interceded in the matter of nuclear reprocessing, on nuclear issues 
generally, he waffled from characterizing nuclear power as a “last resort” to actually 
supporting shorter licensing periods for nuclear plants.  Even though he possessed more 
familiarity in terms of technical and scientific knowledge than his predecessors, Carter 
never fully crafted a coherent nuclear policy. Historian Bruce Schulman has argued that 
Carter “represented the nation’s attachment to a high-technology future,” and that as a 
southerner, he embodied that “faith” because “the hunger for research and development 
funds had emerged early in the South.”5 Lukewarm in his support for nuclear power, the 
southern president with nuclear engineering experience, ironically, cast doubt upon the 
South’s nuclear visions and contributed to a declining enthusiasm for such projects as 
Clinch River and BNFP. Carter, in fact, used his presidential authority to challenge that 
faith rather than sustain it.  
 Contrary to popular depictions, Jimmy Carter’s background in nuclear 
engineering was not as extensive many believe, but his experiences in the field 
profoundly shaped him and his presidency. One of the turning points in Carter’s life 
occurred during an interview for a position in Naval Captain Hyman Rickover’s nuclear 
submarine program. At the time, Rickover was one of the world’s “leading experts” on 
atomic energy.6 In the interview, Rickover asked Carter if he had done “his best” while at 
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the Naval Academy, where he graduated fifty-ninth in a class of 820. Carter, at first 
confirmed that yes, he had done his best but then quickly realized otherwise. Despairing, 
Carter then conceded that he had not done his best, to which Rickover replied, “Why 
not?” Although Carter left the interview convinced of his poor performance, Rickover 
accepted him into the nuclear program, a decision that Carter attributed to his honest self-
reflection.7 The story, recycled frequently, figures prominently in Carter’s memoirs, and 
the experience informed his approach to his presidency, and especially to energy and 
nuclear policy. For Carter, “doing your best,” required a commitment to mastering 
complex issues—and sometimes outsmarting the experts themselves.  
 Jimmy Carter’s time in the nuclear submarine program under the command of 
Captain Hyman Rickover bolstered these tendencies. Serving under Rickover, whose 
opinion he valued deeply, gave Carter a sense of insider status in the nuclear industry.8 
From 1952 to 1953, Carter was assigned to the AEC’s Division of Nuclear Reactor 
Development and worked with General Electric to develop the USS Sea Wolf, a nuclear 
submarine. During this time, Carter took two graduate level courses in physics. He also 
served as part of the team that disassembled an experimental reactor core in Canada, 
which suffered a partial meltdown in 1952.9 Reminiscing about his service, Carter opined 
that “few people at that time were as knowledgeable as we were about this new 
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technology.”10 In October 1953, Carter received an honorable discharge for the navy and 
returned home to Plains, Georgia, choosing to fill the void left by his father’s recent 
death.11 Because of this, Carter’s nuclear engineering amounted to a brief, but 
informative, period. However, as J. Samuel Walker has noted, Carter’s experience “did 
not steer him to clear position on nuclear power as president.”12 It did, however, give 
Carter confidence in his ability to tackle complex policy issues, one that would define his 
presidency.  
 Returning home to Georgia, Jimmy Carter confronted new challenges managing 
his recently deceased father’s farm, which according to Carter, made his “previous navy 
life—even helping to design and build an original nuclear power plant—seem simple.”13 
The “peanut farmer” from Plains, Georgia then entered politics, winning his first election 
in 1962 for a seat in the Georgia Senate, where he served two terms from 1963 to 1966.14 
His early political experiences in Georgia, according to Frye Gaillard, “stamped and 
circumscribed” Carter’s presidency and contributed to his self-professed “outsider” 
status.15 After a defeat in his 1965 gubernatorial campaign, which caused Carter to fall 
into a period of depression, he became a “born-again” Christian, a transformation that 
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influenced his view of public service as “wedding to a gospel of service based on his 
strong religious convictions.”16 Despite his newly devout identity, one that paralleled the 
growth of evangelical Christianity in both the Sunbelt South and US, Carter embarked 
upon a gubernatorial campaign in 1970, where he “acted with ruthlessness and disregard 
of principle,” kowtowing to white supremacists in Georgia to win votes.17 Once in office, 
however, Carter adopted a moderate stance towards race, increased the number of 
African-American state employees, and helped pass a number of progressive measures 
that included environmental protection, tax and welfare reform, and improving the state’s 
mental health services.18  
 Only a year after his election, Carter appeared on the cover of Time, as part of a 
story on a new wave of southern political leaders who embraced racial moderation and a 
“progressive response to economic and social change” in the region.19 The shift in 
political leadership, lead by a number of moderate New South governors, including Dale 
Bumpers (D-AR), Reubin Askew (D-FL), and Winfield Dunn (D-TN), represented a 
broader transformation in the South, from “Cotton Belt to Sunbelt,” where “skyscrapers” 
replaced “run-down shacks.”20 With Carter’s victory in the 1976 presidential election, 
                                                
16 Kaufman, 8.  
 
17 Kaufman, 9. 
  
18 Kaufman, 9.  
 
19 Kaufman, 10.  
 
 20 Numan V. Bartley, The New South, 1945-1980 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1995), 399-404; Gordon Harvey, A Question of Justice: New South 
Governors and Education, 1968-1976, second ed. (Tuscaloosa: University Alabama 
Press, 2002); Bruce J. Schulman, The Seventies: The Great Shift in American Culture, 
Society, and Politics (De Capo Press, 2002), 121; Judith Stein, Pivotal Decade: How the 
  184 
southerners “savored a moment of vindication,” one signified by a growing national 
fascination with a commodified-version of southern culture .21  
 And yet, Carter and the victorious South rang hollow for some. In  November 
1976, writer Larry King lampooned the triumphant South and “good ol’ boys” declaring 
“We ain’t trash no more” after Carter’s election, noting that the new president “never 
was” trash, and “he waren’t [sic] even tacky.”22 Rather, Jimmy Carter’s southern shtick 
obscured his position of privilege, hailing from a family with vast real estate holdings and 
an education that included the elite U.S Naval Academy, “in keeping with genteel 
Southern tradition.”23 More presciently, King expressed his suspicions that underneath 
the “soft spiritual goop” Carter publicly espoused was a “vengeful Old Testament God,” 
which colored his perspective of the world as a “hard and serious place.”24 Underlying 
King’s brash, dark humor and salty language was cutting political commentary, capturing 
Jimmy Carter’s contradictions, his personality, and a world-view that influenced his 
approach to the nation’s many problems.   
 Those contradictions run throughout the commentary on Jimmy Carter’s 
presidency. After his exit from the White House, many commentators characterized 
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Carter’s presidency as a failure.25 One scholar accused Carter of a “passionless 
Presidency,” one lacking any “basic philosophy.”26 Others questioned Carter’s decision 
to include members of his “Peanut Brigade” and “Georgia Mafia,” a home-grown 
network of supporters and campaign staff, in his presidential administration, citing their 
inexperience in national politics as yet another reason for Carter’s alleged failure.27 In 
recent years, a wave of Carter revisionism has contested the predominantly negative 
interpretations of his presidency. The illustrious record of Carter’s post-presidency, 
particularly his humanitarian record, has contributed to the revival.28 Scholars have also 
closely analyzed his success in the White House, challenging the widely held perception 
that Carter’s administration achieved fewer victories than Johnson or Kennedy.29 Political 
scientist Erwin Hargrove concluded that Carter was a “highly conscientious leader” who 
faced “disjointed and recalcitrant political structures.”30 Put another way, Carter advisor 
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Stu Eiznstat’s encapsulated the administration’s difficult circumstances in biblical terms: 
“Moses would have had problems getting the Ten Commandments through Congress 
unscathed.”31 Historian Michael Camp has argued that while Congress added to Carter’s 
difficulties, his “inability to understand and account for the divergent interest groups” in 
the nation’s energy economy created further problems.32 By analyzing Carter’s battles 
over BNFP and CRBR, and his evolution in energy policy, the tendency to place his 
presidency in either the “failure” camp, or within the more forgiving revisionist school of 
thought, appears overly narrow. Carter’s record of achievements and defeats on these 
issues remains sprawling and contradictory enough to render either characterization as 
inadequate, and helps explain why Carter became saddled with his own claims to 
expertise and his high-moralist approach to the presidency.  
Jimmy Carter and his National Energy Policy  
 Carter’s approach to nuclear policy, and specific projects like BNFP and CRBR, 
are difficult to fully assess without a broader consideration of his National Energy 
Policy—a sprawling, complicated, and often contradictory agenda for addressing the 
nation’s energy issues.33 As scholar Burton Kaufman has noted, even Carter’s toughest 
critics acknowledge that the president in 1977 “faced a herculean task,” which would 
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have challenged even the ablest politician.34 Crafting and enacting a successful NEP 
posed a difficult task, and arguably, no other president has devoted more time to 
analyzing the nation’s energy issues than Jimmy Carter. Scholar John Barrow has argued 
that Carter’s “somewhat quixotic quest” for a NEP “defined his presidency,” illuminating 
both his strengths and weaknesses. 35 Carter’s principled aversion to lobbyist influence, 
propensity to micromanage, and a “willingness to tackle inherently difficult” issues 
undergirded his commitment to NEP.36 However, as Barrow and others have noted, 
Carter failed to gain political support within the Democratic Party, struggled to create 
cross-party alliances, and “inspire confidence.”37 Moreover, Carter cast himself as an 
expert, and in doing so, inadvertently hurt his own credibility by not offering more 
satisfactory or transformative solutions.  
 As writer Larry L. King depicted, Carter had “more sides than the Pentagon,” 
seen vividly in his efforts to craft a coherent national energy policy. While Carter proved 
forward-thinking on alternative sources of energy, he undercut his own commitment to 
energy conservation and environmental preservation by proposing a series of measures 
which dangerously vowed to eliminate bureaucratic hurdles for nuclear licensing, oil 
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pipelines, coal mining, and other energy-related projects. Although Carter and Ronald 
Reagan’s policies towards energy and the environment are often presented as a study in 
opposites, a closer look at Carter’s proposals and rhetoric demonstrates how his 
administration, in many ways, laid the groundwork for Reagan’s anti-regulatory agenda, 
albeit inadvertently. Carter’s bid to convince the American people and Congress in the 
realm of energy further contributed to the dethroning of experts in matters of energy and 
the environment during the 1970s and 1980s, even as he achieved numerous successes in 
environmental and energy-related legislation. 
 After an intensive and secretive 90-day period, Carter and a select group of 
advisors crafted the National Energy Plan (NEP). Recounting the experience, Stuart 
“Stu” Eizenstat, Carter’s chief domestic policy advisor, described the 90 days as an 
“inordinate time demand.”38 The new president failed, according to Eizenstat, to 
appreciate the “degree of difficulty” his expectations imposed on his staff, made all the 
more difficult because Carter’s presidential campaign emphasized the economy and not 
energy.39 Suddenly, Carter’s administration confronted the sizable task of shaping a 
national energy policy on a “crash basis.”40 Moreover, Carter’s insisted upon “utter and 
complete secrecy” during the formation of NEP, keeping the policy proposals  “very 
close to his vest.”41 Nearly sixty days into the process, Carter finally shared more details 
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about NEP with Stu Eizenstat, only to direct him to “not share with anyone including 
your own staff.”42 Defying the orders, Eizenstat found it “totally out of the question for 
my own energy person [Kitty Schirmer] to not see it.”43 In Carter’s first hundred days, his 
desire for mastering policy issues, which gave him more control, weakened his ability to 
build essential, long-term support his proposals—even from his own administration.  
 A month before unveiling NEP though, expectations ran high among Carter’s 
administration. Frank Press emphasized its historic potential, advising Carter that his 
energy message could become “one of the most important statements of your 
Presidency.”44 On April 18, 1977, Carter gave his televised address to the nation, which 
detailed his National Energy Plan.45 The speech begins with a dour Carter characterizing 
the address as an “unpleasant talk” with the American people. The speech pointed to the 
ways in which the nation’s energy problems threatened future generations and warned 
that certain proposals would be unpopular and require sacrifice—the “moral equivalent of 
war.” Noting the rapid depletion of natural gas and oil, Carter called for greater 
conservation, coal mining, and alternative sources of energy, particularly solar power. If 
calls for conservation went unheeded, the temptation to “plunder the environment” and to 
build more nuclear plants, to drill offshore, and to strip-mine would only grow.46  
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Compared to his “crisis of confidence” speech in July 1979, Carter’s first address 
on energy appears far more environmentally minded, although his calls for increased coal 
usage might jar readers today in light of global warming. Nuclear energy plays a minimal 
role in the first speech, with Carter mentioning it only twice (oil is mentioned 28 times, 
coal is mentioned 8 times). Conservation occupied a central role in 1977 and 1979, and 
yet, other aspects and emphases of Carter’s energy policy evolved in troubling ways. 
Some commentators have hailed Carter’s energy policies as prescient, and this 
observation is true in two respects. It foretold an aggressive anti-regulatory attitude and a 
more high-minded vision of the future powered by solar energy and conservation.   
 From 1977 to 1979, Carter’s administration increasingly found itself navigating 
the interests of the nuclear industry, oil, coal and the Congressional representatives that 
represented fuel-producing states. These entanglements, along with Carter’s own hostility 
towards bureaucracy, contributed to the evolution in his energy policy. While Carter’s 
administration begrudgingly fostered dialogue with leaders of utilities and industry, the 
proposed policies from Carter in 1979 are alarming in their contradictions—with calls for 
conservation but also giving potentially unlimited power to overrun environmental 
regulations for oil, gas, and coal production.  
 Likewise, Carter remained lukewarm to nuclear power even as he recommended 
reducing the licensing process for new plants. Greater public participation, in addition to 
the requirement that utilities produce an environmental impact statement, resulted in a 
lengthier licensing process. In this sense, Carter’s proposal to cut licensing time appears 
contradictory to his expressed concern about environmental protections and building safe 
nuclear plants. However contradictory, these proposals are less surprising in light of 
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Carter’s highly technocratic and often single-minded approach. As a believer in expertise 
and a self-appointed nuclear expert, a stream-lined licensing process may have limited 
public participation, although Carter’s administration never clearly delineated how their 
proposals would reduce licensing time.  
 In the months preceding Carter’s two major addresses in April and July 1979, his 
administration grappled with how to revive Carter’s presidency. As the hostage crisis  in 
Iran contributed to yet another “energy crisis,” one that many Americans doubted 
actually existed. Rather, skeptics surmised that rising energy prices reflected a scheme by 
oil companies and a result of Carter’s inefficacy. In March 1979, Senator David Boren 
sent Carter a “blunt” memo signed by twenty-one senators, although Boren suggested 
more signatures were attainable. The memo, according to Boren, was offered in 
“friendship.”47 What Boren and his fellow senators proposed soon became part of 
Carter’s second series of energy related proposals and reflected the interests of oil and 
coal producing states. Boren warned Carter that “deep discontent and bitter frustration” 
existed in the country.48 According to the memo, the American people wanted 
“government off [their] backs” and many felt the current administration had done nothing 
to address the nation’s energy problems.49 Moreover, the memo delivered an ominous 
warning that, without bold action, “disillusionment with the entire political process” 
might occur. To better address the problems before Carter, the memo recommended a 
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“bold, Truman, meat-axe approach,” arguing that the American people wanted a 
president with “a firm hand on the tiller.”50   
 The memo’s authors argued that two problems existed: the energy crisis and the 
bureaucratic crisis. In addressing these two alleged crises, the memorandum laid the 
groundwork for reducing regulations and concentrating power into an “energy production 
council” comprised of private sector figures and vaguely similar to the War Production 
Board from World War II. Alarmingly, with presidential approval, the council could 
“take emergency action” to authorize the construction of any facility “to produce, use, or 
transport any form of energy immediately and without delay notwithstanding any rule or 
regulation or the jurisdiction of any other federal or state agency.”51 While this proposal 
primarily targeted oil, coal, and natural gas, the memo’s implications are worth exploring, 
particularly because Carter soon incorporated their ideas and retreated from many of his 
earlier commitments to an environmentally conscious energy future.  
 Less than ten days after the Boren memo, Carter gave his the first of two major 
energy-related addresses in 1979, a speech that illustrates a notable shift in tone.52 Carter 
continued his advocacy for conservation and called for less wasteful consumption, even 
as he railed against the “federal bureaucracy and red tape.”53 Noting the recent accident at 
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Three Mile Island, Carter informed Americans of his presidential commission to 
investigate and produce a “full accounting,” called for greater use of coal and solar 
energy,  and pointed to “American genius” as one of the many ways the country’s energy 
problems could be solved.54 Although Carter devoted attention predominately to oil and 
ending federal price controls, he also noted his recent executive order, Order 12129, 
which “will set strict deadlines for cutting through Federal red tape on important new 
energy projects, such as pipelines…”55 Carter then discussed his “windfall profits tax” 
proposal, which would have diverted a percentage of oil profits into an “energy security 
fund” and encouraged research and development for solar power, mass transportation, 
and developing cleaner alternative energy sources.56   
 Carter’s evolving energy policy reflected the escalating situation in Iran, rising oil 
prices, and fears of depleted resources. It also illustrated the president’s advocacy of 
alternative energy development, his commitment to build and to operate safer nuclear 
plants, and ongoing commitment to conservation. And yet, the April address also 
indicated the growing influence of energy-producing states and Carter’s own distaste for 
bureaucracy and regulations—even those intended for much-needed environmental 
protection. According to White House documents, Carter’s hostility towards bureaucracy 
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manifested itself early in his presidency. Commenting on a document submitted by Stu 
Eizenstat on the number of reserve oil barrels, Carter left a handwritten note, “Stu, this is 
bureaucratic b.s. All I asked for were a) estimates of reserves  b) How many barrels in 
cubic mil.”57 As Carter’s note demonstrates, he sought efficiency and disliked the 
information deluge produced by certain government agencies, but failed to appreciate 
how streamlining approval for energy related facilities created dangerous openings for 
utilities, oil, gas, and coal companies to exploit the environment and to defang the 
Environmental Protection Agency.  
 The note also pointed to Carter’s tendency to chastise his staff, correcting minor 
issues and even offering editorial feedback on non-speech materials. The traces of 
Carter’s intense involvement at many levels of policy formation and staff activities can 
be seen throughout his correspondence and his administration’s papers. In June 1979, as 
fuel shortages loomed, Carter issued a memo to his administration executives that 
whenever he “designated a situation as a crisis or special problem…everyone must 
submit to a greater degree of discipline.”58 During his presidential campaign, Carter 
admonished Stu Eizenstat, who was frequently on the receiving end of such feedback, 
about a daily publication produced by his campaign: “Stu, this is of poor quality – serves 
no purpose & is potential embarrassment. Early ‘warning’ (?) —misspelled names, etc. 
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Stop it.”59 Carter’s staff largely tip-toed around the issues, reluctantly tolerating these 
tendencies even as it became politically disadvantageous. Before Carter’s first debate, he 
returned briefing books—not known for their slim size—to his staff, “having read every 
single page and corrected typographical errors and grammatical mistakes,” as Eizenstat 
recounted. When Eizenstat and several Carter advisors tried to prevent him from being 
“over-briefed,” Carter refused to go through a debate rehearsal and instead relied upon 
his ability absorb the briefing materials.60  
 Carter’s propensity to micromanage and desire for mastery over issues went hand 
in hand. In his 1982 memoir, Keeping the Faith, which detailed his experiences as 
president, Carter appropriately titled the first chapter, “A Graduate Course in America.”61 
Even after his exit from the White House, Carter viewed the presidency as not simply a 
learning process, but as an opportunity to become more knowledgeable than the average 
president. Stu Eizenstat attributed it to Carter’s “utter self-confidence,” but one might 
also go back to his formative moment with Hyman Rickover.62 For Carter, doing his 
“best,” meant continually accepting new challenges to analyze complex issues. James 
Schlesinger, who served as Carter’s advisor and as Secretary of Energy from 1977 to 
                                                
59  Carter to Eizenstat, June 25, 1976 , Folder: Nuclear Power & Energy, Box 127, 
Collection: David Rubenstein’s Files, Domestic Policy Staff.  
60 Eizenstat Interview, Miller Center, 12.  
 
61 Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (University of Arkansas Press, 
2013, orig. published 1982).  
62 Eizenstat Interview, 12.  
 
  196 
1979,  described Carter as having a “very high degree of expertise” in domestic matters.63 
Carter, perhaps naively, believed that expertise granted him political power and 
strengthened his persuasive abilities, which sometimes backfired. For a meeting with four 
American auto executives about pollution, Carter had prepared to such an extent that he 
“knew ten times as much” as nearly anyone else at the meeting. Remembering the 
incident, Schlesinger bluntly characterized Carter’s performance as a “tour de force,” but 
one that made him wonder, “What in God’s name is the President of the United States 
sitting up hour after hour, day after day, reading these briefing papers on various methods 
to control automobile pollution?”64  
 In the wake of Carter’s first of two energy addresses in 1979, his administration 
grappled with falling approval ratings, ongoing conflicts with Congress, internal 
frustration, and diminishing credibility in energy-related matters. According to one 
memo, an NBC survey reported that only 25 percent of Americans believed an oil 
shortage existed, which Carter’s staff characterized as a “plausibility gap.”65 Contending 
with a growing belief that no energy crisis existed, the administration underlined the 
importance of establishing greater authority, noting that maintaining the president’s 
“energy credibility” remained vital if calls for sacrifice occurred.66 Carter’s 
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administration desperately sought new strategies, noting that “old jawboning was 
ineffective” and failed to convince the American people.67  
 Writing in June 1979, Si Lazarus, the associate director of Carter’s Domestic 
Policy Staff, urged Stu Eizenstat to cut the president’s planned stop-over in Hawaii. 
Emphasizing the general “nastiness” of attitudes towards Carter, Lazarus stated “I don’t 
care how tired he is – the time for taking off for visible, nationally televised relaxation is 
plainly not at hand.” Regarding the energy crisis, Lazarus reminded Eizenstat and David 
Rubenstein that Carter need to “illuminate a credible path” to solving the nation’s 
problems rather than serving merely as the bearer of bad news.68 Only a few months 
earlier, the Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, John C. White, professed 
hope that energy might be Carter’s “domestic bag,” but by July 1979, his approval ratings 
sank even lower with a dismal 28% approval rating.69 In response, Secretary of Energy 
James Schlesinger, only a few days before resigning from Carter’s cabinet, urged the 
president to devise an energy program—both “bold and credible.”70 
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 Seeking to revive his presidency, Carter “retreated” to Camp David in July 1979 
instead of giving another speech on energy.71 After ten days of consultation and 
mediation, Carter delivered his “malaise speech” where he called upon the American 
people to collectively sacrifice in order to rebuild the nation’s strength and argued that a 
“crisis of confidence” threatened America’s future.72  The speech also pointed to the 
“battleground of energy” as the primary test for uniting the country and emphasized that 
the energy crisis was indeed real. Moreover, Carter described his time at Camp David as 
a period of reconnecting with people from “almost every segment of society,” an act he 
described as listening to the “voices of America.”73 On matters of energy, however, the 
Camp David summit appears less democratic than Carter claimed.  
 Domestic policy staff documents give a more complete picture of the figures 
Carter consulted during his retreat, and why his energy policy drifted further away from 
its original iteration in 1977. On July 9, 1979, Carter convened a meeting with 
Congressional leaders to discuss energy. While the representatives from the House came 
from a wide range of states, the Senators invited to the summit, not surprisingly, largely 
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represented energy-producing states: Henry Jackson (D-WA), J. Bennett Johnston (D-
LA), Lloyd Bentsen (D-TX), Dale Bumpers (D-AR), Wendell Ford (D-KY), Russell B. 
Long (D-LA), Robert Byrd (D-WV), Daniel Moynihan (D-NY). Of those senators, 
Bumpers may have been the most environmentally-minded, but Bumpers, Long, Byrd, 
Ford, Johnston, and Bentsen clearly sought policies beneficial to oil, coal, and natural gas 
companies and their states. Although Carter pressed for alternatives fuels such as solar 
power, and even proposed a “solar bank” in his malaise speech, he also announced a plan 
for creating the “Energy Mobilization Board,” a strikingly similar idea to the one 
proposed in David Boren’s memo in March 1979, and if enacted, a policy with the 
potential to encourage a major crash program of energy-related drilling and mining in 
states like Kentucky, Louisiana, and Texas—and exactly the type of “crash program” 
Carter warned about in 1977. Among the Camp David attendees, Senator Lloyd Bentsen 
signed the Boren memo and possibly others.74 As one unnamed official from Carter’s 
administration commented after his address, “the President apparently felt he had to fish 
or cut bait between energy and environment. He chose to cut environment.”75  
 In June 1980, the House of Representatives defeated Carter’s proposal for the 
Energy Mobilization Board by a 232-131 vote (roll-call vote). Democrats split their votes 
(107 against, 122 for), and Republicans (125 against, 9 for) largely opposed the EMB’s 
potential for disproportionally shifting power from states to the federal government in 
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matters of energy.76 Ultimately, the EMB constituted only one proposal among a sea of 
proposals created by Carter’s administration. Evaluating Carter’s success in crafting a 
coherent, effective National Energy Policy, and persuading Congress to pass such 
legislation, is a difficult task. Scholars have been quite generous to Carter in their 
interpretations of his energy policy, arguably because his successor Ronald Reagan’s 
policies appear far less progressive comparatively.77 In particular, some have noted that 
Carter’s achievements in price decontrol with oil and natural gas buoyed some of the 
economic recovery in the 1980s and eventually helped usher in cheaper oil prices.78 
Despite Carter’s environmentally unsound proposals for the EMB, his calls for 
conservation, synthetic fuels, and solar power resonant as especially forward-thinking in 
an era of global warming.   
Jimmy Carter as Chief Nuclear Expert  
 One essential part of Carter’s energy policy, an area he expended vital political 
capital on, was the nuclear industry. When Jimmy Carter launched his 1976 presidential 
campaign, nuclear power had come under increasing scrutiny. In the wake of Vietnam 
and Watergate, a diminishing American faith in government contributed to this sense of 
unease. Moreover, the emergence of the environmental movement drew the public’s 
attention to corporate malfeasance and government neglect towards issues like hazardous 
wastes and pollution. During the 1960s and 1970s, a licensing spree occurred in the 
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nuclear industry, with utilities jumping on the “bandwagon market” to build nuclear 
power plants.79 The licensing spree coincided with the public’s growing concern about 
radiation, catastrophic accidents, along with a lack of consensus among the experts, huge 
cost-overruns which then affected ratepayers, nuclear waste, and the Atomic Energy 
Commission’s troubled attempts to regulate an industry it also actively promoted. The 
industry’s credibility gap threatened to turn the public against nuclear technology 
altogether.80  
 In response to this, Congress passed a number of measures that sought to enhance 
the nuclear industry’s credibility and by extension the federal government—allowing for 
greater public participation, transparency, and more stringent regulations, all while 
maintaining a commitment to nuclear power. The nuclear industry and its regulatory 
apparatus begrudgingly attempted to win public approval back – knowing that the 
industry needed an improved public image but also fearing the delays and potential 
controversy these measures would bring. Since the passage of the Atomic Energy Act in 
1954 any “person whose interest may be affected” could intervene in the licensing 
process, but the opportunities for public involvement grew considerably during the late 
1960s and 1970s. 
 Some policy measures were intentionally created to deal with the nuclear 
industry’s credibility issue – such as the Energy Reorganization Act (passed in 1974), 
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which finally ended the Atomic Energy Commission’s reign, and split the agency’s twin 
purposes of promotion and regulation into two new agencies: the Energy Research and 
Development Administration (ERDA) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). 
The act also required the industry to report “abnormal occurrences” to the public within a 
specific timeframe. Other measures, such as National Environmental Protection Act 
(NEPA) and Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), inadvertently or indirectly opened 
space for public involvement and greater access to the inner-workings of nuclear plants, 
and expanded jurisdiction over nuclear power to other government agencies and 
Congressional subcommittees. In 1971, the Supreme Court ruling in the Calvert Cliffs 
case dictated that utility companies were required to submit Environmental Impact 
Statements for nuclear power plants, a landmark victory for both environmentalists and 
anti-nuclear activists.81 After twenty-years of insulation from the outside, the nuclear 
industry and its regulatory apparatus confronted a different landscape, which required 
public hearings, environmental impact statements, and FOIA requests for documents.  
 Despite the crisis within the nuclear industry though, public opinion, as J. Samuel 
Walker has noted, remained ambivalent about nuclear power. A survey in 1976 cited 61 
percent of those surveyed favored nuclear power, while 22% opposed, and 17% were 
unsure.82 Even in April 1979, after the accident at TMI, 44% of Americans surveyed 
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approved of nuclear power, while 43% disapproved. Although the percentage of 
favorable responses slightly decreased, the more significant number is the percentage of 
those who moved from the “unsure” to opposed category. American support for nuclear 
power continued after Three Mile Island for two major reasons: the desire for energy 
independence and the fear of energy shortages. Others viewed the continuation of nuclear 
power as a vital part of American superiority, to stall development would mean an 
abdication of progress through technology.  
 For President Carter, claims to nuclear expertise cut both ways, either reinforcing 
his views or further damaging his credibility.  In 1976, as Jimmy Carter campaigned for 
the presidency, California and Oregon both had similar initiatives on the ballot 
concerning nuclear power. Advisor Carlton Neville outlined Carter’s inconsistency on 
nuclear issues, commenting that he had adopted “both sides of an issue” by opposing 
California’s referendum but supporting Oregon’s, and that “Jimmy Carter Nuclear Expert 
cannot afford to appear “wrong” on a nuclear issue.”83 Carter’s image as nuclear expert, 
high-moralist, and environmental steward constrained his ability to modify his positions 
and hamstrung him on the campaign trail and in the White House. Carter’s “outsider” 
status also prevented him from taking credit for the kinds of “horse-trading” other 
politicians proudly advertised. Considering these limitations, advisor James Schlesinger 
compared Carter to the ultimate political dealer: “Lyndon Johnson could buy in votes left 
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and right…and everyone would talk about Super Lyndon…Jimmy Carter indulges in the 
same thing and they are all over him.”84  
 While his predecessors Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford supported the expansion 
of nuclear power, Carter positioned himself all over the spectrum. He viewed nuclear 
power as a “last resort,” opposed reprocessing, and alienated pork-loving southerners 
with his war on the Clinch River Breeder Reactor. At the same time, he wanted to 
accelerate the licensing process for reactors, striving to cut  “unnecessary bureaucratic 
red tape and uncertainty and shave off four to six years” for nuclear power plant 
construction.”85 Carter’s nuclear policy vacillated throughout his time in the White 
House, leaving industry, Congress, and anti-nuclear activists unsatisfied. According to 
political scientist Robert Duffy, the nuclear industry “never forgot, or forgave, him for 
these transgressions.”86 Carter’s legacy on nuclear issues, and energy generally, is 
exceedingly difficult to characterize as wholly successful or unsuccessful, primarily 
because those metrics fail to account for vastly complicated policy issues. However,  
advisor and Secretary of Energy James Schlesinger described Carter as “unduly 
interested” in the nuclear industry, and that his actions prompted the nuclear industry to 
hate him from 1977 onwards.87 Carter’s interventions in commercial nuclear reprocessing 
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and the Clinch River Breeder reactor largely appear justifiable and reasonable, but the 
fight over the Barnwell plant (BNFP) and CRBR incurred tremendous political costs and 
may have harmed Carter’s broader agenda.  
Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant  
 One of Carter’s first maneuvers as president was the indefinite deferral of 
commercial nuclear reprocessing, which he announced in April 1977. The announcement 
primarily affected the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant, then under construction in Barnwell, 
South Carolina. Plans for the facility began in 1968, when Allied-General Nuclear 
Services (AGNS) applied for a construction permit from the AEC for a commercial 
nuclear reprocessing facility.88 On abandoned farmland—some tracts purchased decades 
earlier for the Savannah River Plant—Allied-General envisioned a large-scale, state of 
the art facility in rural Barnwell. Local politicians viewed Allied-General’s arrival as an 
essential part of the area’s economic designs, where an agricultural region further 
transformed into a technology-oriented one. Once completed, the “South Carolina 
Advanced Technology Park” would host AGNS’s Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (BNFP), 
Chem-Nuclear’s radioactive waste disposal site, and potentially other companies. 89  
 According to the original plans, AGNS sought to process “irradiated nuclear 
power reactor fuel consisting of uranium oxide, or a mixture of plutonium oxide and 
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uranium oxide, clad in stainless steel or zirconium alloys,” commonly known as the 
PUREX process where uranium is derived from spent-nuclear fuel. Adding to these 
plans, the company also envisioned recovering plutonium for “new light water reactors or 
breeder reactors”—two technological possibilities that seemingly promised more efficient 
and more economical nuclear power.90  
Reprocessing spent fuel, particularly uranium and plutonium, through various chemical 
processes, had been used for defense purposes at Hanford, Savannah River, and other 
defense sites as early as the late 1940s. Despite breezy assurances from the AEC and 
nuclear experts, reprocessing spent fuel produced highly toxic, liquid waste products and 
occasionally caused criticality accidents—usually during the transfer of solutions with 
uranium or plutonium into another vessel. Despite the dangers involved, reprocessing 
remained one of many “solutions” for solving gaps in the nuclear fuel cycle—both in 
terms of supply of nuclear materials and reducing nuclear waste.  
 The fuel cycle concept, in theory, envisioned a clear beginning and end. Starting 
the process, uranium or thorium are extracted, then processed and used to power nuclear 
reactors, and depending on the nation, those wastes are either reprocessed—extracting 
materials for future generation, or the materials are spent fuel in need of disposal.91 In the 
abstract, the fuel cycle appears like a simple diagram, but in practice, other complications 
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such as barriers to disposal or reprocessing bans have always challenged this neat 
conceptualization. Nonetheless, visions of breeder reactors and new reactors fueled with 
mixed-oxide fuel, made from plutonium and uranium, encouraged investment in 
reprocessing facilities. Beyond defense facilities, in the United States, three commercial 
reprocessing facilities were built, and only one commercial site ever reprocessed spent 
fuel. Located in Ashford, New York, and operated by Nuclear Fuel Services until 1976, 
the facility closed after encountering numerous problems – ranging from issues of worker 
safety to tighter regulations. In 1980, the Department of Energy embarked upon a 
massive effort to remove nuclear waste, decontaminate, and decommission the site, a 
process that has taken three decades.92   
 When the AEC evaluated the safety of BNFP in 1970, they concluded the facility 
could be operated without “undue risk to the health and safety of the public.”93  In the 
AEC’s assessment, the environmental and technological risks associated with 
reprocessing facilities were “well defined,” and the agency emphasized that processes 
such as releasing low-level radioactivity– such as vapors containing tritium into the 
environment would occur under “controlled conditions.”94 Other risks, such as natural 
disasters or theft of nuclear materials, appeared as manageable problems with simple 
solutions. To prevent theft or unauthorized entry into BNFP, the AEC approved of 
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AGNS’s security measures: “a chain-link fence topped with barbed wire,” an additional 
fence surrounding the perimeter of the 1730 acre site, and concluded “access to the plant 
will be controlled.”95 From the AEC’s 1970 safety evaluation, nuclear non-proliferation 
barely registers as a threat, and chain-link fences offered sufficient protection against the 
theft of nuclear materials.96  
 In 1974, the nuclear nonchalance stopped, as India ratcheted up its regional 
struggle with Pakistan and entered the nuclear club by exploding their own nuclear 
device. Only a year earlier, a report by the AEC downplayed the dangers of using mixed-
oxide fuel in nuclear reactors.97 Despite the government and the nuclear industry’s efforts 
to sever any connection between atomic bombs and nuclear power in the public’s mind, 
heightened proliferation concerns muddled those connections again. While requiring 
environmental impact statements and safety evaluations provided greater accountability 
and encouraged public input in nuclear licensing, early reports reeked of pro-nuclear bias. 
The threat of intrusion or theft could be rendered a non-threat with a guard post and 
barbed wire, and similarly, the ground beneath the site, “potentially susceptible to 
liquefaction” posed few worries for the report’s authors. 98  
 In 1971, three years after the initial application for a construction permit, Allied-
General broke ground on the BNFP site, although the Atomic Energy Commission 
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warned the corporation that all financial risks were the company’s own, “pending the 
outcome” of a future NEPA hearing.99 Thus, Allied-General embarked upon a risky 
venture with fair warning that political winds could shift against the company’s plans, 
and by the late 1970s, they did, as nuclear proliferation fears, problems at the commercial 
reprocessing facility, commonly known as West Valley, in Ashford, New York, and 
rising costs affected the entire nuclear industry.  
 The connections between nuclear weapons and nuclear power solidified further 
during the 1976 presidential election, as Jimmy Carter “stressed the linkage between 
nuclear technology exports and nuclear non-proliferation.”100 As scholar J. Michael 
Martinez has detailed, Carter altered the conversation surrounding nuclear proliferation 
by emphasizing the risks of reprocessing spent fuel.101 In doing so, Carter’s stance also 
enhanced his “credibility with representatives of the blossoming environmental 
movement.”102 Responding to the shift, on October 28, 1976, President Gerald Ford 
further dampened the nuclear enthusiasm of previous decades, stating that “no single 
nation, not even the United States, can realistically hope--by itself--to control effectively 
the spread of reprocessing technology and the resulting availability of plutonium.”103  
 After Carter defeated Gerald Ford in the 1976 election, he acted quickly on the 
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nuclear reprocessing, which simultaneously addressed energy and nuclear proliferation, 
two central issues for his administration. On April 7, 1977, Carter issued a statement 
declaring the “indefinite” deferral of commercial reprocessing, noting specifically that 
the Barnwell facility would receive “neither federal encouragement” or funding.104 
Indefinitely deferring reprocessing did not end the debate over BNFP, even if it 
temporarily stymied AGNS’s plans for recovering uranium and plutonium for 
commercial purposes.  
 In South Carolina, anti-nuclear activists opposed to BNFP achieved a small 
victory but also realized the fight over the facility’s purpose nonetheless loomed ahead. 
Others, in the pro-nuclear camp questioned the decision and sought more definitive 
answers from Carter’s administration about alternative uses, particularly because the 
plant’s alleged value had soared to 250 million dollars.105 For a president who abhorred 
wastefulness, ironically, his deferral potentially implied the abandonment of BNFP, 
leaving an enormously expensive facility to corrode in a rural pasture.  
 In response, one Barnwell resident, Mrs. James W. Dixon, commented that “if I 
had known he [Carter] was going to do this I wouldn’t have voted for him.”106 Asked if 
they would scrap BNFP if future nuclear wars were prevented, many in Barnwell offered 
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a tentative, “yes,” but also doubted Carter’s ability to “sell his ideas to the rest of the 
world.”107 And like Chem-Nuclear’s radioactive waste site, BNFP produced clear 
economic benefits: employing 300 people “with an annual payroll in excess of $5 
million.”108 Likewise, in 1976, AGNS’s tax payments—$407, 775 in total—funded 
county schools.109 For a revenue poor county, the benefits were tangible, while Carter’s 
plans for nuclear proliferation offered a more abstract, principled vision of the future, one 
largely disconnected from everyday realties.  
 More significant for Carter’s political fortunes, his approach towards high-risk, 
“uneconomical” technologies, especially commercial nuclear reprocessing and breeder 
reactors, put him at odds with many southern politicians, who wanted the nuclear gravy 
train to continue – by way of Allied-General, the Clinch River Breeder Reactor, and 
similar projects. A month after Carter’s deferral announcement, his staff navigated the 
political repercussions, arranging at least one meeting with Rep. Butler Derrick, Jr. (D-
SC). Described by Carter’s congressional liaison Frank Moore as the “point man in the 
House on water projects,” Derrick wanted greater consideration for alternative uses for 
BNFP; and in return, the president might gain much needed support for his controversial 
water-project agenda, which threatened to pull federal funding for 117 water projects and 
disgruntled western and southern members of Congress.110 Senators Ernest Hollings and 
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Strom Thurmond both denounced Carter’s decision, although Hollings conceded that a 
temporary delay was “logical and even desirable.”111 But Senator Hollings ultimately 
supported Barnwell for “safety, for control, for needed energy,” characterizing Carter’s 
non-proliferation policy as an “ostrich” policy.112 Going further, Hollings questioned 
Carter’s “utopian rhetoric” in light of the fact that “we are sitting over here fat and happy 
with nuclear as our principal defense,” and concluded that “the nuclear genie is out of the 
bottle and the President can’t put it back in.”113  
 Responding to these concerns, Carter’s chief energy advisor and later Secretary of 
Energy, James Schlesinger, drafted a letter to Strom Thurmond, emphasizing the 
importance of halting nuclear proliferation. Carter, however, added a handwritten post-
script: “P.S. Reprocessing at this time is just not necessary. Other functions may perhaps 
be performed at Barnwell.”114 In the fiercely hierarchical world of Washington, Carter’s 
post-script appears strikingly patronizing to a politician over twenty-years his senior. 
Undoubtedly, Carter’s lack of political acumen has been noted before, but the letter 
further illustrates two aspects of his presidency. On the one hand, Carter’s commitment to 
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analyzing energy-related issues seemingly had no bounds, and as the AEC’s lax safety 
evaluation of BNFP demonstrated, Carter’s deferral of commercial nuclear reprocessing 
was prescient and justifiable. Despite the pleas of nuclear-friendly politicians and 
industry-figures, Carter’s stern and occasionally unforgiving personality paid great 
dividends in terms of stopping a risky-endeavor by ANGS. More importantly, Carter’s 
principled stance to nuclear proliferation, an agenda couched in moral terms, arguably 
enabled him to not vacillate in the face of corporate pressure—at least on the issue of 
reprocessing.  
 The evolution of the Barnwell debate illustrates how Jimmy Carter and his 
administration’s approach to nuclear issues, and energy more broadly, never satisfied any 
camp, leaving environmentalists to cheer one day, only to scratch their heads at Carter’s 
decision shortly thereafter. In 1978, a year after the deferral announcement, Carter’s 
advisors circulated a series of memos which examined transforming BNFP into an AFR 
facility, known as Away-From-Reactor storage, where spent nuclear fuel would be stored 
temporarily. Anti-nuclear activists feared that an AFR site would only encourage the 
federal government and the nuclear industry to delay finding permanent storage for 
radioactive waste. If that occurred, South Carolina would find itself housing an even 
greater amount of nuclear waste. While a number of South Carolina politicians desired an 
alternative use for BNFP, few supported adapting the site for AFR storage. Stu Eizenstat 
and Katherine “Kitty” Schirmer, both members of Carter’s staff, advised the president to 
proceed with caution, and warned that James Schlesinger may have underestimated the 
controversial nature of Barnwell’s fate and its potential to become an “explosive issue” in 
  214 
South Carolina’s gubernatorial elections.115 Furthermore, using Barnwell as an AFR, 
potentially required the newly created Department of Energy to purchase the facility from 
Allied-General, which Schirmer and Eizenstat argued might appear as a “federal 
bailout.”116 In fact, BNFP already received federal funding for its non-reprocessing 
operations, and Carter strongly opposed extending financial support to the facility in the 
1979 budget. Even though James Schlesinger recommended exploring the AFR 
possibility, at least for political reasons, Carter opposed a “federal takeover.”117  
 Despite President Carter’s ban on commercial nuclear reprocessing in 1977, 
public fears heightened as many grew concerned that the BNFP facility would be used as 
a federally-managed reprocessing site or an AFR storage site, even though Carter 
opposed such actions publicly. Opposition to the plant emerged early in the project’s 
planning and construction stage and would continue to grow throughout the 1970s, as 
South Carolinians increasingly questioned the wisdom of their state’s commitment to a 
nuclear-fueled economy. The worst fears of the 1,500 activists who gathered at Barnwell 
in 1978 never materialized, and while Ronald Reagan’s administration flirted with the 
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idea of federally-managed reprocessing or AFR storage at BNFP, ultimately they 
continued Carter’s ban on commercial reprocessing.118  
 However, from 1976 to 1983, the site was used for testing natural uranium as a 
“surrogate,” and for research using plutonium and other transuranic wastes, for 
commercial and for contract work by the Department of Energy.119 Although the plant 
was “decontaminated” in 1983, significant radioactive contamination remained – in 
glove-boxes, fume-hoods, and in three underground, high-level waste tanks containing 
300,000 gallons of rainwater and contaminated liquid.120 One tank contained 300 
kilograms of uranium mixed with 5000 gallons of mixed waste. All said—
decontaminating or “decommissioning” of BNFP has been one of the largest 
undertakings in South Carolina’s nuclear projects yet.121  
    Clinch River Breeder Reactor  
 For Carter, the decision to defer commercial reprocessing, which hampered 
AGNS’s plans and Barnwell’s larger economic designs, drew the ire of some South 
Carolina politicians, but largely remains one of the more positive achievements of his 
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presidency, even if he gained little political capital from it. What leverage Carter 
managed to obtain rapidly depleted as he entered a series of lengthy battles with 
Congress, one of which centered around the controversial Clinch River Breeder Reactor 
Project (referred to as CRBR henceforth). In 1972, AEC Chairman James R. Schlesinger, 
who later served as Carter’s advisor and Secretary of Energy, and Tennessee Valley 
Authority Chairman, Aubrey Wagner, officially announced that a demonstration model of 
a fast breeder reactor would be built along the Clinch River in East Tennessee, near 
Knoxville and Oak Ridge.122  In subsequent years, as with many nuclear facilities, 
forecasts for the length and the cost to complete CRBR increased, but many in Congress 
doggedly supported funding appropriations for the project nonetheless. Like the pork-
barrel water projects, Carter devoted a tremendous amount of time and resources to end 
federal funding for CRBR. Even after years of fighting Clinch River, in 1979, the 
president informed his advisor that he would “rather go down swinging” on the issue, a 
tactic which proved divisive and alienating, and jeopardized the three-decades long 
pursuit for all things nuclear by southern politicians. Moreover, while federal funding for 
CRBR only ceased in 1983, Carter’s attack on the project marked the death-knell of 
breeder technology for commercial purposes in the US.  
 During the 1950s and 1960s, the fast breeder reactor represented what scholar 
Maja Fjaestad has described as a “technological vision,” and industry figures advocated 
breeder-reactors as a more efficient form of nuclear power because of “its ability to 
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produce more nuclear fuel than it consumes.”123 When the nucleus of uranium or 
plutonium undergoes the fissioning process, two neutrons are released, one sustains the 
nuclear reaction, while the other neutron could be captured by the nucleus of enriched 
uranium or thorium. If successfully “captured,” more fissionable material is created, and 
thus, breeder reactors quite literally “breed” fissionable material.124 Because many 
anticipated uranium shortages and rising costs, in addition to broader anxieties about 
resource depletion that culminated in the 1970s, the breeder appeared as a viable option 
for the technological future.125  But as Fjaestad has noted, the breeder “is an example of a 
technological future that did not meet its industrial expectations,” and her study traces the 
failure to transform the breeder into a commercially viable power-source in Sweden.126 
Like the Swedes, a number of other nations invested substantial resources into 
developing their own breeder reactors, including Japan, Germany, France, and the Soviet 
Union, with each hoping to curtail energy shortages in the future, bolster economic 
growth through cheap energy, and possibly attain national prestige through technological 
innovation.127  
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 In the US, the first “fast” reactor, “Clementine,” operated at Los Alamos 
Scientific Laboratory from 1946 to 1953, and was the first reactor to be fueled by 
plutonium and to use a liquid metal coolant: mercury. Clementine had two purposes, one 
of which was to further development of fast reactors, and the other purpose was to 
advance nuclear weapons research. The reactor’s high energy neutrons provided a 
missing link for nuclear weapons design. Before Clementine, researchers at Los Alamos 
had no capabilities of producing such high-intensity neutrons.128  
 Similar to Clementine, other early developments in fast reactors occurred at 
federally-funded, defense oriented national laboratories, such as Argonne in Illinois and 
Hanford in Washington.129  The “first prototype breeder reactor,” informally known as 
Fermi and located in Monroe, Michigan, achieved “criticality” or sustained its first 
nuclear reaction in August 1963.130 The breeder’s fortunes, at least in the US, soured as 
early as 1966, when the Fermi 1 experienced a serious accident—a partial meltdown— 
inspiring John Fuller’s We Almost Lost Detroit (1975), a popular, investigative account of 
the accident.131 Although Fermi 1 restarted again three years after the meltdown, by 1972, 
the reactor’s “outmoded” technology and financial drawbacks contributed to its 
decommissioning.  
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 Adding to the negative publicity surrounding breeders from anti-nuclear activists 
and fiscal conservatives, Fuller’s account also served an essential text for the anti-nuclear 
movement and encouraged fears that breeder reactors could “explode like an atomic 
bomb.”132 The risks associated with breeder reactors encouraged development of an 
experimental reactor, the Southwest Experimental Fast Oxide Reactor (SEFOR), located 
in the mountains of rural Northwest Arkansas. The chief objective for SEFOR was “to 
demonstrate how fast reactors would respond to accidental rapid increases in power,” and 
the reactor operated for this purpose from 1969-1972.133  SEFOR and other experimental 
reactors made considerable advances in developing breeder technology, even though 
certain issues remained, particularly how to translate experimental breeders into reactors 
for the private sector.   
 Despite the initial difficulties, the energy crisis of 1973, along with predictions of 
resource depletion and bloated forecasts for energy needs, spurred further research and 
development funding for breeder prototypes with the objective to create a commercially 
viable breeder reactor. From 1967 to 1983, the federal government “spent over 6.5 billion 
dollars” on Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR) development. Breeder 
technology, according to Richard Nixon in 1971, represented the nation’s “best hope” for 
“economical cheap energy;”134 and according to scholar Michael J. Graetz, the AEC, 
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Nixon, and Gerald Ford viewed the breeder as the “holy-grail of energy policy.”135 The 
breeder offered a technological solution to America’s growing energy insecurity, and for 
a time, Congress backed appropriations for fast reactor research even as the costs 
escalated considerably. Carter’s election in 1976 threatened the endless stream of 
appropriations for breeder development and the future of nuclear energy more broadly.  
 In February 1977, shortly after taking office, Carter announced a $200 million cut 
to the breeder reactor program, which commentators interpreted as a concerted move 
away from nuclear energy towards energy-conservation, coal, and building strategic oil 
reserves. More importantly, Carter’s energy policy seemed to privilege short-term 
solutions rather than long-term energy development.136 And like Barnwell’s reprocessing 
facility, the administration’s proposal to kill the Clinch River project fit within his non-
proliferation agenda. Defending his decision, in April 1977, Carter stated there was “no 
need to enter the plutonium age by licensing or building a fast breeder reactor such as the 
proposed demonstration plant at Clinch River.”137 James Schlesinger surmised that Carter 
saw the breeder “as the single most important source” of nuclear proliferation, which 
distracted him from more pressing issues.138 Ultimately, the maneuver pitted the new 
chief executive against the majority of Congress, launching a fight over CRBR that 
extended throughout Carter’s term.   
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 Although Carter stubbornly fought to end CRBR, in his correspondence and in his 
budget proposals, he supported further research and development in breeder reactors. In a 
September 1977 letter drafted to Congressman John Brademas (D-IN), Carter detailed his 
stance towards breeder reactors, arguing that contrary to what many believed, his vote 
against CRBR did not reflect an anti-breeder stance.139 Continuing on, Carter argued that 
the CRBR was “an expensive, uneconomical and technically out of date facility…and not 
a necessary component of an effective R&D program.”140 While Carter professed 
supported for breeder research, in November 1977, he vetoed an appropriations bill for 
ERDA, which included funds for Clinch River. In order to justify the veto, Carter 
addressed Senate, reiterating his objective to end CRBR and his intention to “analyze still 
available options…to ensure that no further necessary expenditures” were made.141  
 When defending his position on CRBR, Carter consistently pointed to the 
project’s unnecessary nature, describing it as “technologically obsolete,” or as his staff 
put it, a “technological dinosaur.”142 And while nuclear experts may have influenced his 
views, Carter often emphasized his own analysis and his review of the information 
available —the chief technocrat in the executive office. Tellingly, after an assembling an 
expert panel on nuclear issues, members of Carter’s staff pressed for the meeting’s 
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extension, arguing that the president could benefit from a longer discussion.143 But as his 
personal diary attests, Carter fiercely guarded his time, and not surprisingly, seemed more 
comfortable assessing policy issues in less collaborative settings.144  In this regard, Carter 
is arguably unique among American presidents because of his deep involvement with 
research and development policy, where his slight expertise in nuclear matters morphed 
into an ability to dissect the particularities of breeder reactor projects. Writing to Iowa 
Congressman Berkley Bedell (D-IA)  in August 1977, Carter reaffirmed his commitment 
to eliminating pork-barrel projects and reserving support for the breeder “only when it is 
needed” and when “we are sure of the best design,” asking Bedell to “stick” with him in 
the “continuing struggle.”145 As his November 1977 address illustrates, Carter’s knack 
for alienating Congress surfaced early in his presidency, particularly as he reminded 
Senate of his intentions to thoroughly analyze and to locate any unnecessary 
expenditures—which resulted in Carter appearing more as a watchful parent or teacher 
than as a much-needed leader on energy-related issues.  
 Despite Carter’s veto, appropriations for CRBR continued in subsequent years, 
which contemporary commentators characterized as Congressional defiance, and 
demonstrated the political efficacy of Tennessee Senator Howard Baker (R-TN) and 
Congressional Representative Marilyn Lloyd (D-TN), both of whom lobbied for the 
Clinch River during and after Carter’s presidency. As early as March 1978, Carter’s 
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advisors fretted over gaining Congressional support, warning Carter that failure to 
compromise might lead to a second veto over ERDA’s funding, and acknowledged that 
CRBR represented a “highly visible symbol” of support for the nuclear industry. To gain 
support from key Congressional figures, Rep. Olin Teague (D-TX) and Rep. Walter 
Flowers (D-AL), Carter needed a “substitute symbol,” one that enabled the largely pro-
nuclear Teague and Flowers to preserve “their credibility and position on nuclear 
issues.”146 In doing so, however, the compromise threatened Carter’s own credibility, 
who had seemingly back-pedaled from his earlier stance that nuclear power was a “last 
resort.”147  
Carter’s wavering on nuclear issues prompted Rep. Olin Teague’s “urgent, 
personal request for a useful discussion” with the president. Teague warned Carter that 
neither industry nor Congress believed his assurances that the present administration was 
committed to a strong breeder reactor, and he pointed to an “intense uncertainty” about 
Carter’s intentions.148 The uncertainty surrounding Carter’s stance reflected the 
increasingly polarized landscape of energy and environmental policy, which gave a figure 
like Carter, who offered complicated and occasionally contradictory solutions to 
America’s energy problems, a very narrow platform of either “anti-nuclear” or “pro-
nuclear” and left little room for complexity. As Carter had stated in 1977, he supported 
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breeder reactor research but not the CRBR—admittedly a slight nuance, and yet, one 
easily subsumed by the labyrinthine National Energy Policy. In this regard, Carter flailed 
on the issue of public perception.  
 By November 1978, the fight over CRBR continued, and Carter’s advisors 
weighed future options. Writing to James Talmadge McIntyre, Jr., then director of the 
OMB, Frank Press acknowledged that “after eighteen months, we have still not 
succeeded in implementing this policy,” which had become “a very contentious matter,” 
and one that “jeopardized” the administration’s ability to ensure its non-proliferation 
objectives at home and abroad.149   Essentially, the options before Carter followed several 
trajectories. One option required the administration to “take administrative action” and 
cancel CRBR, which Press warned would provoke a “long and bitter lawsuit,” and the 
GAO concluded there was “no ground for such action.”150 Another possibility included a 
series of negotiations and attempts to persuade Congress to accept the cancellation of 
CRBR if funding for breeder research continued, also known as the McClure 
compromise. The least attractive path required the administration to “acquiesce to the 
will of Congress and complete construction of CRBR.”151 Admittedly, none of the 
proposed options represented an ideal situation for Carter, particularly because his initial 
opposition created a wedge between himself, and according to Press, what “has to date 
                                                
149 Memo from Frank Press to McIntrye, November 15, 1978,  Folder: AT 9/16/78-
12/31/78,  Box 2, White House Central Subject File, Atomic Nuclear Energy, JCL.   
150 Ibid. 
 
151 Memo from Frank Press to McIntrye, November 15, 1978, Folder: AT 9/16/78-
12/31/78, Box 2, White House Central Subject File, Atomic Nuclear Energy, JCL.  
  225 
been the majority of Congress.”152 Cancelling CRBR constituted a fraction of NEP, paid 
few dividends, and seriously threatened the president’s larger agenda, but Carter 
remained stubbornly wedded to his opposition. In a letter to Speaker of the House Tip 
O’Neill, written in April 1979, Carter stated he had reviewed the matter again and 
remained “convinced that completion of the project would not be in the national 
interest.”153  
 Convinced that CRBR was uneconomical, technologically obsolete, and would 
weaken the nation’s non-proliferation agenda, Carter’s administration fought for the 
project’s cancellation in 1979 and 1980.154 By most accounts, CRBR’s cost overruns 
were tremendous, requiring approximately $15 million a month by 1979 from Carter’s 
perspective and CRBR critics, the project’s proposed “loop” design appeared 
increasingly outdated as the French nuclear program adopted a “pool” design for their 
breeder reactors.155 Even if CRBR had transformed from once cutting edge to a 
“technological turkey,” Carter underestimated the hunger for pork-barrel projects in 
Congress and the disastrous effects of opposing certain projects. Moreover, Carter’s 
attack upon Clinch River challenged a decades-long quest by southerners to develop not 
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only lucrative defense-contracts but also nuclear-related projects, which provided a mix 
of high-paying engineering positions and temporary construction work, and promised 
additional revenue for state and local governments.  
 While Congressional support had been steady throughout Carter’s administration, 
it waned after Ronald Reagan took office in 1981. Reagan, in fact, supported Clinch 
River, as did his Secretary of Energy, James B. Edwards, the aggressively pro-nuclear 
former governor of South Carolina.156 When Congress resisted Reagan’s desire to do 
away with the Department of Energy, he responded by appointing Edwards, the former 
dentist as his Secretary of Energy, which one scholar described as “the most significant 
watershed in modern U.S. energy policy.”157 
 According to Edwards, Clinch River “fit into the administration’s energy policy 
because it was a ‘long term high risk R&D venture,’ enhanced national security, and it 
contributed to non-proliferation goals.”158 From this perspective, if the US dominated the 
field of breeder technology, the American position to better dictate international control 
of nuclear materials and technology would improve. After the administration encouraged 
the NRC to license the facility, site excavation finally began in 1982. In a strange twist of 
events, the long and divisive conflict over CRBR came to a sudden end in 1983, as a joint 
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effort by fiscal conservatives and environmentalists successfully cut federal funding for 
the project.159  
 At opposing ends of the CRBR debate in Congress were two southern senators: 
Dale Bumpers (D-AR) and Howard Baker (R-TN). Senator Baker’s clever maneuvers 
saved the project for over a decade and paralleled his efforts with TVA’s controversial 
Tellico Dam. But as a lame-duck in 1984, Baker no longer wielded the same power in 
Congress, and fiscal conservatives in his own party found CRBR unfeasible. Bumpers, an 
advocate for the environment, gained support from environmental activists who had long 
opposed Clinch River because of the risks it posed. After a long, protracted battle, the 
“stake through the heart of the breeder” came from two southerners.160   
Conclusion  
 Viewed holistically, Carter was an advocate for the environment and for a 
forward-thinking energy future, but revisionists have also glossed over his more hare-
brained schemes—particularly the EMB and his calls for greater usage of coal. Curiously, 
some revisionists have painted his anti-regulatory, anti-bureaucracy rhetoric as benign, 
but unlike Ronald Reagan, Carter adopted the mantle of expert technocrat; and therefore, 
his calls for overriding regulations for pipelines and energy facilities seem more 
dangerous. The precise, president-engineer found “red tape” stifling the nation’s energy 
future and inadvertently gave intellectual backing to the environmentally-hostile Reagan 
                                                
159 Ibid., 238; Judith Miller, “Excavation is Begun for Breeder Reactor,” New York Times, 
September 23, 1982.  
 
160 David Shribman, “Senate Kills Funds for Breeder Reactor in Passing Energy-Water 
Bill,” New York Times, June 23, 1983; Martin Tolchin, “Senate Vote Virtually Kills 
Clinch River Atom Reactor,” New York Times, October 27, 1983; “The Clinch River 
Rathole,” New York Times, September 21, 1983.  
 
  228 
administration. In evaluating Carter’s presidency, over-simplifying Carter as a great 
champion of the environment and alternative energy obscures his evolution in energy 
policy. By 1979, Carter’s tone and proposals had shifted and acknowledging that change 
complicates the perception of him as a high-moralist, impervious to influence. In a more 
desperate political climate, Carter went to Camp David not as a biblical figure in search 
of prophetic vision, but as an increasingly hardened politician searching for leverage and 
a chance to salvage his political career.  
 Revisionist scholars have emphasized Carter’s accomplishments in pro-
environment legislation, rightly noting the important legislative measures enacted during 
his presidency.161  On environmental issues, the Carter administration’s greatest victories 
occurred with the passage of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (the “Superfund” Act) in 1980, which gave the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) authority to remediate sites of hazardous 
environmental contamination and “argue in court who should pay the cost,” and the 
Alaska National Interest Conservation Act (1980) which “set aside 105 million acres of 
Alaskan wilderness.”162 Under the Carter administration, legislative measures addressing 
the environmental impact of surface and strip mining were passed, along with 
                                                
161 Brinkley, “The Rising Stock of Jimmy Carter; Jeffrey K. Stine, “Environmental Policy 
during the Carter Presidency,” The Carter Presidency: Policy Choices in the Post-New 
Deal Era, ed. Gary M. Fink and Hugh Davis Graham (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 
1998), 180. 
 
162 Jimmy Carter, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 
1980-1981, ( Best Books, 1981), 2381; Jeffrey K. Stine, “Environmental Policy during 
the Carter Presidency,” The Carter Presidency: Policy Choices in the Post-New Deal 
Era, ed. Gary M. Fink and Hugh Davis Graham, 180.  
 
  229 
amendments to the Clean Air and Water Acts.163  Carter’s fight over wasteful and 
environmentally damaging water projects cost him politically, but offers another example 
of his commitment to fiscal responsibility and environmental conservation.164 Adding 
these accomplishments, Carter’s administration highlighted climate change and 
humanity’s role in it. The National Climate Program Act of 1978 “doubled” the budget 
for research about climate change, and Carter publicly noted that “the risk that man’s 
own activities—might adversely affect the earth’s environment and ecosystem” and 
warned that a greater understanding of these issues was necessary “before changes are 
irreversible or the consequences inevitable.”165  
 Writing to advisor Stu Eizenstat in March 1980, Carter expressed his “deep” 
concern about “the acid rain problem,” which Congress “must be warned about.”166 
Carter’s advocacy for environmental issues and the seriousness upon which he viewed 
them, is quite clear, but his stubbornness still abounded. Finding it difficult to shake old 
habits, Carter told Eizenstat that “data must be presented to the public,” despite repeated 
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warnings by the administration that the American public had abdicated, or least grown 
weary, of data and expertise. Reflecting on his presidency in 1982, Carter described the 
piece-meal nature of getting energy legislation passed as “despairing and tedious, like 
chewing on a rock that lasted four whole years,” and then surmised that the public wasn’t 
interested and were instead “aggravated every time I went on TV.”167 As Carter realized, 
expertise went extinct in the 1970s, and Americans gravitated towards fewer details not 
more. Reagan, in Carter’s words, capitalized on this moment and “deliberately [excluded] 
other conflicting or confusing issues” for a “single minded purpose.”168  Despite Carter’s 
environmental victories, the tide had turned against scientific authority and perhaps even 
the necessity of proof itself.  
 In the ream of nuclear technology and non-proliferation, Carter scored bigger 
victories, even though the battle over Clinch River cost him politically. By indefinitely 
deferring commercial nuclear reprocessing, Carter intervened in a project with potentially 
catastrophic risks, and neither Allied-General nor the federal government had fully 
elucidated or considered questions of adequate security, or occupational and 
environmental hazards. In the process, the community of Barnwell, South Carolina lost a 
long-term source of revenue and employment, and although the facility operated for 
several years, the South Carolina Advanced Technology Park never expanded into what 
many envisioned. However, other activities at the site also produced a significant amount 
of contamination with natural uranium and other materials, which has remained largely 
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hidden from the public view and further demonstrates the importance of Carter’s 
intervention.  
  Beyond the deferral of commercial nuclear reprocessing, Carter’s response to the 
accident at Three Mile Island encouraged reform within the nuclear industry. By creating 
the Kemeny Commission, which investigated the TMI meltdown and proposed steps for 
moving forward, Carter’s administration spearheaded an effort that helped Americans 
and the nuclear industry understand what occurred at TMI, provided transparency, and 
also led to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission changing its own practices. The nuclear 
industry and the NRC “adopted wide-ranging reforms” which have significantly 
contributed to safer practices and more stringent regulations.169 The American nuclear 
power industry reached a crisis point in the late 1970s and early 1980s, with mass 
cancellations and TMI, but in subsequent years, output from existing nuclear plants has 
increased and better performance has arguably narrowed the industry’s credibility gap 
with the American public.  
 Like the Kemeny Commission, Carter’s administration used the independent-
study approach to address nuclear waste disposal, forming the “Interagency Review 
Group on Nuclear Waste Management (IRG)” in 1978.170 A year later, the IRG released 
their report, offering tempered support for the feasibility of permanent storage, while 
acknowledging the political and environmental barriers persisted.171 Responding to the 
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report, Carter’s new policy statement on nuclear waste created a “State Planning 
Council” lead by South Carolina Governor Richard Riley, who diverged from long-
standing patterns of pro-nuclear sentiment in the state.172 As J. Samuel Walker has noted, 
Carter’s statement was “a milestone in efforts to manage radioactive waste because of 
both its visibility and its thoughtful, substantive proposals to address the technical and 
political aspects of the problem,” but it failed to transcend the “stalemate” of overcoming 
public fears and finding adequate solutions for “inherently unresolvable waste issues.”173 
Moreover, the IRG’s recommendation of creating regional compacts for greater inequity 
in waste disposal never worked as planned. 
 More broadly, Carter’s tepid support of nuclear power and his fight against Clinch 
River Breeder Reactor paralleled a general decline in enthusiasm over nuclear power. 
With Clinch River’s cancellation, hopes for commercial breeder reactors to operate in the 
US by the early twenty-first century largely dissipated.174 While Carter publicly 
supported funding other breeder projects in an abstract sense, in practice, the federal 
government’s invested in breeder technology subsided.175 In tandem, widespread 
cancellations of planned or partially built commercial nuclear reactors coincided with 
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Carter’s presidency and for several years afterward. From 1977 to 1984, twenty four 
reactor projects (individual reactors) were cancelled in the US South.176 Although  
numerous factors conspired against the nuclear industry, the wave of cancellations, 
demise of CRBR, indefinite deferral of commercial reprocessing, and radioactive waste 
stalemate challenged nearly three decades of regional nuclear optimism, which 
paradoxically occurred under the watch of “Jimmy Carter nuclear expert” and native 
southerner.177 Carter vacillated on many aspects of nuclear technology, but he never 
wavered in highlighting the dangers of proliferation, a stance that disrupted a long 
trajectory of downplaying the risks associated with harnessing nuclear technologies for 
generation and destruction.   
 Despite Jimmy Carter’s accomplishments in energy, environment, and non-
proliferation, the American public remained skeptical, even if periods of initial optimism 
occurred (as in July 1979). Although Carter promised equity in energy sacrifices, for 
some Americans, the burden of sacrifice and conservation rested upon the average 
citizen, and elected officials seemingly paid lip-service to the idea but failed to conserve 
energy in practice. One Florida couple, Mr. & Mrs. John Wyman, commented, “Carter, 
with all his travels, fishing trips, etc does not seem to be doing much of the conserving he 
wants the public to do.”178 Others echoed that sentiment, noting that “Amy & Rosalyn are 
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traipsing around Switzerland…Carter’s flying all over looking for 1980 votes.”179 Like 
his advisors warned, Carter appeared Janus-faced and tone-deaf to many, as one 
constituent lamented,  “I for one am getting a little tired of having Carter talk out of both 
sides of his mouth at the same time.”180 Other Americans blamed Congress for its failure 
to regulate nuclear plants and deal with the energy crisis because policy-makers were “so 
busy increasing its own pay and benefits.”181 The decade’s economic and energy turmoil 
undergirded a sense of inequality and perhaps an aversion towards conservation. And 
faith in technological solutions continued, as another Floridian argued, “We have the 
expertise in this country to solve any problems if we want to.”182  
 American faith in Jimmy Carter’s ability to solve, or at the very least improve, the 
nation’s energy problems had once been robust.  In December 1976, after Carter’s victory 
over Gerald Ford, one survey reported that nearly 76 percent of Americans believed the 
new president was “very likely” or “fairly likely” to create an effective national energy 
policy, an issue which Carter, ironically, had devoted little attention to in his 
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campaign.183 The “outsider” from Plains, Georgia committed to serving the “public 
good” brought insider knowledge on nuclear issues and an engineer’s mind to 
Washington, which generated an extraordinary commitment to analyzing policy issues 
but also obscured contradictions, particularly in terms of environmental protection and a 
better energy future.184 Like his ill-fated attempt to run a six mile race in 1979, where an 
exhausted Carter required assistance off the course after four miles, the president 
staggered into the 1980 election, unable to match Ronald Reagan’s assurances to make 
“America great again.”185 By September 1980, one poll reported that 54% of Americans 
surveyed disapproved of Carter’s energy policy, and another concluded that 75% 
characterized Carter’s performance in handling the nation’s energy problems as “poor” or 
“only fair.”186 During the 1980 election, Americans continued to express greater faith in 
Carter’s approach versus Reagan’s, but expertise and “technocratic precision” gave way 
to an administration that exuberantly rejected the need for detailed analysis by the chief 
executive. Reagan’s Secretary of Energy, the pro-nuclear, former governor of South 
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Carolina James B. Edwards, pointedly reminded an audience of his limited knowledge in 
1977:  
 I am not a nuclear expert…for that matter, I am not a professional politician. 
 Before  running for office, I was an oral surgeon. When the conversation reaches 
 strontium and  thorium and some of the technical nuclear terms, such as: mixed 
 blend, co-processing, I only know what these mean to our people in terms of job 
 opportunities and a prosperous life.187 
 
 And this disavowal of expertise characterized the new administration—free enterprise 
superseded close scrutiny of policy issues.188  
 Carter, defeated in 1980, no longer appeared as “Moses who will lead us out of 
our post-Watergate desert, through the Red Sea of red tape, into the promised land of 
personal salvation and good feeling,” nor did he resemble Saturday Night Live’s 
“amazing colossal president.”189 For a politician considered an integral part of the “New 
South,” where Sun-Belt optimism and moderate politics redefined regional identity; as 
president, Carter offered an older tradition in southern culture—the grim sermons of the 
past, which warned sinners to repent or else.190 Despite his many accomplishments, 
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Carter never effectively communicated a coherent platform, resisting the trend towards an 
increasingly polarized, partisan rhetoric concerning energy and the environment. Like a 
“greased pig,” Carter provided complicated and contradictory solutions to complex 
issues, failing to see that his forward-thinking vision on alternative energy, justified 
stance against wasteful pork-barrel projects, and unwavering attitude towards non-
proliferation could be tempered by his cries against red-tape, federal bureaucracy, and 
regulations.191 Writing in 1988, Carter described the natural world as “fragile and 
lovely,” noting that Henry David Thoreau’s observation that “wilderness is the salvation 
of mankind” remained “more true than ever,” an indication of his deep affinity for the 
preserving the environment against the unscrupulous activities of man.192 In light of this, 
one wonders why Carter betrayed his faith in “wilderness as the salvation of mankind” in 
1979, accepting political peanuts from the vested interests he disdained—appearing 
“elusive as a lightning bug” yet again.193 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
THE MIND OF THE NUCLEAR SOUTH: ANTI-NUCLEAR THINKING 
AND THE DILEMMAS OF TECHNOLOGY AND PROGRESS 
But if the passion for actual building assumed tremendous 
proportions, the passion for dream building and for 
speculating upon that dream building, as it developed in the 
extravagant, romantic, and Progress-haunted South, was 
Gargantuan. For every real new factory, for every real new 
skyscraper plastered with mortgages, ten imaginary ones 
leaped up.1  
--W. J. Cash, The Mind of the South (1941) 
The roads are now of concrete or gravel and there are 
thousands of miles of ugly wires crossing the landscape 
bearing messages of light…We have gone forward our 
progress is ever so evident. And the river? It is changed and 
eternally the same.2  
--William Alexander Percy, Lanterns on the Levee  
 
 By the early 1970s, commercial nuclear power was no longer a technocratic 
dream. It had become a widespread, visible reality. It sparked admiration and it instilled 
fear. And it led to a regional uprising of sorts over the meanings of technology and 
progress. An emergent anti-nuclear rebellion sparked rancorous debates and grassroots
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 protests. Their warnings about a nuclear present and future were central to the decade’s 
larger discussions about energy production, environmental fragility, and technological 
risk. In their rebellion against nuclear power, anti-nuclear activists organized public 
protests, engaged in legal battles, encouraged whistle-blowers within the nuclear 
industry, aspired for a diverse coalition across class and racial lines, and challenged 
nuclear experts, vigorously fighting the region’s growing number of nuclear plants from 
the early 1970s to the mid-1980s. Peaking in 1978, a year before the accident at Three 
Mile Island, the South’s largest anti-nuclear rally occurred in Barnwell, South Carolina, 
drawing protestors from across the region. Over 1500 people gathered in opposition to 
the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant, the global nuclear economy, and what they perceived as 
the “South’s disproportionate burden,” seen most visibly in South Carolina, where the 
state’s nuclear complex included the Savannah River Site, a low-level radioactive waste 
repository, a number of operating or planned nuclear reactors, and an under-construction 
nuclear fuel reprocessing facility.1  Nowhere had the atomic aspirations of the region’s 
mid-century boosters developed so fully as in the Palmetto State, or as some called it, the 
“Plutonium State.”2 From the Oystershell Alliance in New Orleans to the Catfish 
Alliance in Alabama, anti-nuclear rebels formed local groups and built a regional 
network dedicated to challenging the nuclear industry and offering alternative visions for 
the South’s future. These activists helped shape a nuclear “mind of the South,” to borrow 
the provocative phrase of Wilbur J. Cash.  
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  In their shaping of the South’s thinking about the nuclear world, the region’s anti-
nuclear activists were the heirs to a tradition of “regional self-scrutiny” that reached its 
pinnacle during the 1930s to 1950s. If they lacked the eloquence of writers like William 
Faulkner or Lillian Smith, these rebels nonetheless shared a place in a long line of 
thinking about progress, modernity, ignorance, and change in southern history. At the 
heart of that tradition is Wilbur J. Cash’s The Mind of the South, published in 1941. Part 
indictment and part reflection, Cash portrayed the southern mind as stubbornly solid, 
violently wedded to tradition, and in the twentieth century, enraptured by a sort of crass 
materialism. Southerners, in Cash’s view, paid lip service to “Progress” and a “New 
South” but were unable to free themselves from racism, class exploitation, and willful 
ignorance. As scholar Robert Brinkmeyer describes, Cash saw southerners not as 
“prisoners of authoritarian forces,” but rather as “prisoners of their own thoughtlessness 
and their determination not to analyze.”3 
  Critics in subsequent decades found fault with much of Cash’s interpretation. 
Cash’s vision appeared too homogenous, it over-simplified black southerners and poor 
whites, and it imbued southern planters with a guilt out of sync with historical reality. 
Despite its shortcomings, The Mind of the South, as Richard King asserts, remains  “a 
quintessential expression of the regional self-scrutiny,” one that found good company 
during the southern literary “Renaissance” in the 1930s to 1950s.4 Writers like William 
Alexander Percy, William Faulkner, Lillian Smith, James Agee, Thomas Wolfe, and the 
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Nashville Agrarians, produced meditations on the South, its history and its identity, while 
also exploring their own roots. In the process, many of these writers looked at the 
changing world around them, as the flawed region they loved stood at the precipice of the 
“Bulldozer Revolution,” to use C. Vann Woodward’s phrase.5 Even before Will Percy 
lamented the “thousands of miles of ugly wires crossing the landscape,” other writers, 
like W.E.B. Du Bois expressed skepticism and ambivalence towards the promises of 
“Progress.” Traveling back to his old haunts in Tennessee, Du Bois looked upon the 
former site of a log schoolhouse, where “in its place stood Progress,” and Progress, and 
he understood it, was “necessarily ugly.”6 Of course, southerners have no monopoly on 
impugning modernity or the façade of Progress, but these critics rarely disentangled those 
views from a regional context.   
However tempting it may be to interpret the South’s anti-nuclear rebellion in 
national or even global frameworks (and those links exist) that mode risks short-
circuiting their critiques to a narrow time-span, where the only meaningful connections 
occur at the specific historical moment. In other words, by divorcing the anti-nuclear 
critique from a longer historical trajectory, grounded in southern history, a good deal of 
meaning is lost. The region’s anti-nuclear activists found inspiration and resembled 
movements elsewhere, but their power came from a slightly different well, one that 
rebelled against a southern way of suppressing dissent, encouraging conformity, and 
kneeling at the altar of Progress and New South schemes. It chiseled away and further 
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fractured what Cash saw as a mind of the South, solid and total in its ability to keep 
certain people in their place and reinforced older, dangerous tendencies. In this sense, the 
mind of the modern, nuclear, South is fragmented; with the determination “not to 
analyze,” foundering, but still Progress-haunted as ever.7  
 The mind of the nuclear South, in its fragmentation, left room for an ongoing 
commitment to Progress, material advancement, and technological euphoria, and the 
region’s anti-nuclear rebellion produced critics, who viewed their activism as anti-
progress, hysterical, and overly paranoid. Faced with nuclear controversies in his home 
state, South Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond (R-SC) lamented anti-nuclear activism as 
“most illogical.” To the 75-year-old politician, the movement’s “frequent forecasts of 
doom” were “the product of unthinking opposition to progress.” The “miracle of modern 
technology” had turned “our nuclear sword into a nuclear plowshare.” Leaving that plow 
idle, he warned constituents, was a dangerous thing.8 Thurmond’s reference to nuclear 
plowshares merely recycled the language of the Atomic Energy Commission’s 
experimental “Project Plowshare,” the agency’s attempt to utilize atomic energy for 
peaceful purposes.9 Thurmond’s biblical language would have resonated with his 
constituents and further underscored the New South’s long-standing gospel of growth— 
the doctrine that espoused industrial progress as a means of regional advancement and 
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that stretched back almost a century.10 Anti-nuclear activism challenged that New South 
creed, that boosterish way of thinking that emphasized industry, progress, development, 
and an optimism that glossed over the deep issues of inequality and corruption facing the 
region. 
 The history of the post-WWII South, has often been cast as a tragic tale of hasty 
development, wherein the “Bulldozer Revolution” steamrolls cultural tradition and rural 
life. Eager boosters and Sunbelt politicians play the part of villain, bargaining with the 
federal government and corporations for development at any cost, and southerners serve 
as hapless by-standers, politically inert and disengaged with the transformation of their 
region. The South was “sold,” and by most accounts, despite a few writers and scholars 
penning Dixie’s epitaph, the rest of the region’s citizens embraced economic and 
technological development at any cost.11 In the case of the nuclear industry’s 
development, historian James Cobb has argued that “many southerners expressed little 
doubt about the safety of nuclear facilities, choosing instead to accept at face value the 
assurances of utility officials that such operations promised more jobs and a better 
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standard of living and were far more of a blessing than a threat.”12 Perhaps 
unintentionally, the masses appear much in the way W.J. Cash portrayed them, concerned 
with material things and acquiescent in the maneuvers of a more powerful class.  
 To be sure, popular accounts of southern economic development have contributed 
significantly to our understanding of the American South’s industry and economy and its 
relationship to the federal government and military. And yet, by their very focus, a top-
down narrative emphasis on groups like state economic development boards has obscured 
the grassroots rebellion that occurred in the 1970s-1980s, one that fostered widespread 
debate about energy, the environment, and technology. Responding to these debates, anti-
nuclear activists delivered jeremiads that offered another perspective on a changing 
South, replacing what writer Marshall Frady called the “old fierce tragic theologies” of 
the region’s past with newer warnings of ecological doom, nuclear meltdowns, and grave 
threats to public health. Anti-nuclear activists supplied the region’s “old fierce tragic 
theologies,” and like any good old-time religion, their work forecast foreboding for the 
future. Their vision of the next-New South ran counter to the prevailing feel-good 
regional identity prompted by the growth of the Sunbelt South and its newly affluent, 
sprawling metropolitan areas like Atlanta and Charlotte.13 The “mind” of the nuclear 
South, then, offers historians a more complex picture of how southerners viewed 
technological and environmental change, in addition to placing anti-nuclear activism 
                                                
12 James C. Cobb, Away down South: A History of Southern Identity (Oxford  ; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 132.  
 
13 Cobb, Away Down South, 247; Marshall Frady, “Gone With the Wind,” Newsweek 86 
(July 28, 1975), 11  
 
  245 
within a longer-trajectory of southerners who sharpened their own swords against the 
region they loved.   
Anti-Nuclear Jeremiads as “Old, fierce tragic” sermons in the Prosperous and Bland 
South 
Southern anti-nuclear activists drew upon regional history, environmental 
discourse, and fears about out-of-control science and technology rooted in long-standing 
suspicions. Their apocalyptic tone resembled anti-nuclear screeds elsewhere, but their 
jeremiad also contained distinctly “southern” elements, bound explicitly to the region’s 
history and its New South quest. Activists recast the region’s lust for development, 
progress, and cheap energy as a morality tale, where nuclear power constituted the final 
chapter in a century-long drive toward modernity and economic development at 
seemingly any cost.14  From their correspondence, newsletters, speeches, protests, and 
imagery used, anti-nuclear thinking appears not only fragmented, but also deeply 
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troubled by the consequences of modernity. In part, activists likely exaggerated the 
menace as a rhetorical strategy, and yet, their devotion to fighting nuclear projects 
suggests they sincerely feared the destructive possibilities and a future South defined by 
technological risk, environmental degradation, and untrammeled development.  
The South’s most prominent critics of modernity lived in a pre-nuclear world, or 
at the very least, wrote at the dawning of the nuclear age. Some, like William Faulkner 
and James Agee, grappled with the atomic bomb, but nearly all passed away before the 
commercial nuclear industry developed in the South. Companies might blight the air with 
smoke-stacks, or ruin the landscape with transmission lines, but atomic energy and 
nuclear technology offered a new threat to infuse southern perspectives on modernity and 
progress. While these threats were and are global in nature, and have transformed our 
planet fundamentally, those changes also reverberated and altered the form of “regional 
scrutiny” propagated by southern observers in the past.15 Southerners constructed anti-
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nuclear jeremiads which incorporated broader fears of nuclear catastrophe with older 
themes.  
Anti-nuclear activists gravitated towards this confluence of apocalypse and 
southern history. For instance, William Reed Moore, a Georgia native and early nuclear 
opponent, inveighed against South Carolina’s leaders for their greed and blind faith in all 
things atomic, warning that “deadly radioactive fission garbage” would put “future 
generations of South Carolinians, and to the people of neighboring states” at too much 
risk for the “short term profits for the industry and the utilities.”16 Moore served as 
president for one anti-nuclear and environmental organization—Environmental Inc., and 
like many of his peers, exhaustively wrote letters to politicians and newspapers. Moore’s 
letters warned of the doom brought about by greed, and his writings are riddled with 
references to biblical passages that criticized the “perverse disputings of men of corrupt 
minds…supposing that gain is godliness,” and pointed readers to passages in the New 
Testament that cautioned against a “love of money and greed.”17 While Moore’s anti-
nuclear activism possessed a greater religious tone than other activists, the underlying 
critique resembled popular portrayals of utility executives as oversized, gluttonous 
tycoons and southern politicians as swindlers and peddlers of radioactive death—in both 
anti-nuclear publications and political cartoons.  
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Echoing these themes, the left-leaning publication Southern Exposure published a 
special issue dedicated to the region’s nuclear industry in 1979, tracing the connections 
between utility executives and southern politicians, denouncing another New South 
scheme, and hinting at impending disaster:  
 The South has long fallen prey to the purveyor of the simple solution, the savior 
 who would lift the region from economic stagnation to new heights of 
 prosperity and  national prestige. Our history is littered with such demagogues, 
 and though we now sneer at them with New South sophistication, we are still 
 often blinded by the Big Promise of renewed fame and fortune. Witness the 
 uncritical acceptance—and prideful defense—of Jimmy Carter by even the liberal 
 minded Southerner. More importantly, witness the region’s love affair with 
 nuclear power.  
 
 Every day brings new revelations of the dangers and mismanagement of nuclear 
 technology. It is not our primary purpose to add to that overwhelming evidence, 
 but rather to reveal the score of the industry in the South and the importance 
 of the region to the larger nuclear dream/nightmare.18 
 
 In this rendering, the South no longer faced some sort of cosmic retribution for 
slavery, but rather for its unthinking acceptance of industry at all costs. Cheap energy, 
specifically nuclear energy, assumed the role of savior—a new Christ swathed in 
radioactive linens—in the eyes of southern boosters and politicians. For many anti-
nuclear activists, cheap energy was “false salvation,” devoid of any substantial economic 
virtues and carried with it unimaginable risks.19 The Tower of Babel allusion, if 
somewhat debatable in its interpretation, nonetheless carried the weight of an old fire and 
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brimstone sermon. The less than subtle subtext of biblical language in this context 
warned audiences that without action the region’s quest for nuclear supremacy would end 
in a fashion worthy of the Old Testament.    
 Accordingly, visions of apocalypse and catastrophic accidents pervaded anti-
nuclear materials published by groups in the region, and while these imaginings were 
shaped by larger discourses, they remained grounded in a specific sense of place, a fear 
of permanent alteration or even mass exodus. In this sense, anti-nuclear writing and 
imagery echoed the sense of loss incurred by modernity’s encroachment, seen perhaps 
most vividly in Will Percy’s Lanterns on the Levee or the Nashville Agrarians’ manifesto 
I’ll Take My Stand, but the threat of nuclear annihilation or mutation from radiation 
added a menacing, dystopian quality. The “imagination of disaster,” as Susan Sontag put 
it, changed the warp and woof of regional self-scrutiny.20 Employing this imagery, one of 
South Carolina’s major anti-nuclear organizations, the Palmetto Alliance, warned the 
public about the dangers of the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant, a proposed commercial 
nuclear fuel reprocessing facility:  
 You don’t have to be a nuclear engineer to understand the dangers associated with 
 nuclear fuel reprocessing…such an accident could require the EVACUATION 
 OF MAJOR CITIES ON THE EAST COAST AND LEAVE SOUTH 
 CAROLINA UNINHABITABLE FOR MILLENIA.21  
 
 For the alliance, nuclear reprocessing technology represented a threat not only to 
the Barnwell community but to the entire East Coast, one that possessed catastrophic 
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potential unimaginable in a pre-nuclear era. Like the Palmetto Alliance, the North 
Carolina-based group, Coalition for Alternatives to Shearon Harris (C.A.S.H), described 
that state’s battles over the nuclear industry in apocalyptic terms, characterizing the fight 
as one against “the 4 Horsemen of our region’s nuclear apocalypse.”22 Likewise, locals 
living near the Shearon Harris nuclear plant, then under construction and located outside 
the Tri-Cities area in North Carolina, saw the site in menacing ways. Cecil Morris, a 
farmer living nearby, described the cooling tower as a “tombstone over Wake and 
Chatham Counties.”23 Another local resident, Teresa Dixon, told reporters she planned to 
buy her family gas masks and radiation suits.24 The fears and anxieties of people like 
Morris and Dixon gave activists fodder for their anti-nuclear publications, which often 
mixed serious reporting with dark-apocalyptic tinged humor.  
 In their fight against the Shearon Harris nuclear plant, CASH produced flyers and 
pamphlets that starkly portrayed the issue as one of life or death, but they reserved the 
most horrifying imagery for mothers. Radiation from the Shearon Harris plant, according 
to the organization, could cause “birth defects” and “spontaneous abortions,” effectively 
rendering a vision of the future where the disabled and deformed were no longer 
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outliers.25  Living in a risk society thus created a trade-off of cosmic retribution; the 
Faustian bargain of nuclear power would reap devastating consequences for all. This 
image, of course, served as a vivid contrast to the depiction of a future with alternative 
energy. Through solar and  wind power, and conservation, the ugliness of disability and 
death would be diminished in the utopian landscape. Central to CASH’s construction of a 
nuclear controversy, mutation, disability, and aborted radiated fetuses, appealed to 
maternal anxiety and a broader fear of a society plagued with poor health. Good mothers 
opposed nuclear power.  
 Conjuring images of mutated babies and environmental catastrophe served as one 
way to terrify people into opposing nuclear power, but they also spoke to deeper fears 
about modernity and technological risk, where the “imagination of disaster” left the big 
screen and became visibly imprinted upon the region’s environment and their way of 
thinking. When Will Percy looked at the ugly transmission lines, he feared losing a way 
of life defined by southern gentility, and a brutally reimagined landscape perhaps. The 
power of nuclear warfare only visibly materialized three years after his death in 1942. 
Greenville, Mississippi might be transformed but not obliterated by newly powerful 
weapons or abandoned for hundreds of years after a catastrophic nuclear accident. These 
dark possibilities haunted the mind of the nuclear South and no doubt encouraged 
impassioned, creative warnings. In North Carolina, activist Wells Eddleman offered a 
revised, nuclear-infused version of “Jingle Bells” that encapsulates the mixture of 
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gallows humor and sincere horror in anti-nuclear thinking: “Dashing through the glow, of 
atomic waste/ Running for our lives, fleeing our home place.”26 Another activist, Bo 
Lozoff, wrote an inspired version of   “Downtown,” originally recorded by Petula Clark:  
First there’s a problem because something starts wobblin’ in de inner core; 
Meltdown! 
And de first backup system maybe go on de fritz and not do what it’s for; 
Meltdown! 
When all the backup systems fail to cool off the container, 
Executives evacuate with lawyers on retainer… 
 
You might miss seeing Apex wiped off of the map, from a MELTDOWN! 
Consumers can hardly wait, MELTDOWN! I hear it lowers de monthly rate, 
MELTDOWN! It’s gonna be such a great show!27 
 
 
Both songs emphasize a loss of place, whether by a nuclear accident wiping Apex “off 
the map” or residents fleeing for their lives. Scholar Ursula Heise has explored the 
detachment from local places and customs, the disappearance of a sense of place in light 
of risks created by large-scale technological systems, and others have explored similar 
questions in the face of climate change and living in a risk society more generally.28 In 
the 1970s and 1980s, a more distinct southern regional identity had begun to slip away, as 
cities like Atlanta and Charlotte embodied a newer South, one more connected to 
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suburban Los Angeles and Phoenix than the Mississippi Delta or South Carolina 
Lowcountry. How fitting then, that Lozoff and Eddleman’s nuclear songs imagine a 
literal loss of place, where people are forced to abandon their homes and lose their 
connection to North Carolina, and more broadly, the South.  
 While imagining disaster was central to anti-nuclear thinking generally, activists 
found other ways to critique the region’s nuclear build-up. Even as activists 
acknowledged the battles over the nuclear industry were global, going so far as to phrase 
the fight as planetary in significance, anti-nuclear opponents harnessed meaningful 
symbols from southern history and culture to ground their commentary on environmental 
inequity, showing how risk supplanted other markers of regional identity. The modern 
South’s theology may have shifted from one of “old fierce tragic theologies” to a “feel-
good” evangelical Christianity, but anti-nuclear activists offered another reading of the 
region’s future—where doom and destruction still loomed but redemptive possibilities 
existed too.  
 In April and May of 1978, the largest anti-nuclear rally in the US South occurred, 
a demonstration against the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (BNFP) and nuclear power, 
attracting approximately 1500 protestors, and a slew of high-profile critics of nuclear 
power, including Drs. John Gofman, Helen Caldicott, the controversial Ernest Sternglass, 
and musician Jackson Browne. Of those attending, 280 protestors were arrested as they 
approached the gates of Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant, a nuclear reprocessing facility 
under construction, and refused to leave until Allied-General Nuclear Services officials 
met with them.29 Holding hands and singing “Love each other as ourselves, for we are 
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one,” the anti-nuclear protestors deliberately fashioned their spectacle to counter a 
nuclear industry many perceived as destructive, violent, and part of a machismo culture 
that threatened not only human life but “mother earth” as well.30 The anti-nuclear 
organization, the Palmetto Alliance, spearheaded the opposition to BNFP. The group’s 
organizational materials shows how anti-nuclear thinking in the South embodied both a 
global consciousness but also a locally grounded perspective; and in this sense, it spoke 
to a tension that nuclear power provoked – even as local and regional distinctions eroded, 
to the point that some would call the region the “No South,” activists spoke of planetary 
destruction but also employed rhetoric and imagery that placed nuclear technologies in a 
regional context. Thus, in Palmetto Alliance newsletters, writers compared Barnwell’s 
climate to the French reprocessing facility, La Hague, but also characterized their actions 
as “southerners mobilizing for survival” and deplored the region’s political leaders who 
chose “radioactivity over the sun’s warm rays, cancer over health, death over life.”31  
 When Ronald Reagan’s administration considered using the facility for either a 
federally managed reprocessing center or an Away-From-Reactor storage facility, 
activists again appealed to southerners using familiar language invoked many times in the 
past, emphasizing the importance of states’ rights and claiming such action “usurps the 
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rights of the citizens of South Carolina.”32 In their opposition to nuclear power, the 
Palmetto Alliance  readily re-appropriated the language of southern demagogues, looking 
back into the region’s past while also envisioning catastrophe reaching far into the future. 
Similarly, Alliance activists cited their opposition to subsidizing BNFP’s future by 
characterizing such a bill as a “blatant violation of states rights,” one that according to the 
Palmetto Alliance, South Carolinians “never asked the federal government to dictate the 
use of a major section of South Carolina real estate for hundreds of years.”33 Echoing 
southern political leaders railing against an expansive federal government, the Alliance 
declared that “the people of South Carolina, not bureaucrats in some federal agency 
should decide if we want to become an area of national sacrifice.”34 No doubt the 
activists’ strategy was, in part, a rhetorical one, aimed at galvanizing South Carolinians 
who might otherwise be suspicious of groups that appeared radical or fringe.  
 Palmetto Alliance publications also reached further into the past, evoking South 
Carolina’s dubious honor as the first state to secede from the Union in 1861, and 
challenging the federal government’s prerogative to force South Carolina to accept spent 
nuclear fuel: “Denying a South Carolina Governor the right to disapprove a federal site 
for spent nuclear fuel –in this state?? Why, it practically calls for another secession!”35 
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While the calls for secession were tongue-in-cheek, it nonetheless drew from the state 
and the region’s past, and relied upon a deeply embedded resentment to federal intrusion, 
one long associated with slavery and civil rights. In one photo of Barnwell protestors, a 
larger banner depicts the Grimke´ sisters, the 19th century abolitionists from South 
Carolina.36 In this sense, the references to a southern past contained mixed messages, 
incorporating language of white supremacists but also imagery of another, more 
redemptive history.  
 Like the gallows humor evoked by activists, anti-nuclear groups also employed 
southern symbols in a comedic manner that also delivered serious commentary. The 
Oystershell Alliance, an anti-nuclear group in Louisiana, encouraged protestors to attend 
a mass demonstration in Barnwell, describing the protest as a “south-wide event” and a 
“fertile meeting” ground for “clean energy people all over the South,” calling on 
southerners to “flex your grits.”37 Thus, the publication not only emphasized the event’s 
regional nature, one where like-minded southerners converged, but also pointed to a 
staple of southern cuisine, transforming a southern symbol into one that conveyed 
strength and a different sort of unity. C.A.S.H activist, Wells Eddleman used another 
southern trope, derived from the expression “bless her heart” or “bless his/her soul,” in a 
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letter to the editor that criticized the Raleigh News & Observer’s coverage of nuclear 
issues: “Bless your editors! …I’m sure the editors will give up their space, and some 
more, for the ‘blessings’ of this wacky waste. ‘Blessings’ include huge Duke Power rate 
hikes, possible leaks, waste transportation on our roads and maybe disease and mutations 
down the road.”38  
 Likewise, an Oystershell Alliance publication pointed to the long history of 
negative perceptions of southerners as ignorant and poor, citing the high number of 
cancelled or deferred nuclear plants in Louisiana as proof that “Us ignorant, dumb 
Southern folks will buy anything; just as long as it’s in the name of progress!”39 
Significantly, the writer’s usage of “us” implicates the activists as well, instead of 
creating a division between the anti-nuclear forces and other southerners. Moreover, the 
publication pointed to the region’s history of accepting projects of questionable value in 
the name of progress and modernity. Another Oystershell newsletter infused their critique 
of the nuclear industry and Louisiana’s friendliness to polluting industries with a nod to 
southern customs and language:  
 How has our own State of Louisiana government protected us? Our politicians, 
 besides winking at all the poisonous wastes produced here in Louisiana, have now 
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 made this state a national dumping ground, inviting every polluter in the 
 country to bring their garbage down here! Southern hospitality, y’all.40 
 
With the same biting humor present in many anti-nuclear publications, the Oystershell’s 
criticism emphasized the environmental costs of the state’s pro-industry, anti-regulation 
attitudes and the calculated ignorance of southern politicians, while also illustrating the 
disjuncture between the “commodified vision of southernness” and an uglier reality.41 
The South depicted in Southern Living, the magazine created in 1966 that quickly became 
the handbook for southern women and southern hospitality, showed a region where 
educated, affluent southerners nonetheless maintained a more-benign version of southern 
identity, where Frito-Pie and using the term “y’all” constituted regional charm not 
markers of inferiority.42 For the region’s anti-nuclear and environmental activists, the 
region’s badge of exceptionalism had shifted from Jim Crow segregation to one defined 
by gross environmental inequity and an acceptance of technological risk.  
 For the South’s anti-nuclear activists, the nuclear industry presented an urgent 
situation that threatened the public’s health and the environment. These feelings 
sometimes appeared acutely localized, bound by one community or state borders. As 
Palmetto Alliance publication stated, “In every state of the nation, nuclear power is a 
controversial issue. In South Carolina, it is an emergency.”43  If the statement lacked 
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verifiable accuracy, it underscored a larger sense of crisis, where certain people and 
places were more susceptible to high-risk, technological systems. While the notable 
presence of the nuclear industry in South Carolina encouraged activists to highlight the 
state’s disproportionate burden, the Palmetto Alliance also highlighted the problem in a 
regional framework. According to Alliance members, the South bore the “burden of the 
most diversified and the most concentrated collection of Nukes,” and was “the nuclear 
dumping ground for the world.”44 We increasingly credit systems like nuclear power for 
giving way to a more global sense of connectedness and vulnerability (and a detachment 
from a localized sense of place), and controversies like the Barnwell Fuel Plant 
heightened an awareness of the ways nuclear technologies carried risks beyond state and 
national borders. In the words of a Palmetto Alliance publication,  there was “no where 
[sic] to hide.”45 These systems encouraged a type of mediation from communities that 
utilized local or regional symbols language but also found new ways to define a “sense of 
place” through inequities and risks.  If the Dixie had experienced an “Americanization” 
of sorts, prompting some to write an epitaph for the region’s identity or describe the 
region as the “No South,” activists found news ways to define the South’s identity, one 
that starkly contrasted the commercially viable “southern” identity sold on television, in 
magazines, and in stores.46  
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 Critics of the movement levied a series of invectives against anti-nuclear groups, 
often portraying activists as paranoid, hysterical, and unrealistic about necessity of 
nuclear power. In one screed against the Kudzu Alliance, an anti-nuclear group in North 
Carolina, John Graham of the American Nuclear Society described the Alliance’s 
members as “sore losers” and “outraged rebels” who believed “they were performing a 
democratic act, when actually they were doing the opposite.”47  Another critic, Scott 
Greig, writing for the Daily Tar Heel (UNC’s student paper) caustically lampooned 
protestors of the Shearon Harris plant. Noting the uproarious nature of public hearings 
and the vitriolic exchanges between Carolina Power & Light officials and C.A.S.H. 
activists, Grieg proposed, in jest, that a journalist like “Hunter S. Thompson who’d 
probably be drinking Wild Turkey over ice” watching the two groups “go at it verbally 
with everything but knives and the Municipal Building’s folder chairs.” Grieg wondered 
if CASH’s supporters were opposed to Shearon Harris, a plant located approximately 25 
miles from Chapel-Hill, merely because of a “paranoid reaction to Chernobyl” or a 
“cosmic embalance [sic]” that prevented the protestors from playing their Bob Dylan or 
Grateful Dead albums on a turntable powered by nuclear energy.48 Grieg’s portrayal of 
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CASH activists as aged hippies fighting battles of days gone by, while comical, is 
perhaps more representative of hostile views towards anti-nuclear groups and 
environmentalists in general.  
 Others found anti-nuclear activists dangerously anti-progress, weak-hearted, 
hysterical, and incapable of understanding different perspectives. James Davis of South 
Carolina, a hot-bed of nuclear opposition but also pro-nuclear sentiment, surmised that if 
the anti-nuclear Palmetto Alliance had existed in the 19th century, “the wagon trains 
might never have rolled Westward.”49 Davis accused Ralph Nader and his followers for 
the “Chicken Little Syndrome” “taking over,” and worried that “such faint-heartedness” 
held “ominous implications” for the United States, who might “become a ‘pitiful, 
helpless giant.”50 For Davis, Uncle Sam “must stand up and fight like a man, not hide in 
the closet, fearful of taking any risks.”  Others echoed Davis, like Roy Mendelson of 
Columbia, South Carolina, who warned the such a “faint hear[t]” would lead America 
back to the “dark ages,” unable to confront the Soviets “with boundless energy 
supplies.”51 Both letters, written in April 1979, responded to the calls for a nuclear 
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moratorium in the aftermath of Three Mile Island, but also underscored a deeper fear that 
the nation’s supremacy could be undercut by dwindling energy supplies and a more 
general “crisis of confidence” that Jimmy Carter addressed in July 1979.  
 Still others assailed anti-nuclear activists as unthinking radicals who failed to 
represent the majority of Americans or southerners alike. One South Carolinian expressed 
his “firm belief” that a large pro-nuclear “silent majority” existed in the state. Floridian 
Jeffery Shulman described anti-nuclear activists as “the product of leftist political 
elements who appeal to sensationalism and rely on widespread ignorance.”52 Shulman 
warned that “freedom has never been gained without risk,” and “without nuclear power, 
we compromise our strength, independence and assertiveness.” Another letter described 
activists as “unthinking anti-nuclear freaks,” while another questioned whether or not 
Americans wanted to become a “second-rate nation because of a few protestors that get 
all the publicity?”53 To be sure, many people felt undecided about nuclear power, and in 
fact, found themselves as neither pro or anti-nuclear power, but the letters nonetheless 
testify to the perception of activists as unrepresentative of the average person and bent on 
reducing the nation to “second-rate” status. These views resonated with Americans 
generally, but they also pointed to a strand of continuity in the southern mind, where 
dissent or questioning larger systems of authority appeared heretical and hysterical.   
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 To counter negative portrayals of anti-nuclear forces as a fringe minority, and 
perhaps to further undermine the South’s history of conservatism and exclusion, southern 
anti-nuclear groups advocated for diversity within their organizations. From archival 
sources and interviews, it seems that southern anti-nuclear groups aspired for greater 
diversity than they ever achieved, but hope for a movement that cut across class and 
racial and ethnic lines is evident. In a 1978 memo to South Carolina Senator Ernest 
Hollings, a staffer warned him of the “broad base of political support” anti-nuclear 
groups had garnered, describing the coalition as one comprised of “people typically 
aligned with various liberal causes –folks involved in ACLU, women’s rights, 
conservationists, and various community activists, as well as moderate, middle-class 
types who are scared to death of anything nuclear.”54 Continuing further, the staffer 
described the widely publicized anti-nuclear events in the state, which attracted high-
profile musicians and reached national television:  
 Furthermore, a fund-raiser rock concert was held in Columbia last Friday, 
 starring Jackson Browne and John Sebastian. While these names may not mean 
 anything to you, they are top-level rock stars, and raised a great deal of money for 
 this effort.  
 
 The point being, Barnwell is taking on national significance. It was even 
 mentioned on Saturday Night Live on television, this past weekend.55 
 
Hollings, must have remained unconvinced, because in 1980, he promised one political 
supporter that “We are going do everything to keep Duke Power and nuclear power 
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growing and growing.”56 If southern anti-nuclear activists seemed paranoid to some, they 
were right in their suspicions that many politicians shared close alliances with utility 
executives.  
 In their efforts to fight pro-nuclear attitudes, groups across the South sought 
broader participation, expanding beyond the white, middle-class, and well-educated 
activists that typically comprised anti-nuclear groups in the South and elsewhere.57 The 
Oystershell Alliance, an anti-nuclear group in Louisiana, envisioned fundraisers with 
“different kinds of music for different kinds of people. Black music for blacks, Cajun 
music for Cajuns, c*un*try music for country folks. Poor white boy music for Po*boys. 
ETC.”58  Commenting on the reluctance for locals in Barnwell, South Carolina to align 
with activists protesting the Allied-General Nuclear Reprocessing facility and Chem-
Nuclear’s low-level waste site, a contributor to the Palmetto Alliance’s newsletter wrote, 
“Some of them still distrust the activists, some of them come up to the Natural Guard 
members on the street, and whisper, ‘Can’t say anything in public, but I’m with you all 
the way.’ ” The writer then noted the sympathetic disposition of Barnwell police officers 
towards anti-nuclear activists and envisioned a day when officers would “sit down by the 
                                                
56 Letter from Hollings to Ted Jones, January 25, 1980, Folder; Hollings, Public, Senate, 
Top., 96th, Energy, Nuclear, Gen., Box 271, SCPC.  
 
 57 Ethan M. Cohen,  Ideology, Interest Group Formation, and the New Left: The Case of 
the Clamshell Alliance (New York: Garland, 1988); Thomas Wellock discusses 
opposition by California farmers in Critical Masses: Opposition to Nuclear Power in 
California, 1958-1978 (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1998).  
58 Oystershell Materials, Box 86, Collection 32, Folder 8, Nuclear Energy: Louisiana 
Info, 1970, 1972, 1974-75, 1977-79, Ecology Center of Louisiana, Loyola University, 
Special Collections, New Orleans.  
 
  265 
fences and in the roads with us.”59  Local residents in rural communities, police officers, 
construction crews, minorities, and Third World groups represented a large and 
amorphous presence for the anti-nuclear movement, and activists likely exaggerated the 
diversity of the movement to combat popular stereotypes of activists as a small group of 
radicals detached from reality.  
 Anti-nuclear organizations, in the South and presumably elsewhere, eagerly 
sought information from workers within the nuclear industry, particularly those on 
construction crews (which would satisfy the working class credentials). In part, this 
desire to glean information from “the inside” spoke to a need for legitimacy. If activists 
were limited to outsider status, their jeremiads about the dangers of nuclear power, while 
provocative and potentially terrifying, lacked the authenticity of workers building the 
plants and measuring radiation levels. Some scholars have argued that the commercial 
nuclear industry’s credibility was damaged from dissension within the community of 
nuclear experts, but this is only one reason why Americans doubted the safety of nuclear 
power.60 Studying anti-nuclear groups from a local vantage point illustrates the ways in 
which activists utilized the expertise of scientists and engineers, but also how they sought 
the observations of less-high profile figures, such as construction workers and health 
physicists.  
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 In other cases, activists sought employment at local power plants with the 
objective of discovering information about safety violations. Activist Darryl Malek-
Wiley, one of the chief organizers of the Catfish Alliance, was hired at a Alabama 
nuclear plant and absconded with documents, an act of mischief and political protest.61 
Karen Silkwood became an anti-nuclear icon not simply because her story exposed 
unsafe practices within the industry. The blue collar revival in American culture helped 
transform her into a working class hero, although not in the same vein as Archie 
Bunker.62 Enlisting working class insiders was an important maneuver for a movement 
that attracted the upwardly mobile, the college educated, and the ecologically sensitive. 
And in the eyes of activists, the problems surrounding the nuclear industry were matters 
of life and death that affected everyone, even if the problems disproportionately impacted 
some communities more than others.  
 In building their nuclear controversies, activists interviewed “whistle-blowers” 
who generally focused on construction-related issues such as improper welding and 
radiation monitoring for currently operating sites. Stories of whistle-blowers found their 
way into newspapers across the US during the 1970s and 1980s—scandalous exposés of 
lax standards, drug use among workers, and shoddy construction were not a southern 
phenomenon but frequently appeared in local papers (and were encouraged by anti-
nuclear groups). One alleged employee on the construction crew at Shearon Harris 
reported that workers widely abused “downers” and “even the supervisors were drunk” in 
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a feature with the ominous headline “A Disaster Waiting to Happen.”63 Finding whistle-
blowers and portraying the movement as diverse served as vital strategies both in terms 
of countering their critics but also fit within a larger cultural fetishism of the working-
class and attack of the so-called “nuclear priesthood” that activists accused of shrouding 
industry misdeeds in secrecy and using their expertise as a cudgel over lay people.64  
 The South’s anti-nuclear rebellion reached small towns in Mississippi, flourished 
in well-heeled places like Chapel Hill, and meandered its way into the hills of western 
North Carolina. To some extent, the expansive nature demonstrated how far-reaching the 
region’s embrace of nuclear industry had become—as activists warned, there was “no 
where [sic] to hide.” No place appeared too remote for the nuclear industry’s reach. 
Capturing the many themes shaping the mind of the nuclear South, the small community 
of Beaverdam, North Carolina sprung to life after plans for storing nuclear waste 
threatened their township and their mountain-homes.  
 In 1986, the same year as the disaster at Chernoybl, the Department of Energy 
investigated the feasibility of housing a high-level nuclear waste site, one that would 
store spent fuel rods and military wastes, in western North Carolina, near the township of 
Beaverdam. In one report the DOE’s plans included: “condemning up to 20,000 acres of 
surface area, constructing a 400 acre facility, building 200 miles of tunnels, 1500-3000 
feet below the surface, burying 77,000 metric tons of spent fuel rods and military wastes 
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and then isolating this area for the next 10,000 years.”65 This “prospecting” mission by 
the DOE galvanized the community to organize an opposition movement, which resulted 
in the formation of the group “Beaverdam Against Nuclear Dumping,” or BAND, with 
meetings held at several local churches.66 In a speech by Rev. Kyles Wallace of 
Beaverdam Methodist Church, an “expert” on his own turf, holding a Masters in 
Theology from Duke and a Doctorate from Emory, he pointedly questioned the 
infallibility of the DOE’s methods and their knowledge of the area, while also 
underscoring theological reasons for the community’s opposition.  
 Perhaps in response to the growing anti-environmental, anti-regulatory rhetoric of 
the 1980s by the New Right, Wallace opens his speech, with the assurance that the people 
of Beaverdam “are for a great deal more than we are against,” and continued to “let the 
record show” that the township was for the lives of those living now and in the future, the 
responsible use of the earth’s resources, for “those places where we gather to worship 
freely the God who gave us this earth and entrusted us with it,” and for the “tracts of land 
which contain the remains of our families and loved ones.” Continuing, Wallace warned 
that the township would “stand toe to toe if need be” in opposition to DOE policy for 
siting high-level nuclear waste. Citing the DOE’s own study, Wallace noted the seismic 
risk in the area, along with the potential for contamination of shallow groundwater, and 
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the proximity to Asheville, North Carolina. Moreover, Wallace vocalized the 
community’s concerns about how a high-level waste repository would damage the area’s 
agricultural sector, in addition to harming any mountain-related tourism and recreation. 
Going further, Wallace pierced the gospel of growth, noting that any jobs created by the 
waste facility would be “short-level” and urged the DOE to consider the “potential 
consequences for now and our future lives in the name of a high-salary for a short 
duration.” Wallace lamented the short period of time the “lay people” of Beaverdam had 
to prove “scientifically what we already believe emotionally.”67  
 Concluding his speech, Wallace again pointed to the earth as God’s creation, and 
reminded his audience of their responsibility in protecting the “water, soil, plants, animal 
life, and human beings,” and the value and irreplaceable nature of each. Wallace mused, 
“what is the price of a person’s life or a family heritage in Beaverdam township?” and 
then declared “You cannot buy people’s lives off, we consider Beaverdam township 
justifiably worth keeping…On the basis of scientific data, civil outcry, and rational, 
intelligent protest, we in Beaverdam township will persist, endure and stay put…so help 
us God.”68  As seen in other nuclear controversies, Wallace’s speech depicted a system of 
gross inequity, where certain communities paid an unspeakable price for the nation’s 
commitment to nuclear power and weapons (in this case, high-level radioactive waste 
from the military). For Wallace and those involved in BAND, no “price” could substitute 
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for the preservation of the area’s heritage and its people; they rejected the trade-off model 
that government officials and corporations readily espouse. The calls for persistence and 
endurance, as well as the warning that the DOE could not “buy people’s lives off,” 
challenged the authority of the federal government and its experts, in addition to 
demonstrating how the rural community perceived these incursions. The South’s 
Bulldozer Revolution, rather than steamrolling public opinion into acquiescence, often 
encouraged unexpected opposition. While many in Barnwell, South Carolina clamored 
for Chem-Nuclear’s low-level waste site, residents living in the mountains of western 
North Carolina recognized the value in their environment for several reasons. Among 
them, angry citizens foresaw the negative effects, whether because of actual 
contamination or imagined dangers, of radioactive material in the caverns of the 
Appalachian mountains.  
 At stake then, as Rev. Wallace carefully outlined, were the lives of Beaverdam 
residents but also a sense of place, one threatened by a powerful government agency with 
experts, an agenda, and little knowledge of why this place mattered to the people that 
lived there. If the anti-nuclear movement was given, on occasion, to exaggerated 
apocalyptic imaginings, this way of thinking coincided with a tempered, yet forceful 
commentary on a changing, Progress-haunted region, one that W.J. Cash indicted for its 
inability to question and its ever-fixedness. The buildings and the landscapes changed, 
but Cash saw an immutability in southern thinking—in the southern mind—that left little 
room for hope. Anti-nuclear activists challenged an older southern “mind” and embraced 
the model of regional self-scrutiny.   
Conclusion 
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 The mind of the nuclear South is fragmented, torn between impulses of rebellion, 
preservation, and New South scheming. Walker Percy’s short story, “Young Nuclear 
Physicist,” originally written in 1937, captures the contradictory impulses of the nuclear 
South. The protagonist, Ralph, hails from Arkansas, but studies nuclear physics in New 
York. Ralph worships at the altar of pure science and believes that nuclear physics offers 
an escape from his past, his heritage, and his region. It is only at the end of the story 
when Ralph realizes, in order to impress a young bohemian woman, that “pure science” 
endears him to no one, and performing a series of folk-songs from Arkansas will give 
him the cultural legitimacy he sorely needs. The songs of “sourwood trees and the 
stillness of the mountains” represent his past, which despite his best efforts, he can never 
abandon.69  
 Few other southern writers in the mid-twentieth century explored the possibilities 
of nuclear physics or atomic energy at length; the writers of the Southern Renaissance 
gave halting, attenuated renderings of a world transformed by scientific discovery and 
technology. In her memoir Killers of the Dream, Lillian Smith only hints at the 
transformative qualities of atomic energy, Albert Einstein’s theories, and of “men in 
laboratories,” who “wrapped their invisible theories” around the world, making it appear 
“so small a thing” humanity could “not believe it.”70 Recounting a play performed by 
children at a summer camp, Smith noted the children chose four traveling companions for 
the little Prince, inspired by Antoine de Saint Exupery’s The Little Prince. “Conscience, 
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Southern Tradition, Religion, and Science,” who had only one “ardent defender,” a 
“quiet, withdrawn” girl. The defender of Science “asserted “we live in an age of science,” 
and warned that it was “too dangerous” to leave the Prince with only conscience, 
Southern Tradition, and Religion as his companions through the universe, for Science 
implied a “search for the truth.”71 In the end, the question “twisting in their minds,” the 
ghosts of racism and segregation in the South, prompts the children into a debate about 
equality and love for all mankind, with the “young scientists” overturning Conscience’s 
argument that science is only “good for making bombs and planes,” and banding together 
with Religion to oust Southern Tradition and Conscience—the two forces denying the 
Prince a better universe.  
 Similar to Smith, W.J. Cash contrasted the southern mind with a “modern mind,”  
one presumably transformed by casting off tradition, and perhaps guilt, in the search for 
truth. Others, like James Agee, reacted in horror to the atomic bombing of Nagasaki and 
Hiroshima. In what historian Paul Boyer has described as a “five thousand word 
fragment,” Agee left his atomic-bomb novel incomplete, leaving only a brief snapshot 
called “Dedication Day.”72 As the title suggests, Agee depicts a dedication day for a 
“uranium fused” arch in Washington D.C., built to commemorate the atomic bomb. 
Underneath the arch burns an “Eternal Fuse,” powered by chemically-treated cotton, 
grown by “members of a Sharecropper Rehabilitation Project in one of the richest of the 
condemned areas of the Delta,” with bales of cotton furnish “alternately, by a white and a 
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Negro family.”73 Even after humanity created a weapon of apocalyptic magnitude, the 
bales of cotton remained segregated. Workers toiled beneath the Arch keeping the Eternal 
Fuse lit. Among them, a scientist whose intellect helped create the atomic bomb, 
agonized over his guilt, and after pleading to have the ceremonial honors on dedication 
day, he commits suicide shortly thereafter, as a “sacrifice” for the “triumphal moment.” 
Buried with military honors at Alamogordo, New Mexico, where the first successful 
nuclear test, “the Trinity test,” occurred in July 1945, the atomic scientist’s body 
decays—no doubt with a much shorter half-life than the radiation left behind.  
 Like Agee, William Faulkner’s 1950 Nobel Prize speech probed the central 
question in an atomic world: “When will I be blown up?”74 Lamenting the “general and 
universal physical fear,” Faulkner observed the problems of modern society were “no 
longer problems of the spirit” but far simpler questions about when the end would come. 
Rejecting the “basest of all fears,” and “leaving no room in his workshop for anything but 
the old verities and truths of the heart,” Faulkner believed mankind would “prevail.” 
Faulkner’s speech is perhaps more famous for his conclusion—an optimistic rendering of 
humanity’s fate as not inevitably doomed. Faulkner’s speech, fusing the menacing with 
faith in the human spirit, embodies the roots from which the mind of the nuclear South 
sprung.  
 Atomic energy’s destructive possibilities infused southern perspectives after 
World War II. The thoughts of nuclear meltdown or annihilation combined with a 
growing sense of larger transformation. For over a century, the New South crusade 
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reconfigured the region’s environment, contributed to an exodus from rural communities, 
and uprooted a sense of place. And yet, none of this occurred uncontested or in the 
sweeping fashion as commonly depicted. Throughout the South, people looked at 
changes afoot and asked if southerners could do better and if the bargains paid for 
“Progress” were worth it after all. When writer Dennis Covington searched the hills of 
northern Alabama for snake handlers, he found the hallmarks of the bland, modern South 
in the form of civic centers, but he also found a countryside “littered with burned-out 
house trailers, automobile graveyards, collapsed chicken farms, and those ubiquitous 
totems of cultural anomie—tanning beds and late-night video stores.”75 Like Will Percy, 
who bemoaned those dreaded transmission wires, or the protagonist of John Kennedy 
Toole’s A Confederacy of Dunces, Ignatius J. Reilly, whose disdain for fluorescent lights 
prompts him to wonder if the world “will someday get him on some ludicrous 
pretext…and drag me to some air-conditioned dungeon and leave me there beneath the 
fluorescent lights,” the South’s gigantic cooling towers, electrical systems, and low-brow 
commercialism mutated the once rural landscape.76  
 These broader changes, along with the new threats nuclear things evoked, sparked 
the anti-nuclear rebellion. It was a continuation of older themes, reminiscent of the 
Nashville Agrarian’s manifesto against the modernity’s assault upon the region,  but one 
that lacked their nostalgia for pastoralism bound by white supremacy and older southern 
                                                
75 Dennis Covington, Salvation on Sand Mountain: Snake Handling and Redemption in 
Southern Appalachia  (De Capo Press, 1995), 24.  
 
76 John Kennedy Toole,  A Confederacy of Dunces (Grove/Atlantic, Inc., 2007, orig. 
published 1980), 230.  
 
  275 
traditions. The South’s anti-nuclear rebels envisioned a different future, with 
decentralized forms of energy and a more conscientious relationship with the 
environment, and sought to preserve other aspects of heritage and tradition. Following in 
James Agee’s footsteps, perhaps the South’s finest documentarian voyeur, Ross 
McElwee’s documentary Sherman’s March (1986) captures the region’s anti-nuclear 
spirit by way of Jackie, the filmmaker’s former paramour and activist in South Carolina. 
Jackie explained her activism by citing her deep ties to the state; her roots made it 
impossible for her to ignore the nuclear threat. These roots also prompted her to consider 
leaving South Carolina and head westward instead: “I’m trying to get out of here and go 
to California. Here…I’m compelled to say something…being of this place – out 
there…real shallow roots out there – everybody lives in a yogurt cup.”77 Westerners were 
no strangers to anti-nuclear activism, and California had its own share of nuclear 
controversies, but for Jackie, her sense of place kept her ensnared. “Men in laboratories” 
made the world “smaller and smaller,” changing our sense of perspective and 
highlighting the fragility of our planet, but roots and ties to a place, despite arguments to 
the contrary, did not uproot southerners entirely. “Being of this place,” as Jackie said, 
implied a state of consciousness that made imagining disaster a global project but also 
one of an intensely local and even regional nature. Like the “backwoods prophets” of 
another era, the South’s anti-nuclear rebels preached their own sermons, issuing forth dire 
warnings, while pointing towards another kind of salvation, only found by renouncing 
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crass materialism, the false promises of progress, and harnessing alternative energy.78 In 
this, they shaped a mind of the nuclear South—not solid—but one more able to sustain 
dissent, foster inclusivity, question authority, and challenge unsavory southern traditions. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
NUCLEAR GHOSTS: RELICS OF THE TENNESSEE VALLEY 
AUTHORITY’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM  
The people fell before the word, like corn before a storm of wind, 
and many rose from the dust with a divine glory shining in their countenances.1  
---John McGee (1821) 
 
 Along Highway 25, near Hartsville, Tennessee, a cooling tower looms over the 
pastoral landscape. Locals derisively call the giant, concrete tube a “used beer can”— a 
fitting label for an object that seems discarded and conspicuously out of place.2 In 1973, 
the Tennessee Valley Authority announced their plans to build the “world’s largest 
nuclear plant,” a massive four reactor complex in rural Hartsville. For over six years, 
construction proceeded, and crews bulldozed the home of John McGee, one of the area’s 
first settlers, and then exhumed his body from his grave. In its place, a cooling tower and 
partially built containment structures emerged, unsettling the land along the Cumberland 
River. Despite TVA’s bold intentions, external and internal factors conspired against the 
agency’s nuclear program. In 1979, TVA deferred two of Hartsville’s four reactor units, 
eventually cancelling the project entirely in 1984, after spending four hundred million
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 dollars. Of the seventeen reactors planned for the nuclear division, only six operate 
today.1 Some cancelled reactors exist only as blueprints, while others are fragments 
dotting the valley’s landscape—curious monuments of metal, concrete, and vegetation. 
When southern writer Dennis Covington searched for snake handlers in rural Alabama, 
his journey began in “a ghost town in the shadow of the twin cooling towers” at TVA’s 
partially constructed, idle Bellefonte nuclear plant.2 In those shadows, where modern 
technology and rural spaces meet, Covington found a primeval brand of Christianity 
practiced by people revolting against contemporary society. TVA’s nuclear relics 
symbolize the uneven process of “modernizing” the Tennessee Valley, and by extension, 
the American South.   
 Like Barnwell and Grand Gulf, the history of Hartsville’s abandoned nuclear 
plant is a local story. As with other rural communities affected by nuclear developments, 
the arrival of a costly, high-risk energy system illustrated the divide between a rural and 
urban South, where power flowed from the periphery to growing metropolitan 
communities with ravenous appetites for electricity.3 Nuclear power plants, while 
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promising economic benefits and increased revenue, also threatened to disrupt “the 
individual’s relationship to the local.”4 Although some residents, including area native 
and former Vice President Al Gore, supported the plant’s construction, others opposed it. 
To some degree, common fears about radiation and catastrophic accidents provoked 
opposition, but local residents also viewed the project as destructive in more subtle 
ways.5 If nuclear power threatened lives, the plant also threatened a way of life, one 
intimately connected to the environment and to Hartsville’s history.  In their quest to 
build the “world’s largest nuclear plant,” TVA planners discounted local environmental 
knowledge, the area’s history, and a community’s values.  
 More broadly, Hartsville’s nuclear ruins intersect with a regional and an 
institutional history. Harnessing and distributing affordable electricity proved central to 
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the project of modernization in the American South.6 For many, modernity, progress, and 
“regional salvation,” especially in the Tennessee Valley, were closely connected with 
energy production, first seen with the TVA’s development of hydroelectricity, then coal, 
and later atomic energy.7 From its inception in 1933, TVA embraced the principle of 
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cheap, widely accessible energy as a means for economic development and improving the 
quality of life for Valley residents.8 Leading the nuclear charge, the Tennessee Valley 
Authority built some of the region’s earliest nuclear reactors but soon found itself 
embroiled in controversy in the 1970s. TVA’s nuclear program faced serious budgetary, 
management, and safety issues; it became the thorn in the institution’s side, and by the 
1980s, TVA’s nuclear agenda stood tottering on the brink of extinction. Capturing this 
moment of crisis, TVA executive John G. Stewart lamented, “The problem is not that 
[the] TVA has made mistakes (although that, too, has happened). The problem is with the 
perception that TVA as an institution is a failure…It is more serious because it calls into 
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question the reasons for TVA’s very existence.”9 TVA’s approach to the Hartsville 
project embodied the agency’s institutional crisis. In many ways, TVA’s practices  
resembled other utility companies, but they strove to appear as something more than their 
rivals—as a benevolent force in the valley. The disjuncture between TVA’s mythic image 
and its practices no doubt heightened the sense of injustice from Hartsville residents, 
forced to rearrange their lives for a failed project that altered the environment, erased 
local history, and left residents with that giant “used beer can.”  
 With the passage of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act in 1933, TVA rapidly 
pursued its goals of producing cheap and plentiful electricity, improving river navigation 
and flood control, along with a host of other aims.10 Guided by Arthur Morgan, who 
served on TVA’s original Board of Directors and espoused  “physical and human 
engineering,” and Franklin Roosevelt administration’s observation that the South 
remained the nation’s “number one economic problem,” TVA’s identity was tightly 
bound to a New Deal ethos, one that imbued the federally owned corporation with loftier 
objectives. Regionalism and technocracy, both strong currents in social science in the 
1920s and 1930s, characterized TVA’s early years. As historian Thomas Hughes has 
observed, the era’s technocrats viewed electricity as the technological agent for regional 
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transformation, and nowhere was this belief more strongly directed than at the American 
South.11  
TVA’s leadership differed with respect to how the agency would transform the 
Valley. Arthur Morgan viewed electricity as a means “to create a new society,” where 
TVA operated as a “social planner.”12 The other original board members, David 
Lilienthal and Harcourt Morgan, adherents to a “Jeffersonian ideal of grass-roots of 
democracy,” saw TVA’s role as vital for improving infrastructure that would 
subsequently encourage “private initiative.”13 With Morgan’s resignation in 1938, the 
agency directed its attention towards power production and resource development rather 
than social engineering.14  Even as TVA planners forced Valley residents from their 
homes, many supported TVA in the 1930s because the agency offered potential 
employment and promised a better quality of life. Although TVA garnered criticism from 
its inception, its identity in the 1930s and 1940s strongly reflected a New Deal theme: 
“the heroic worker back on the job and the benefits of new technologies.”15  
 Writing in 1944, David Lilienthal detailed the TVA’s objectives and guiding 
philosophy in his book Democracy on the March.  Lilienthal underscored the agency’s 
belief in technology and technocrats as instruments for regional transformation and 
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democratic aims. Imbued with a moral, democratic purpose, TVA existed in a loftier 
realm than ordinary power companies. “Indeed,” Lilienthal mused, “this valley even in 
the brief span of twenty years, supports a conviction that when the use of technology has 
a moral purpose and when its methods are thoroughly democratic, far from forcing the 
surrender of individual freedom and the things of the spirit to the machine, the machine 
can be made to promote those very ends.”16  
Lilienthal advocated a moral technocracy, one in which TVA’s “dreamers with 
shovels” would use technology as a means of sweeping societal and economic change.17 
Lilienthal and TVA planners eagerly crafted a narrative where the agency stood apart 
from “the smooth-talking centralizers, the managerial elite, cynical politicians, everyone 
without faith in the capacities of the people.”18 These efforts to shape TVA’s public 
image offered a rebuttal to contemporary critics who characterized TVA as state-
sponsored socialism.19 Describing the agency’s planners as “dreamers with shovels,” 
however, posed a problem for TVA in subsequent decades, as it wrestled with the 
grandiose ideals of a different era in a new political climate.  
By the 1950s, TVA expanded its power division from primarily hydroelectric to 
include nuclear power, and it purchased land throughout the Tennessee Valley for this 
                                                
16 David Lilienthal, TVA; Democracy on the March (New York: Harper, 1953, orig. 
published in 1944), 223.  
 
17 Lilienthal, 224.  
 
 18 Ibid., 224-225.  
19 Christopher J. Manganiello, Southern Water, Southern Power: How the Politics of 
Cheap Energy and Water Scarcity Shaped a Region (Chapel Hill: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 2015), 84-85.   
 
  285 
purpose, first scouting property in Alabama in 1953. Breaking from earlier aspirations, 
director Aubrey Wagner narrowed TVA’s mission to producing cheap, plentiful power. 
The maneuver required a diversification in power sources, and in response, TVA first 
increased its coal-fired plants. In 1950, TVA drew only 15 percent of its power from coal. 
By 1960, coal plants supplied 67 percent and increased further a decade later.20 Next, 
TVA ambitiously committed to nuclear power, envisioning that eventually 80-90 percent 
of any new generating capacity would be nuclear powered.21  Acting on this, by 1974, 
TVA’s estimated investment towards nuclear power hovered at six billion dollars, which 
was, according to one study, “the largest commitment in the entire United States by a 
single utility to nuclear power generation.”22 TVA hedged their bet upon estimated “first-
cost” investments, which forecast that coal plants required more capital investment than 
nuclear over the long term.23  
 TVA’s first nuclear power reactor, Brown’s Ferry, went online in August 1974 in 
Limestone, Alabama. By the time the first reactor began operation, TVA’s potential 
nuclear projects dotted the valley, with construction permits issued for at least twelve 
more reactors during the 1970s. In order to fund this building frenzy, Congress raised 
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TVA’s debt limit –from $1.75 billion before 1970 to $15 billion in 1976.24 As one 
journalist described, TVA had “long treated by Congress as a child to be seen but not 
heard,” asking few questions about their rapid expansion and its financial requirements. 
Moreover, “projected load growth,” which forecast electricity consumption over several 
decades, supported TVA’s expansion. Writing to Congress in 1975, TVA chair Aubrey 
Wagner justified the agency’s commitment to building new facilities by rehashing the 
connection between economic growth and affordable electricity. Wagner assured 
Congress the facilities were “essential” for the “economy and creation of jobs,” and 
without an increasing in borrowing authority, TVA could not “carry out its responsibility 
to meet the needs for electricity in its area.”25  
 The gospel of growth drove TVA’s nuclear program until the bubble burst in the 
1980s. As Erwin Hargrove has noted, “for most of the past half-century in the mid-South, 
there was an almost religious belief in the growth of electric power as a measure of 
progress, and the generating plants of the Tennessee Valley Authority were the 
tabernacles of the faith.”26 The belief in the agency’s vital role in transforming the 
valley’s economy reinforced its generally positive image until the late 1960s.  
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 Although not the first TVA project to provoke opposition, the Tellico Dam 
controversy signaled a marked shift in the relationship between TVA, valley residents, 
and the public. Critics argued the project made little economic sense, displaced a 
community, and threatened one of the last “wild” rivers, the Little Tennessee River. 
Southerners, historically less vocal about environmental protection than their western 
peers, joined the growing number of Americans who found pollution and reckless 
development alarming.27 The controversy also spoke to other anxieties about the “bland,” 
modern South, where southerners felt disconnected from nature and from a sense of 
place, seen most vividly in James Dickey’s novel Deliverance, where four men, 
attempting to escape the complacency and boredom that characterize their lives, canoe 
down a wild river before it is dammed and new lakeside properties are parceled into time-
shares.28 In part, the Little Tennessee River embodied a disappearing southern landscape.  
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 While the Tellico Dam drew ire from area residents, the discovery of the snail 
darter, an endangered species of fish found in the Little Tennessee River, transformed it 
into a national debate over the environmental impact of dams.29 Some dismissed the fight 
over the tiny snail darter’s habitat as the absurd logic of extreme environmentalists given 
to blocking any and all development. But as Marc Reisner has argued, with or without the 
snail darter, one could still characterize Tellico as “a bad project proposed by a 
dinosaurian bureaucracy; a needless destruction of one of the last wild rivers in the East; 
usurpation of a quiet valley; and a cynical Congress sneaking around one of its own 
laws.”30 Even though TVA prevailed through Senators Howard Baker and James 
Duncan’s machinations, the Tellico controversy put the organization on notice. No longer 
could TVA expect to have its projects rubber-stamped by Congress, subvert 
environmental law, steam-roll communities under the guise of “progress, jobs, and 
modernity” and avoid public scrutiny. The Tellico Dam controversy portended future 
conflicts, as valley residents found themselves questioning TVA’s haphazard nuclear 
program.    
 In the late 1960s, TVA began scouting land for a future nuclear plant in middle 
Tennessee,  eventually acquiring land in Trousdale County and Smith County for the 
Hartsville nuclear project. TVA planned a four reactor plant, making the plant the 
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“world’s largest,” as at least one billboard in town advertised.31 Because building a 
nuclear power plant is neither simple nor fast, communities with nuclear projects could 
count on potential job growth during construction, tax payments during its operation, and 
additional revenue for rural areas with limited funds. Initial studies conducted by TVA 
indicated that 65 percent of Hartsville residents were in favor of the plant, while 25 
percent opposed the plant, and another 10 percent were undecided. 32 The study showed 
cautious support, but even a minority of opposition could slow the licensing process 
down, one that TVA planners ignored. Despite the Tellico showdown, TVA’s history 
suggested that squelching even fierce opponents simply required a capable legal team and 
powerful political allies.  
  TVA, however, encountered numerous obstacles in the licensing process. TVA 
management failed to adjust to a new regulatory landscape, one that more closely 
considered environmental impacts and allowed public input.33 Even in the 1970s, 
licensing a nuclear reactor required detailed consideration of environmental, 
socioeconomic, technical, and safety issues. Almost immediately, TVA confronted 
resistance for the Hartsville nuclear site. During the licensing process, no less than nine 
attorneys representing 59 individuals intervened. It was the TVA’s most intense licensing 
                                                
31 Photograph, Folder: 319 Nuclear Power Plants (A-Z); Box 5, Records of the Chairmen 
and Members of the Board of Directors Director William L. Jenkins, 1972-78, TVA, 
NARA.  
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struggle yet, foreshadowing a troubled future for their nuclear program.34 Among the 
complaints levied, a petition submitted on behalf of the state of Tennessee, suggested that 
TVA had overestimated future needs for electricity and appeared financially unqualified 
to build multiple reactors simultaneously.35 Governor Winfield Dunn’s administration 
demanded sounder justification for building so many nuclear reactors, and questioned the 
wisdom of relying upon forecasts that predicted future energy consumption. If those 
forecasts or cost estimates were wrong, ratepayers might suffer exorbitant rate increases. 
Their chief objections proved prescient, as TVA conceded a decade later.  
 The most sustained and meaningful resistance came from the Hartsville 
community, and like state officials, residents opposed to the project or to aspects of the 
plant’s siting wasted little time expressing their concerns.  Even in TVA’s golden years, 
when its mission seemed firmly connected to the New Deal’s higher purpose, the removal 
of valley communities for dams, reservoirs, and recreational areas aroused hostility 
between agency planners and local people.36 Dams permanently alter the landscape with 
their construction; flooding the land irrevocably wipes away the homes, habitats, and 
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history of a place. The construction of nuclear plants is less imposing but does require 
large tracts of land. In Hartsville’s case, the nearly two thousand acres contained valuable 
farmland, forests, 19th century homes, and several graves. For some residents, TVA’s 
assessment of property values, historic sites, and environmental impact largely served as 
a self-serving charade. As an institution, TVA acted very much like an ordinary utility 
company, employing a hard-nosed legal team to achieve its objectives and overrule 
community objections. Despite this, TVA’s leadership, and even its employees, remained 
attached to an image of TVA as a force for public good.  
 Pasture and farmland dominated the Hartsville site, with woodland areas 
interspersed, possibly home to “a myriad of songbirds, reptiles, and small mammals.”37 In 
the adjacent Cumberland River, many fish species thrived, ranging from walleye to 
catfish. According to Hartsville resident, Tom P. Thompson Jr., ducks and geese 
regularly flocked to the area, and hunters frequented the site.38 While not pristine 
wilderness, TVA had poached viable farmland, woodlands, and riverside areas, which 
local families had used for centuries prior.  
                                                
 37 EIS, 2-17. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation. Final Environmental Statement Related to Construction of Hartsville Nuclear 
Plants of the Tennessee Valley Authority. (Washington; Springfield, Va.: NRC  ; National 
Technical Information Service, 1975), 2-17.  
38 Letter to Asst. Gen Counsel, David Power, TVA from Tom P. Thompson, Jr.  of 
Thompson & Thompson Law Offices, Hartsville, Tennessee Feb. 3, 1975, in U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. Final 
Environmental Statement Related to Construction of Hartsville Nuclear Plants of the 
Tennessee Valley Authority. (Washington; Springfield, Va.: NRC  ; National Technical 
Information Service, 1975), 
  292 
 The nearly two thousand-acre acquisition yielded, among other things, several 
homes dating to the early nineteenth century. TVA’s purchase included land once settled 
by John McGee (1763-1836), one of the state’s earliest Methodist ministers. McGee 
traveled from North Carolina to Tennessee, leading revivals along the way, impressing 
congregations with his “unreined emotionalism” that led to parishioners to believe “God 
himself was at work.”39 Settling near present day Hartsville, John McGee built a home 
along the Cumberland River, perhaps sometime after 1816. Until his death on June 16, 
1836, McGee lived in this home and was buried on the same property. For over two 
hundred years, McGee’s home and grave remained relatively undisturbed, surviving the 
American Civil War and the wiles of modernity. By TVA’s own admission, the house 
remained in “good condition, although substantially altered since its construction.”40As a  
piece of local and state history, the property represented something distinctive about 
Hartsville in an era of eroding distinctions and disappearing rural communities.41 
 During the licensing process, TVA assessed John McGee’s significance, along 
with his home, and proved at odds with those who saw the home as worthy of 
preservation despite the changes to its architecture. Enlisting the help of an architectural 
historian, TVA concluded that based upon Dr. James Patrick’s study and “their own 
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investigations” McGee’s home was a “fine example of a brick farm house of its period, 
but architecturally… not unique,” and argued that the “historical relationship of this site 
is only associated with the activities of John McGee.”42 TVA ruled that because the home 
possessed no unique architectural qualities, and had no direct relationship to John 
McGee’s religious activists, which were ironically – immaterial – as his role in the 
religious revival movement came through itinerant preaching, that the house could be 
demolished.43 The agency promptly bulldozed McGee’s home and then exhumed his 
body. 
 TVA’s plans for McGee’s new grave including adding a historical marker at a 
“suitable site” for “appropriate recognition.”44 For several decades prior, TVA exhumed 
the bodies of countless individuals for their projects. When exhumation was deemed 
unnecessary, TVA catalogued the graves on purchased land, producing a vast record of 
gravesites across the valley—over thirty thousand bodies approximately.45 By 
comparison to earlier projects, TVA’s nuclear sites intersected with very few burial sites. 
According to TVA’s records, only Brown’s Ferry (10 graves) and Hartsville (4) 
contained burial sites. Nonetheless, if TVA’s projects intruded upon people’s lives and 
their livelihoods, they also intruded into their afterlives, and McGee was no exception. In 
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1976, TVA moved McGee’s body to the Hartsville Methodist cemetery and four others to 
nearby Dixon Springs.  
 Among those dissenting, the State of Tennessee’s Office of Urban and Federal 
Affairs and local attorney Tom P. Thompson each wrote letters to TVA in 1975, urging 
the agency to reconsider John McGee as historically significant enough to warrant the 
home’s preservation.46 In response, TVA defended their choices, concluding that 
McGee’s influence in the state’s Methodist history occurred years before the home was 
built, and the building had no relationship to his role in history. In their approach, TVA 
differed little from other government agencies or private companies pursuing 
construction permits.  Arguably the difference lies in TVA’s desire to reinforce the image 
that the agency was something more, and strove to develop strong relationships with the 
people in the valley, value their history and play a pivotal role in it. Eminent domain laws 
gave TVA an unusual degree of power; and coupled with their appeals to progress, 
economic development, and modernity, the agency could freely take land, demolish 
buildings they ruled insignificant, and exhume bodies whose location interfered with their 
designs. The “dreamers with shovels,” once bearers of light, transformed into plunderer, 
fundamentally altering the valley’s landscape and erasing remnants of the area’s history.  
 The Hartsville plant threatened more than local history; it also threatened a way of life.  
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 Writing in 1975, local lawyer Tom P. Thompson Jr. expressed concern about 
TVA’s draft environmental statement, listing forty-seven different points of contention. 
Thompson’s extensive engagement with TVA’s environmental assessment, cost-benefit 
analysis, and alleged distortion of property values reveals a deep suspicion of the agency 
and the licensing process generally.  Through its dismissal of local, lay knowledge, TVA 
widened the chasm between the agency and the Hartsville community.47 Thompson’s 
correspondence also illustrates the porous nature of property lines in the Hartsville 
community versus TVA’s approach to land as inventory. To be sure, Thompson 
represented the landowners forced to sell their land for the Hartsville plant, and his 
appeals reflected his professional interests as well. But Thompson, an area native, who 
lives on a farm in Hartsville to this day, gave an impassioned plea that far exceeded the 
bounds of legal wrangling and demonstrated his close connection to the community.48  
 Throughout Thompson’s correspondence, he underlined how construction of the 
plant threatened, beyond the life and limb of residents, a particular way of life , one 
bound to local traditions for men in the community.  His letters shed light upon the 
complexities of TVA’s relationship with Hartsville residents, and how the agency 
approached purchasing land and assessing environmental impact. According to 
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Thompson, the 1,940 acres TVA set to purchase had long hosted local hunters, and he 
implored the agency to include this aspect of Hartsville life in their cost-benefit analysis: 
“Quantify the loss of hunting land (as recreational costs). The wooded areas have long 
been hunted for squirrel and the pastures for rabbits and birds. The river areas have been 
used to hunt ducks by the local residents.”49 Thompson questioned TVA’s knowledge of 
waterfowl habits, pointing out that construction would significantly alter the patterns of 
ducks and geese in the area, further underscoring his point that the land was “one of the 
best duck hunting and goose hunting areas in the county.”50 For Thompson, despite 
TVA’s vast resources, they failed to understand how waterfowl behaved and what value 
such spaces held for the area’s residents. In response to Thompson’s concerns, TVA 
conceded that the area may have been “one of the best duck hunting sections in the 
county,” but emphasized that goose hunting was illegal in the area, another reminder that 
the agency’s way of “seeing” conflicted with local practices.51 Duck hunting and duck 
hunting clubs have long been part of southern culture and a rite of passage for young men 
in the South. Of the many things at stake then was arguably southern manhood – one that 
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had a direct connection to soil, to blood, and to the Cumberland River.52 Nuclear power 
represented something precise, sterile, and opposed to local practices, knowledge, and 
values, and TVA stood in stark contrast to the lingering vestiges of rural and southern 
life. 
 TVA’s arrival meant a new way of life, one with enforced boundaries. As 
Thompson’s description of local hunting practices indicates, property lines often bled into 
one another, particularly for collective activities such as hunting. For some, the Hartsville 
project spelled more substantive changes to local practices and local ways of being. For 
Linda Gentry, “born and raised in Macon county,” directly north of the nuclear plant, 
TVA’s incursions threatened the “blessings” of a rural existence:  
At night, you still sit outside and listen to the whipporwill [sic] call. You can still see 
owls and chase ‘possums, rabbits, and raccoons. Maybe the area behind your house or 
across the road is a meadow with wildflowers…Your children can still wander over the 
hill and explore for themselves…Many doors are left unlocked in the country…This is a 
fast-dying tradition. As urban sprawl hit Macon County, so will the prospect of a locked 
up experience.53  
 
As she states elsewhere, the well-known risks associated with nuclear power, while 
relevant, only represented one component to her opposition. Large-scale, high-risk 
technological systems reordered environments and rural practices. Local wildlife and 
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rural people faced a “locked up experience;” one that restricted movement, curiosity, and 
potentially altered their very being.    
 At nearly every turn, TVA approached Hartsville like other utility companies: 
relying upon cost-benefit analysis, marshaling forth expertise, and exploiting legal 
loopholes. The emotional ties the community held with certain areas or homes, along 
with their anxiety surrounding the changes the Hartsville site would bring, carried little 
weight in the face of a sprawling organization with a powerful legal team.  Borne out of 
New Deal idealism, TVA’s leaders struggled to rectify their actions with their roots. In 
TVA’s dealings with rural communities, the agency appeared like a wolf in sheep’s 
clothing, bringing promises and then betraying the trust of local people.  
 As the licensing process for Hartsville continued, debates ensued over property 
values and adequate compensation for landowners. Beyond the question of economics 
and legality, these concerns took on new meaning in the context of a rural community 
with different values. TVA’s cost-benefit analysis lacked the capacity to factor in the 
largely intangible consequences of eminent domain practices. Writing to TVA chairman 
Aubrey Wagner in February 1975, Tom Thompson, the Hartsville native and legal 
counsel for the landowners, detailed the sense of loss, both financial and emotional:  
 the land that you are taking is the best farming area of our county…It is with great 
 difficulty that these men are having to accept the fact that they are losing their 
 ability to earn a living from agriculture in this county.54  
 
Continuing on, Thompson underscored the feelings of injustice, stating “…if you [TVA] 
had come into this area and paid the farmers what this land was worth then 70% of your 
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opposition would have fallen to the wayside.”55 If the condemnation of the land was 
inevitable due to the sweeping powers allotted to state and federal government through 
eminent domain laws and definitions of “public good,” Thompson’s clients hoped for a 
fair price, one that reflected more than their loss of land and homes but also their 
livelihood. Thompson noted the disparity between TVA offering farmers “pitifully low 
prices for his land while…they have no qualms about paying a large industry to wit.”56 
Ed Gregory, a farmer who owned 200 acres on the future Hartsville site, complained 
about TVA’s appraisal of land value, noting that while the agency quoted $840 per acre, 
he deemed the land more valuable, “at least $1500 per acre,” in part because the land 
included his brick home which Gregory considered “to be of great value.”57 Others 
echoed these sentiments but also underlined, again, the precarious nature of southern 
manhood with its ties to land ownership and the ability to cultivate it: “2100 acres of the 
best crop and grassland of the county will be taken out of production. Some of this land 
has been in the same family for many years. Neither gold nor silver would purchase this 
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land…A man’s home is his castle that is valued greater than diamonds and pearls.”58 In 
1975, the twenty-four landowners settled with TVA, and the agency paid a total of 
$1,425,900 dollars.59 Today, the land’s value has risen to over two million dollars, even 
after TVA sold a small parcel, while one portion of the land has no reported value.60  
 Again, at odds with the realities on the ground was TVA’s cost-benefit analysis, 
which critics charged inflated Hartsville’s benefits, while diminishing the project’s  
drawbacks for the Hartsville plant. TVA argued that “electric power was a tool for 
economic development,” one that “has helped ease the burdens of drudgery; provided 
more jobs and more productive employment; brought the amenities of life to an ever 
increasing number of people.”61 In its cost-benefit analysis, the agency described the 
plant as a lever for economic growth and a source of “increased payments to local 
governments,” but Tom Thompson alleged the payments were barely more than property 
taxes.62 One could reasonably predict that cheap electricity might encourage economic 
growth, but electricity is not necessarily a “local” resource. TVA acknowledged their 
plan to sell excess electricity via transmission corridors, which connected to other utility 
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companies. Moreover, even if the plant created jobs, local economic benefits would be 
tempered by its proximity to the Nashville metropolitan area, only forty-five miles away.  
 Finally, TVA’s environmental assessment largely overlooks the consequences of 
major accidents, giving the reader or local residents little, if any, indication of how a 
serious mishap could impact the surrounding area.  Nearly every reactor in the region 
received its construction permit before Three Mile Island, and the nuclear industry 
tightened safety measures following TMI in 1979. Thus, the major gaps in environmental 
statements indicate, to some extent, the more cavalier attitude toward nuclear technology 
so prevalent before 1979.  
 Tom Thompson urged TVA to reconsider how they measured the effects of 
serious accidents. Noting that nuclear power necessitated rural or less populated 
locations, Thompson argued that TVA valued the lives of rural populations less than 
others, and that this value judgment should be stated explicitly. In its response to 
Thompson, TVA surmised that “because of the low probability of the occurrence of these 
accidents…no significant hazard to the persons residing in the vicinity of the Hartsville 
Nuclear Plant exists.”63 If socioeconomic cost and benefits of nuclear power could be 
measured, as the EIS attempted to do, then not measuring the human cost also challenged 
TVA’s image as a benevolent force in the rural South.64 TVA could uproot bodies buried 
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for over two hundred years, but the agency avoided articulating what would happen to the 
bodies of the living if an accident occurred.  
 In tandem, TVA dismissed Thompson’s concerns about an adequate flood plan, 
by defining major floods as “an extremely rare occurrence.” While acknowledging that at 
least twenty-percent of the site sat below flood level, TVA believed it could shut the plant 
down in case of a major flood. In March 1975, a month after Thompson’s correspondence 
occurred, Nashville and the surrounding areas experienced a major flood, as the 
Cumberland River swelled to over 47 feet, over seven feet above flood stage, causing 
extensive damage. This environmental reality underlined the depth of local knowledge 
and the extent to which TVA’s risk analysis faced shortcomings. The “bureaucratic 
logic” of TVA’s analysis, to borrow James Scott’s phrase, impeded more thorough 
assessments of the area’s climate and susceptibility to flood.65 Today, FEMA flood maps 
highlight a portion of the site in the flood zone.66 Adding further credence to Thompson’s 
concerns decades earlier, in 2010, the Nashville area and surrounding counties, including 
Hartsville, experienced a 1000 year flood, which according to NOAA has a .01% chance 
of occurring in any given year.67 To be sure, TVA’s plans including locating the reactors 
at an elevation of 520 feet, over fifty feet above estimated hundred-year flood levels.68 
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Flooding remains a serious concern for nuclear sites, and in 2011, the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission issued forth new recommendations regarding flood risk and dam failures.69   
 The plant’s construction also prompted organized resistance, spearheaded by 
William and Faith Young, whose historic home and farm were located across from the 
Hartsville site. To fight the plant, the Youngs formally intervened in the licensing process 
and organized an anti-nuclear group: Concerned Citizens of Tennessee. Built in the late 
1780s, their home, “Dixona,” was named after the original owner – Tilman Dixon. The 
“long famed stopping place” had hosted a number of visitors, including Louis Phillippe, 
Duke of Orleans and later King of France in 1797.70 The Hartsville plant, with its four 
imposing cooling towers planned, threatened as Faith Young pointedly argued, “the 
beauty and integrity of the historic, rural vicinity, a treasure for future generations, so 
long preserved with care and pride,” and concluded that TVA’s plans were the “ultimate 
act of insensitivity and hostility to man, his surrounding, and his physical, aesthetic, and 
emotional needs.”71 Although TVA planners gestured towards a consideration of non-
economic and non-energy related needs in their cost-analysis, visiting the area today 
raises questions about why the agency found the site suitable for the “world’s largest 
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nuclear plant.” TVA’s approach to siting appears wildly out of sync with shifting cultural 
and environmental values in the 1960s and 1970s. 
 William and Faith Young’s first legal challenge to the Hartsville project 
contended that the Hartsville site was not located on the Tennessee River or any of its 
tributaries, violating the original intention of the TVA Act in 1933.72 In 1977, one year 
after construction began, a court ruled in favor of TVA, a decision that no doubt made 
many further question the agency’s motives and potential misuse of federal power.  
 The second legal challenge initiated by the couple concerned an endangered 
species residing in Cumberland River’s warm waters: the Lampsilis orbiculata, or the 
pink mucket mussel.73 Classified as an endangered species in 1976, the pink mucket is 
one of many freshwater mussels in the Tennessee Valley threatened or eradicated by 
human activity, particularly dams and man-made reservoirs, which flood mussel 
habitats.74 TVA’s projects significantly contributed to the decline in riverine mussel 
populations. For hundreds of years, humans harvested mussels for their pearls and shells, 
which decreased local populations, but the rivers remained wild, allowing mussel beds to 
grow again. Only when large-scale human intervention occurred did the freshwater 
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mussel population in the valley plummet.75 According to Donald Edward Davis, the 
“TVA system of reservoirs collectively destroyed hundreds of miles of important mussel 
waters,”76 In many ways, mussels are a more apt symbol for the vast ecological changes 
produced by TVA’s manipulation of the valley’s environment than the snail darter, but 
the Hartsville case offered less clear cut evidence that the nuclear plant’s thermal 
discharge would irrevocably harm local mussel species.77  
 While neither legal intervention proved successful, they demonstrate how anti-
nuclear and environmental activists used the new regulatory landscape to, at the very 
least, slow the licensing process down and highlight neglected environmental impacts. 
Moreover, these lawsuits underscored the vulnerability of TVA and the nuclear industry 
generally. The industry needed some semblance of public transparency to successfully 
site plants anywhere—a necessary public relations measure to assure anxious residents. 
These openings in the licensing procedure for public involvement created headaches for 
power companies because nuclear power generated more interest than many other risk-
laden industries.  
 Legal interventions, while vital to opposing nuclear plants, comprised only one 
part of a larger anti-nuclear playbook. In Hartsville, Faith and William Young 
                                                
 75 Donald Edward Davis, Where There Are Mountains: An Environmental History of the 
Southern Appalachians (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2000), 190-192.  
76 Davis, 191.  
 
77 For more on the thermal pollution and nuclear power, see J. Samuel Walker, "Nuclear 
Power and the Environment: The Atomic Energy Commission and Thermal Pollution, 
1965-1971," Technology and Culture 30 (October 1989): 964-92. In 2001, divers 
discovered no local populations of mussels were present, see Environmental Assessment 
and Finding of No Significant Impact,” Hartsville Nuclear Plant Site, Tennessee Valley 
Authority, March 2002, 22, NRC Library, <nrc.gov>.  
 
  306 
spearheaded public protests against the Hartsville plant with their organization Concerned 
Citizens of Tennessee (CCT). Although some applauded their efforts, local plant 
supporters, who looked forward to employment opportunities and increased local 
funding, drew connections between anti-nuclear activities and other sources of 
polarization. Even sleepy, rural enclaves in the South proved vulnerable to the 
aftershocks of the 1960s and 1970s, where Watergate, Vietnam, the civil rights 
movement, and the myriad of other changes seeped into unexpected places. Leading the 
anti-nuclear charge, Faith Young helped organize a local collection of books and 
pamphlets on nuclear power and gathered signatures for a nuclear moratorium in 1974.78 
The opposition to Hartsville had a strong, local base, but it also attracted protestors from 
Nashville, the Farm in Summertown – a left-leaning commune, and from anti-nuclear 
groups in surrounding states.79 After Three Mile Island in 1979, public demonstrations 
occurred in Hartsville, with CCT holding “truth days” outside the site.80   
 Early on, William and Faith Young grounded their opposition in terms of truth, 
credibility, and fraud. Their appeals covered many issues, but trust and “truth” remained 
central, and rural communities, from their perspective, lacked the means to uncover the 
truth or challenge claims from experts or industry figures. In 1975, Faith Young 
denounced a public opinion survey conducted by Oak Ridge National Laboratory, which 
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showed most residents in favor of the plant, calling the survey a “ ‘fraud on the people’ 
and a coercion and intimidation of a politically unsophisticated populace.”81 Two years 
later, Young again concluded, “isn’t it a shame to have the wool pulled over the eyes of 
us poor, uneducated, rural, old people living near a nuclear plant?”82 Faith Young was 
neither poor nor uneducated; she attended the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill 
and lived in New York and France before moving to the area. Faith Young’s values and 
experiences marked her as an “outsider,” even when she considered herself to be a 
“local” too. Like many area residents though, Faith and William Young lived on a 
working farm, albeit one with an exceptional historic home. In response to their 
antinuclear activism, one Hartsville resident complained: “This is the same crowd that 
was against the war in Vietnam. We were for the war in Vietnam; we wanted to win it.”83  
 The issues surrounding nuclear power blurred with other polarizing events, 
especially the war in Vietnam; protestors’ concerns appeared unpatriotic or anti-progress. 
One resident found the media’s attention to anti-nuclear activists had obscured a 
supportive majority, likening the situation to Vietnam: “You remember the Vietnam war 
and other wars…there were only a few that made the headlines in the news media while 
the 99 percent were true American citizens who fought the wars and carried the flag.”84 
In response to critics, William Young, Jr., legitimated his anti-nuclear stance with his 
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military service, “I’ve been under fire before but never in as much danger or as real 
danger as from this proposed nuclear plant.”85 Others, such as Mrs. Andrew Welch, 
found her opposition to the plant placed her in the unpatriotic category of locals, to which 
she responded:  
 I was unaware that objecting to a government agency’s attempt to take land, that 
 is not for sale at any price, with a non-negotiable bid of less than current market 
 value is unpatriotic. I was unaware that asking for proof of the need for a $2.5 
 billion expenditure to supply power in this area is unpatriotic. I was unaware that 
 wishing to maintain our rural community rather than converting to an 
 industrialized area is unpatriotic. I was unaware that question the safety of nuclear 
 power is unpatriotic.86 
 
 Opposition and support for nuclear power, at least in the US, was not a strictly 
partisan issue, and this likely stems from the very clear catastrophic threat people feared, 
along with the rising anxiety about health effects from radiation exposure.87 Moreover, 
nuclear power generally increased utility rates, which made it less appealing, particularly 
as the American economy tanked in the 1970s. In Hartsville, support for the plant came, 
disproportionately, from the local business community, elected officials, and those who 
believed economic development outweighed the downsides. Writing in 1975, state 
representative Hugh Dixon, disapproved of TVA’s hunger for land and their propensity 
for under-valuing that land, but expressed a dim view of those opposed to the plant, 
arguing that, “most environmentalists are people who have never worked for a living. 
They have had everything given to them all their lives and have no experience at 
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anything,” a common if unfair representation.88 Dixon’s assault overly generalized what 
was often a diverse group of people, but his words reveal the ways “work” became a 
coded term that differentiated many activists with the laborers on site and local farmers.89 
The debate about Hartsville also demonstrates how environmental and technological 
issues intersected with the era’s other polarizing events, and to some, environmental and 
anti-nuclear organizations appeared anti-progress, anti-jobs, and anti-American.  
 Despite the opposition, construction began in April 1976—later than anticipated 
and only with a limited work authorization initially. 90 For five years, construction at the 
“future home of the world’s largest nuclear facility” continued, even as TVA continually 
revised the site’s anticipated completion date. Early in the construction stage, TVA 
betrayed the touted benefits promised to the Hartsville community through its hiring 
practices, straining an already unsteady relationship between TVA and local people. 
Residents in Hartsville and the surrounding rural counties anticipated that in exchange for 
their land and their dutiful tolerance of the risks associated with nuclear power, they 
would find steady work for at least a decade. To some, TVA had a greater moral 
obligation, unlike other utilities, to train locals and to raise the standard of living by direct 
benefits: i.e. jobs. This problem first appeared after construction began in 1976, when 
TVA began its hiring process. TVA assured residents that the Hartsville project “would 
not be a closed shop,” primarily because union membership posed a hurdle for 
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economically disadvantaged residents.91 As the project proceeded, the very definition of 
“local” came under scrutiny, with the agency and residents in the five-county area (those 
immediately adjacent or containing the plant) defined “local” in very different ways. For 
TVA, “local” workers included anyone from a sixteen county area, a broad and expansive 
definition, whereas residents living near the plant defined “local” as those in Trousdale, 
Smith, Macon, Sumner, and Wilson county.92 TVA vacillated on the question of union 
labor, promising to consider non-union workers, while also assuring the Tennessee 
Trades & Labor Council preference to union workers.93 The labor issue reflected larger 
changes in the American economy in the 1970s, where manual labor jobs operated in a 
boom, bust cycle that gave the working class little stability.94 Moreover, TVA’s 
equivocation on labor matters reflected a general inconsistency with the agency’s 
promises and their actual practices.  
 TVA’s early difficulties with the Hartsville project were symptomatic of larger 
problems. The agency’s aggressive, foolhardy strategy towards building power facilities, 
coupled with internal dysfunction, inflation, and tightening regulations, created a 
cataclysmic situation. By the late 1970s, construction costs soared, demand for power 
dropped, and in a post-Three Mile Island world, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
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reevaluated standards for ensuring plant safety. Although utilities across the nation faced 
similar circumstances, TVA’s sites were perhaps the most beleaguered in terms of safety 
issues, which slowed construction and allowed costs to soar upward. 
 When construction began in 1976, TVA moved the goal operation date for 
Hartsville to 1983-1984.95 By May 1979, TVA’s Board voted to defer four units in the 
nuclear program: two at Hartsville (B-1: 17% complete, B2: 7%), one at Yellow Creek 
(MS), and another at Phipps Bend (TN).96 The estimated date of operation for 
Hartsville’s other two reactors, by 1980, extended into 1987-1989. In light of the 
deferrals, TVA board member S. David Freeman attempted to assure the public that the 
agency would not turn their “backs on investments of billions,” even as the forecast for 
nuclear power darkened.97   
 In subsequent years, between the initial decision to defer two units at Hartsville in 
1979 and to defer all units in 1982, TVA’s board and high-ranking employees wrestled 
with the decision to defer or cancel the units at Hartsville, Yellow Creek, and Phipps 
Bend. Initially TVA cited a decline in energy demands and construction costs as the 
primary reasons for deferral.98 At stake, beyond TVA’s reputation, was the considerable 
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investment, hovering around two billion dollars, in unfinished nuclear projects. 
Responding escalating crisis, director Robert “Bob” Clement asked, “Has our nuclear 
program gone too far to turn this cost picture around? If not, this is one of the most 
serious issues facing TVA today.”99 
  As early as August 1981, TVA officials started planning their exit strategy, which 
included draft “options” papers detailing possibly approaches to cancellations, deferrals, 
and possible mitigation efforts for affected communities.100  Less than two years after S. 
David Freeman’s assurances that nuclear power remained a viable option, internal 
memorandum displayed a different picture. A changing energy outlook forecast lower 
consumption demands for the next decade.101 When coupled with an inability to 
accurately predict construction costs, in addition to other issues, all signs pointed to a 
grim prognosis for TVA’s once lofty nuclear ambitions.  
 By late 1981 and early 1982, an options paper laid out the central issues clearly:  
 The important issue which TVA faces is whether to continue to borrow and spend 
 an additional $8.2 billion to complete three nuclear units …These numbers 
 reflect the staggering increases in construction costs that have occurred as the 
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 impact of inflation has been multiplied by very long construction times and by 
 record high interest rates.102  
 
These were industry-wide problems, and utilities cancelled nuclear projects across the 
country in response. And yet, TVA’s situation stood apart because it represented 
something different than the average utility company. Duke, SCE&G, Middle-South—all 
of these utilities received public scrutiny over increases in rates and their nuclear plants, 
but few people held these companies in the same regard as TVA. Perhaps more 
importantly, changes in the American economy and the nation’s energy outlook forced 
TVA to reconsider a fundamental principle that had driven the agency’s decisions for 
decades: cheap electricity and economic growth strongly correlated to one another.103  
This principle of cheap and plentiful electricity propelling economic growth intersected 
with TVA’s mission to improve the quality of life for Valley residents. As TVA scaled 
back their nuclear ambitions, the socioeconomic effects of those decisions and the 
communities affected by them proved a formidable challenge, which strained political 
alliances and further damaged their public image. Rather than the prodigal son returning 
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home, lessons learned and forgiveness afforded, the agency’s nuclear program cast a 
permanent shadow on its legacy and image.  
 From TVA’s vantage point, scaling back their nuclear division required slight 
adjustments in the local government budget, some out-migration from workers, and 
creating certain temporary mitigation efforts such as job training to ease the 
socioeconomic costs of stopping construction. According to TVA estimates, deferring the 
two additional reactors at Hartsville resulted in a loss of approximately 1,962 jobs.104 
TVA drew workers from essentially a five-county area: Smith, Trousdale, Macon, 
Wilson, and Sumner. Smith and Trousdale comprised the counties where the plant 
property was located; and thus, those counties in many ways served as the most critical in 
terms of mitigation. Bordering Nashville, the other two counties, Wilson and Sumner, 
underwent major growth during the 1970s and 1980s.   Surrounding rural counties 
experienced declining populations or limited growth,  making this a tale of the two 
Souths: one rural, one metropolitan.  
 For Smith and Trousdale counties, TVA anticipated laying off over two hundred 
local workers, a small but visible portion of the labor force, considering the community’s 
sacrifices.105 After the first wave of deferrals and cancellations in 1979, residents pressed 
the agency to lay off local workers last, with one stating, “It’s not right for people who 
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have to live in this county, right under the plant, not to be able to work for it.”106 As it 
planned for the deferrals, TVA considered the extent of its obligation to the affected 
communities, questioning the social and economic planning ethos of an earlier period: 
“Should TVA try to address the short-term problems caused by the construction 
cutbacks….or should TVA strive for long-term improvements…recognizing that these 
improvements will not resolve the project impacts?”107 Centrally, TVA’s troubled nuclear 
program underscored the agency’s personality crisis. Did TVA have a “moral 
responsibility” to local communities affected by their half-finished projects?108  
 In January 1982, the death knell sounded for the Hartsville project. With the 
release of the “options paper,” TVA officials laid out various paths for cancelling, 
deferring, or transforming the sites into coal-fired plants. A risky move politically, the 
agency endangered their alliances with members of Congress, state, and local 
governments. Governor Lamar Alexander acknowledged “the numbers might not work,” 
but proposed to TVA board member Richard Freeman that “if the laws need to be 
changed to make it work, then let’s try to change the laws,” a move possibly inspired by 
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Senator Howard Baker’s sleight of hand with the Tellico Dam.109  Al Gore Jr., then a 
Congressional representative for Tennessee’s 4th district (which included Gore’s 
hometown of Carthage and nearby Hartsville), disputed the very nature of TVA’s options 
paper, concluding “TVA’s analysis appears to be not so much an option paper as a 
blueprint to justify a predetermined judgment to defer construction,” and warned the 
agency of the “grave consequences” of such action.110 For Gore, beyond the problem of 
job loss in his Congressional district, stalled nuclear projects threatened the valley’s 
economy, and he affirmed his faith in the connection between power supply and 
economic growth.111 Gore chastised the agency’s about-face move, recalling TVA’s 
vigorous defense of their  nuclear program only one year earlier, finding the change in 
policy “disturbing.”112 TVA’s relationship with southern politicians, both Democratic and 
Republican, provided crucial leverage in Congress; and in return, an expectation of 
reciprocity existed. If not stated explicitly, in return for projects in their district or state, 
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the agency gained political support. TVA’s waffling endangered a long-standing 
symbiosis.  
 Two months after releasing the options paper, TVA’s Board of Directors voted to 
defer, indefinitely, the remaining two reactors at Hartsville and cancel the two previously 
deferred reactors, and passed similar measures for Yellow Creek in Mississippi. With a 
period of suspension over, the reckoning began, as the local community and the agency’s 
political allies  reeled over the decision. Residents in Hartsville and the surrounding 
community, along with prominent Tennessee politicians, sought recourse from TVA: lost 
jobs and lost revenue created a headache for locals and their elected representatives. State 
legislators in Tennessee feared what the deferrals and eventual cancellation would do to 
their state revenue. 113 In the 1981 fiscal year, the state of Tennessee received $87.4 
million dollars in payments. Backing utility projects, especially nuclear power, while less 
desirable for rate-payers and ultimately damaging to TVA’s bottom line, generated 
increase revenue and reduced unemployment—albeit temporarily. With the onslaught of 
TVA projects stalled, the cycle of construction projects and increased revenue reached an 
untimely end for the area’s elected officials.  
 For Hartsville locals, the deferral and eventual cancellation, brought the sting of 
lost employment and feelings of betrayal.114 James Donoho, Mayor of Hartsville, wrote 
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TVA’s board in 1982 after the second wave of deferrals, acknowledging TVA’s 
“awesome responsibility” to provide power, and noting TVA’s past record of 
encouraging industrialization and improving quality of life. Despite giving credit to TVA, 
Donoho emphasized the large-scale investment of Hartsville locals, at the behest of TVA 
according to Donoho, thus underscoring TVA’s  obligation to help the community even 
as it jumped shipped with their nuclear reactors:  
 In a large area around the Hartsville plant several people made investments in 
 trailer parks, apartment houses, garages, road side markets, homes, etc., to serve 
 TVA workers, many of these investments being at the direct request or suggestion 
 of TVA because they were promised that construction would continue for 10 to 
 15 years. The closing of this plant now will cause great loss and damage to these 
 investors and further damage to TVA’s credibility which is low enough. 115  
 
 Then U.S. Congressman, Al Gore Jr., publicly opposed the shutdown, and like 
Donoho, reminded the board of the “the “human impact” of TVA’s decision to halt 
construction of its Hartsville Nuclear Facility, and of TVA’s “clear responsibility to the 
workers, businessmen, and county leaders who changed their lives and planned their 
futures based on what once seemed to be an unchangeable decision to build the Hartsville 
plant.”116 While TVA continued to employ a reduced workforce after the 1982 deferral, 
                                                                                                                                            
1982, Nuclear Power Plants, Tennessee Valley Authority Records, Record Group 142, 
National Archives and Records Administration—Atlanta.   
115 “A Statement By James Donoho, Mayor of Hartsville to the Board of Directors of the 
Tennessee Valley Authority, January 23, 1982, Folder: Hartsville, Box 41: Records of the 
Chairmen and Members of the Board of Directors; Records of S. David Freeman, 1977-
1978 and 1981-1984, Tennessee Valley Authority Records, Record Group 142, National 
Archives and Records Administration—Atlanta.   
116 Correspondence from Al Gore Jr. to Charles “Chili” Dean, May 19, 1982; “A Special 
Report from Congressman Al Gore Jr., March 26, 1982, Folder: Hartsville, Box 41: 
Records of the Chairmen and Members of the Board of Directors; Records of S. David 
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and offered some funding for economic mitigation, it nonetheless committed an 
unpardonable sin in the eyes of many. TVA acquired and modified the land, leaving 
behind partially built containment structures and cooling towers, and retaining the land 
for possible use. One Trousdale county official wrote in 1983 wrote to Chairman “Chili” 
Dean, in what would soon become a common request, to use the land for some other type 
of industry in order to offset high unemployment. 117  
 In August 1984, TVA officially cancelled the Hartsville and Yellow Creek 
projects, after investing 4 billion dollars.118 TVA estimated it would cost 6.5 billion to 
finish the project, which seemed economically untenable and unreasonable as demand for 
power dropped. Some applauded this decision, due to anti-nuclear sentiment and growing 
concern about utility rate increases. By the end of the 1980s, TVA’s reactors at Brown’s 
Ferry and Sequoyah (Chattanooga) had successfully gone online, while work on one 
reactor, Watts Bar reactor 1 (Spring City, TN) continued but was plagued with problems.  
Other projects were cancelled or permanently deferred, leaving the once 
ambitious nuclear program tattered, with visible nuclear ruins looming in the valley 
landscape. With a major stall in its nuclear program, TVA knew the problem extended 
beyond resolving financial matters, the agency had an image problem—once a beacon of 
progress and enlightened regional planning (with all its loaded meanings) in the Valley 
                                                                                                                                            
Freeman, 1977-1978 and 1981-1984, Tennessee Valley Authority Records, Record 
Group 142, National Archives and Records Administration—Atlanta.   
117 Letter, from G.W. Oldham, Trousdale County Executive to Chairman Dean 
September 12, 1983,  Folder: ICD 10 (Hartsville, TN) Industrial Parks, Box 031912 ,  
Tennessee Valley Authority Records, Record Group 142, National Archives and Records 
Administration—Atlanta.   
118 “TVA Cancels Four Reactors,” New York Times, August 30, 1984, D4. 
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and nation at large, TVA now seemed like another unwieldy, cumbersome institution, far 
removed from its innovative beginnings. TVA’s Board spent much of the 1980s trying to 
reshape their mission and public image, save the nuclear division, and justify the 
agency’s existence. An internal memo captured the feeling among the board well:   
 There appears to be a growing perception among certain academics, journalists, 
 public officials, and students of public policy that TVA has “failed.” This view 
 replacing the earlier opinion among many of the same people that TVA was one 
 of the few grand governmental experiments that “worked.”…There may have also 
 been changes to TVA’s organizational style, values, and attitudes…the 
 experimental, open, progressive spirit, that was attributed to TVA in its first two 
 or three decades has progressively been replaced by a defensive, legalistic, cover-
 your-ass, don’t cause any trouble and mind-your-own business mentality.119  
 
 Publicly, TVA acknowledged their “mistakes,” albeit in vague terms, but as late 
as 1985, they whitewashed a damning safety record in their nuclear plants. Behind the 
scenes, TVA correspondence reflected a far more candid view. Still, TVA’s board 
vacillated between identifying actual problems and focusing on how to change public 
perception. The failures of the agency’s nuclear program posed a serious problem, 
especially because President Ronald Reagan’s administration sought to reduce TVA’s 
role to power production exclusively, aiming for eventual privatization.120 As a symbolic 
                                                
119 John C. Stewart, “Improving Relations With Intellectuals and Public Opinion 
Makers,” Folder, Public Relations, 1982-1985, Box 37, General Manager’s Files, 
Director Richard M. Freeman’s Correspondence Files, 1977-1986, Tennessee Valley 
Authority Records, Record Group 142, National Archives and Records Administration—
Atlanta.   
 120 Reagan’s disdain for TVA had been long-standing, see Rick Perlstein, The Invisible 
Bridge: The Fall of Nixon and the Rise of Reagan (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014), 
386, 402. For the Reagan administration’s stance towards TVA,  Hearing on Tennessee 
Valley Authority Oversight, July 30, 1985, Subcommittee on Regional and Community 
Development, Committee on Environment and Public Works. Senate; Committee on 
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engine of development, progress, and modernity, TVA’s disastrous nuclear program, if 
not entirely damaging its legacy, certainly complicated the public’s perception and its 
viability in Washington.  
 Beyond an image problem though, safety issues ensnared TVA’s nuclear 
program, and the agency tangled with the NRC in the late 1970s and 1980s over technical 
problems and violations. In March 1975,  a fire at the Brown’s Ferry nuclear plant in 
Alabama caused a stir among the public and generated alarming headlines, among them 
“How We Almost Lost Alabama.”121 Publicly, TVA blamed its safety problems on the 
agency’s salary cap because no TVA employee could be paid more than a member of 
Congress, and they argued that their inability to keep effective management hindered the 
nuclear program.122 Despite this, TVA’s records indicate a lax attitude towards safety 
existed among employees. TVA executives acknowledged that “poor attitudes towards 
safety/quality still prevail, even after the Brown’s Ferry fire.”123 After cancellations and 
                                                                                                                                            
Environment and Public Works, HRG-1985-PWO-0022, S. Hrg. 99-239,  
Y4.P96/10:S.hrg.99-239. 
121  David Comey, “16 Hours of Nuclear Mayhem: How We Almost Lost Alabama,” 
Chicago Tribune, August 31, 1974, Folder: Licensing Two, Box 63: Office of 
Engineering Design and Construction, Chief Engineer’s Files / Office Of Manager’s 
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122 Hearing on Tennessee Valley Authority Oversight, July 30, 1985, Subcommittee on 
Regional and Community Development, Committee on Environment and Public Works. 
Senate; Committee on Environment and Public Works, HRG-1985-PWO-0022, S. Hrg. 
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123 “Reflection on TVA Nuclear Program, 1980-1984, Factors Contributing to Poor 
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increased scrutiny, TVA issued what appears to be an internal memo listing the factors 
“contributing to poor performance” in their nuclear program, among them: “high 
turnover,” “poor attitudes towards safety/quality,” “poor definition of work 
requirements,” “management problems,” and “lack of recognition by management that 
performance was inadequate.”124  
 In 1985, TVA shut down its entire nuclear operation for several years, leaving the 
only operating plants, Brown’s Ferry and Sequoyah, in a temporary holding pattern while 
the agency addressed a litany of problems. With this, TVA reached a bitter interregnum, 
one that left its once ambitious nuclear program damaged and endangered the agency’s 
future. The nuclear program restarted in 1988, and finally, in 1996, the long-delayed 
Watts Bar Unit 1 went online—twenty-three years after receiving a construction permit. 
More recently, TVA has led the way in the recent nuclear revival, invigorated by 
increasing concerns about climate change, and Watts Bar Unit 2 should go online in 
2016.  
 Today, remnants of what TVA once heralded as the “world’s largest nuclear 
plant” slowly decay in rural middle Tennessee. 125 The site’s scattered warehouses 
function as TVA’s storage unit, a glorified closet for miscellaneous parts the agency 
periodically auctions, and the agency categorizes the land as “inventory.” While the 
majority of the site remains in TVA’s possession, in 2002, the agency sold 554 acres to 
                                                                                                                                            
General Manager’s files, Director Richard M. Freeman’s Correspondence Files, 1977-
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Records Administration—Atlanta.   
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125 TVA denied my request to visit the site, citing “active maintenance.”  
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the Four Lake Regional Industrial Development Authority, now known as Tennessee 
Central Economic Alliance.126 The organization, TCAE, orchestrated the development of 
the land into an industrial center, and soon thereafter, a new conflict emerged when 
Louisiana Energy Services (LES) sought to build a uranium enrichment facility on the 
recently purchased land. The local community reacted swiftly, pointing out the absurdity 
of placing the facility on the banks of the Cumberland River. Echoing criticisms from an 
earlier era, one resident lamented the inequity:  
 I know in today’s climate that any job is a good job, but can’t the Tennessee 
 Economic and Community Development office find jobs for Trousdale county 
 residents that don’t involve mopping floors or cleaning toilets? This would 
 be a much safer choice than a uranium enrichment plant.127 
 
While LES’s plans for the enrichment facility failed, more recently TCAE attracted 
Correctional Corporations of America (CCA) to build a prison on the site.128  Over forty 
years later, rural communities like Hartsville continue to search for means of survival, 
even if that entails choosing mass incarceration over uranium enrichment.   
 For those born in the region after World War II, accustomed to the region’s 
sprawling metropolitan areas, the presence of a cooling tower in an otherwise rural, 
bucolic setting thwarts expectations. Its presence feels wrong, taking with it a certifiable 
and authentic southern landscape not yet occupied by the hallmarks of modernity. As a 
sense of place grounded in the environment disappears, perhaps the desire for locating a 
more authentic South, amplifies the disorientation produced by Hartsville’s nuclear ruins. 
The lone cooling tower begs for the folly parable, where man toils relentlessly for an 
                                                
126 For more on TCEA, see <http://tennesseecentral.org/about_us/history.>  
 
127 Kimberly Potts, letter to editor, The Tennessean, September 20, 2002, 18A.  
128 CCA was founded in Nashville, TN in 1983.  
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unrealized goal that brings unforeseen costs. The tower’s presence evokes the uneven 
process of “modernizing” the Tennessee Valley, and by extension, the American South.  
 While not yet canonized in southern history,  the cooling tower memorializes 
TVA’s sprawling restructuring of the landscape and a period in which an overriding faith 
in the relationship between cheap electricity and economic growth energized the nuclear 
boom. By bulldozing local history and replacing it with an idle cooling tower, TVA left 
Hartsville with nuclear ruins and nuclear ghosts. Over the course of its existence, TVA’s 
reordering of the Valley has required tabulating over thirty-thousand human graves, some 
moved and others merely recorded—never mind the waterways, the vegetation, 
environments destroyed or permanently altered, the wildlife forced into new habitats, and 
communities submerged underwater.  
 The locals, decades later, still feel betrayed, and some are suspicious of TVA’s 
project. From a pragmatic perspective, TVA’s continued ownership of the land and the 
scattered warehouses are merely a product of bureaucracy and business. TVA maintains 
the land as an asset, thereby boosting its financial picture, while justifying its continued 
existence in Hartsville by storing inventory in the site’s warehouses. But at least one 
local, suspects otherwise, and believes the Hartsville site is part of a larger government 
conspiracy, where helicopters cloaked in darkness move covertly around the site, strange 
humming noises infiltrate local airwaves, and electrical problems suggest a secret 
agenda—all occurring behind the site’s gates.129  If most locals dismiss the cooling tower 
as a “used beer can,” and more likely, dismiss TVA, others spin yarn, desperately 
searching for other explanations. The history of nuclear power, and the complicated 
                                                
129 Ted Randall, “Hartsville Nuclear Plant Incident,   
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relationship people had with it during this period, is characterized by more than fears of 
radiation or rising utility bills. Hartsville’s history suggests that debates about nuclear 
power also exposed a rural and urban divide, and a complicated matrix of bureaucratic, 
legal, and political forces that subordinated local autonomy, knowledge, and history for 
another New South scheme. 
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CONCLUSION  
Still, comrade, the running of beasts and the ruining heaven 
Still captive the old wild king.  
---James Agee, Let Us Now Praise Famous Men 
 
 I’ve lived in at least two Souths. One is an affluent South, with slick shopping 
centers, gated communities, and feel-good religion. The other is a dirt-poor South in 
eastern Tennessee. In that South, I spent time in manufactured homes, found nothing 
unusual about defunct cars in front-yards, and swam in abandoned quarries filled with 
unnatural, milky blue-green water. I became well-acquainted with poor, white people 
who lived hard and died sooner than the rest of us. While I had the benefit of privilege, 
the strange geography of south Knoxville, Tennessee meant neat, middle-class homes 
mixed with trailer parks and Superfund sites. Less than a mile away from my childhood 
home were two sites of staggering industrial contamination.1  
 One, the David Witherspoon, Inc. site, located in a dilapidated section of south 
Knoxville known as Vestal, operated as an “industrial landfill.”2 From the 1950s to 1974, 
the landfill legally operated, but evidence suggests illegal dumping activities continued 
until 1983. From 1966 to 1969, the Atomic Energy Commission licensed the David 
Witherspoon company to receive radioactive metal from the weapons installation 
                                                
1 The site not discussed here is the Smokey [sic] Mountain Smelter. 
https://cumulis.epa.gov/supercpad/cursites/csitinfo.cfm?id=0406753 
 
2 The Witherspoon site is comprised of three “individual” sites adjacent or close to one 
another.  
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complex in nearby Oak Ridge, Tennessee.1 Over two decades, a slow, incremental 
process of environmental contamination occurred, or rather, what scholar Rob Nixon has 
called “slow violence.”2 An assortment of toxic contaminants, like PCB, lead, and 
mercury consorted with the radioactive isotopes of enriched uranium and thorium. What 
the people living around the landfill had suspected for years became publicized after a 
former Witherspoon employee, Dorothy Hunley, died from a rare type of bone cancer.3 
Sparked by Hunley’s death, some members of the community formed “Project 
Witherspoon,” and in 1990, the group and approximately one hundred people, held a 
“March Against Toxic Waste” in Vestal. Future Vice President and Tennessee Senator Al 
Gore Jr. (D-TN) attended the event and echoed the calls for action.4    
 Because the Witherspoon site did not fulfill the EPA’s requirements for a 
Superfund site, the responsibility for remediating the area fell to the state of Tennessee.  
Like many other cases of hazardous industry run amuck, the entities so willing to ship 
their waste to sites, were rarely willing to take responsibility for the cleanup unless 
legally compelled to do so. In 1992, David Witherspoon claimed his company could not 
pay for the site remediation, and the Department of Energy begrudgingly removed 232 
                                                
1 Department of Energy, “Work Plan for the Radiological Survey for the David 
Witherspoon, Inc. Landfill, 1630 Site, Knoxville, Tennessee (DOE, July 1996); John 
Nolt, “Injustice in the Handling of Nuclear Weapons Waste: The Case of David 
Witherspoon, Inc.,” in Michele Morrone and Geoffrey L. Buckley, eds. Mountains of 
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Press, 2011).  
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Harvard University Press, 2011).  
3 John Holt, “Injustice in Handling Nuclear Weapons,” 126.  
 
4 Ibid., 132.  
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drums of waste from the site.5 After years of sporadic action and nearly thirty-two million 
dollars spent, officials declared the Witherspoon site cleanup complete in 2009. The DOE 
shipped 15,647 truckloads of materials from Witherspoon back to Oak Ridge for 
disposal.6  
 The history of Vestal’s atomic landfill resembles others in the environmental 
justice oeuvre, but in this case, I lived near it. As a child, I had a vague notion it was 
polluted, but it seemed unremarkable—simply another junkyard in a place full of trash, 
biker bars, and run-down buildings. Like the “strange juxtaposition” of Louisiana’s 
chemical corridor and former sugar cane plantations, I knew a dirt-poor South, where 
objects of supreme ugliness nested in the foothills of the Appalachian mountains and 
along the banks of the Tennessee River.7   
 The recent trend in southern history post-World War II, with some exceptions, has 
emphasized another South: affluent or middle-class, Republican, suburban, metropolitan, 
and evangelical.8 These studies are important, but they only tell part of the story. The 
transformation of the modern South only reached so far. Look twenty or thirty miles 
beyond the edges of Atlanta or Charlotte, or travel to the decrepit corners of post-
                                                
5 Holt, 135. 
 
6 “David Witherspoon Cleanup Completed,” 
http://www.oakridge.doe.gov/em/ssab/Publications/Advocates/10-09.pdf 
 
7 Barbara L. Allen, Uneasy Alchemy: Citizens and Experts in Louisiana’s Chemical 
Corridor Disputes (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 2003).  
8 For review essay on topic, see Matthew D. Lassiter and Kevin M. Kruse, “The 
Bulldozer: Suburbs and Southern History Since World War II,” Journal of Southern 
History 75, No. 3 (August 2009): 691-706. Paradoxically, the authors call for more 
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industrial Appalachian cities, and the absurdity of the modern South appears fully on 
display.  
 In that vein, the impetus for “Radioactive Dixie” came after reading about 
Barnwell’s nuclear waste site. Barnwell piqued my interest because it defied 
expectations; a community not only wanted a radioactive waste dump, they expressed 
pride in their twenty-seven million cubic feet of atomic garbage. The reasons for their 
stance appeared more complicated than the accusations of ignorance levied at them. 
Barnwell’s history suggested that the rural South still existed and still mattered after 
1945. Those histories, however, have largely fallen out of favor as the “Dixie Rising” 
narrative has come to dominate.9   
 Grand Gulf and Port Gibson, St. Charles Parish, Hartsville, and Barnwell 
comprise, if not a counter-narrative, an important addition to modern southern history. 
They are the kinds of places where cooling towers are built and discarded with little care, 
and more importantly, where the rural, sparsely populated areas located near nuclear 
plants and radioactive waste disposal sites are mostly ignored. Studying the region’s 
nuclear sites further illustrates how technological and environmental risks reflect an 
ordering of sorts, and how the systems devised to manage, to tax, and to regulate these 
large-scale, high-risk technologies bear the “imprint” of society, culture, and politics.10  
The power plants and the communities studied here tell us about these arrangements of 
power, one that many groups sought to reorder to their benefit.  
                                                
9 Peter Applebome, Dixie Rising: How the South Is Shaping American Values, Politics, 
and Culture (Crown/Archetype, 2012).  
10 Langdon Winner, “Do Artifacts Have Politics?” Daedalus 109, No. 1 (Winter, 1980): 
126-127. 
  330 
 Beginning in the 1950s, southern politicians, industry figures, federal officials, 
and the region’s universities sought power through atomic energy. They sought to wrest 
power from the federal government in nuclear regulation, pursued subsidies from the 
Atomic Energy Commission to better compete with other regions, and wanted to wave 
the “atomic talisman” to ward off perceptions of a backwards, anti-modern South. During 
the 1970s and 1980s, a new class of moderate, southern governors, led by Jimmy Carter 
and Bill Clinton, challenged the region’s nuclear enthusiasm. Those battles sometimes 
proved politically expedient and paved the way for future political success, while others 
backfired, as Carter’s fight over the Clinch River Breeder Reactor and the Barnwell 
Nuclear Fuel Plant shows. Buoying these efforts, the South’s anti-nuclear rebels never 
shared the numbers of anti-nuclear groups in California or Germany, but they offered an 
important critique of unmitigated development and unchecked technology. Their efforts, 
along with the journalists who relentlessly covered the period’s utility scandals, helped 
expose shoddy construction, substandard safety assurance measures, and encouraged 
greater accountability from energy conglomerates.   
 Nuclear power survived two decades of controversy, albeit not unscathed, but 
continues to send power to the grid today. In South Carolina, nuclear power supplies 
approximately fifty percent of the state’s electricity. Growing concerns about climate 
change and federal subsidy programs supported by the administrations of George W. 
Bush and President Barack Obama encouraged a small nuclear power revival in the past 
decade. While a number of utilities sought new reactor licenses, the resurgence has been 
tempered by construction costs.11 Despite those obstacles, the South’s nuclear reputation 
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holds true; the only new reactors currently under construction or nearing commercial 
operation are located in Tennessee, South Carolina, and Georgia.  
 When nuclear revival began in 2003, Entergy reconsidered finishing Grand Gulf 
Unit 2 in Claiborne County, Mississippi, and the community largely supported the 
announcement. Mayor Imelda Arnold told reporters that Grand Gulf’s presence offered 
Claiborne County “tremendous help,” and concluded “it would be very hard to live here 
without the tax money.”12 However, in 2009, Entergy suspended its plans, and so today, 
Grand Gulf Unit 1 quietly operates alone, powering Jackson, Vicksburg, and the other 
forty plus service counties.  
 Even as the plant quietly operates, the road to Grand Gulf is dotted with 
evacuation signs, reminding visitors and residents alike that danger lurks. At a split in the 
road, one sign points drivers to Grand Gulf Unit 1, while another sign directs drivers to 
the Grand Gulf Military Park. When the sun goes down in Grand Gulf, amidst the nuclear 
plant’s blinking lights and the crumbling remains of an older, tragic place, no doubt it 
appears “progress-haunted.”13 In The Mind of the South, W.J. Cash juxtaposed the New 
South’s skyscrapers with the image of Confederate ghosts, in the oft-cited line: “Softly; 
do you not hear behind that the gallop of Jeb Stuart’s cavalrymen?”14 When C. Vann 
Woodward reviewed the book in 1941, he found W.J. Cash’s claims about a progress-
haunted South overwrought, and slyly responded that no skyscraper had “called up any 
                                                
12 Ivan Dylko and Jamesetta Walker, “Few Oppose Reactor Expansion,” Clarion Ledger, 
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14 Cash, 219.  
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such ghostly echoes.”15 If only Woodward had stood before Grand Gulf Unit 1, 
surrounded by the “most broken country” General Ulysses Grant ever saw, he too might 
have heard the gallop, softly behind, the whirring of machines.16 
                                                
15 C. Vann Woodward, review of The Mind of the South, by W.J. Cash, Journal of 
Southern History 7, No. 3 (August, 1941): 400-401.  
  
16 Cash, 219.  
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